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SUMMARY 
The role and influence of the secretary of the governing body have been overlooked in 
contemporary research on UK higher education governance. Despite occasional 
investigations of the contribution of the secretary to governance structures, little is 
known about the working relationships of the secretary with other key players in higher 
education governance and the way in which they impact upon the effectiveness of the 
governing body. 
This study considered, through the lens of the secretary, but with contributions from 
chairs and heads of institutions, whether the part played by the governing body 
secretary in the ‘doing’ of governing had been underestimated, and how this role was 
undertaken. A multi-method research strategy was adopted, in which a conceptual 
understanding of the place of the secretary within the governance system and a micro-
process analysis of the secretary’s role were developed, to inform the way in which 
quantitative (survey) and qualitative (interview) data could be gathered from across the 
UK higher education sector. 
The research identified evidence of a triadic network (Simmel, 1950; Krackhardt, 1999) 
in which distinctive areas of influence had been adopted by the three key players in the 
governance system. There were, however, differences in the perceptions of influence 
between the secretary and the head of institution in some areas of governance 
practice, highlighting tensions that could ultimately affect governance performance. 
The research also identified an apparent cluster grouping of the survey population that 
suggested that the use of conventional typologies (eg pre- or post-’92 universities) to 
describe an institution’s approach to governance needs to be reconsidered. Finally, a 
number of recommendations for governance practice, and areas for further research, 
emerged from the study, in support of the conclusion that there should be a greater 
recognition of this critical role in the effective governance of the UK higher education 
sector. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND AIMS OF THE STUDY 
1.1 Looking at higher education governance through the lens of the secretary 
Since the emergence of modern approaches to corporate governance1 in the early 
1990s, considerable attention has been placed on the accountability and effectiveness 
of higher education governance systems. The ‘ripple effect’ of large scale governance 
scandals such as those seen at Barings Bank, Enron and the retail group, Royal Ahold 
(for a review of which, see Mallin, 2004) and similar problems in the further and higher 
education sector (described in Shattock, 2006) have led to a wealth of guidance and, 
more recently, a code of governance practice (CUC, 1995; 1998; 2001; and 2004). 
The duties and responsibilities of the secretary of the governing body2 feature in the 
CUC guidance, and in related work by the Higher Education Funding Council for 
Wales (HEFCW, 1997). In both, the secretary is regarded as having a key position in 
the operation and conduct of the governing body. 
The secretary coordinates the activities of the governing body and operates the 
various processes and procedures that lead to the effective management of governing 
body business. These involve, inter alia, the selection of new governors, their 
induction, the organisation of governing body and related committee meetings, the 
production of minutes and arrangements for follow-up action and communication and 
liaison between the governing body and the rest of the institution. But the role has 
many other facets. The secretary may be responsible for the provision of legal and 
procedural advice, a contributor of information required by the governing body, a 
counsel to the head of institution3, chair, and others on the issues being addressed by 
1 Corporate governance is a term applied to governance systems across the private and public sectors. 
For clarity, elsewhere is this study, a distinction is made between company, non-profit and higher 
education governance systems. ‘Modern approaches’ refers to developments in corporate and other 
governance arrangements since the Cadbury Report (1992). 
2 An early problem in any work on higher education governance is to consider precisely what is meant by 
commonly used terms and classifications in the literature. There are a number of instances of local 
terminology from which different audiences, even within the UK, may take different meanings. The CUC 
has adopted the phrase ‘governing body’ to describe the supreme decision-making body within the 
higher education institution that is variously known as the Council, Board or Court of Governors in 
different parts of the sector. 
3 The term ‘head of institution’ is used in place of the wide variety of titles, for example, Vice-Chancellor, 
Principal or Rector, for the chief executive/chief academic officer role, and ‘chair’ is used to describe the 
Chairman/Chairwoman of the Governing Body. These terms have been used for consistency with those 
adopted by the CUC and other recent studies. 
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the institution and the governing body and, on occasion, an independent voice that can 
keep the governing body from going astray. The role must often balance the 
managerial imperative with the transparency and accountability required of institutions 
in the higher education sector (see, for example, HEFCE, 2006; SFC, 2007; Wotjas, 
2007). Shattock (op cit, p.25) concluded that the secretary was now, ‘At the heart of 
the governance process in a way that would not have been conceivable prior to the 
events in the mid 1990s’ . 
At a recent OECD conference van der Wende (2006) considered the way in which 
higher education institutions were being required to address new measures of 
accountability in exchange for public resources; maintain high standards of 
governance to safeguard the values and integrity of universities in the light of 
increased political intervention; and address the driving force of corporate and related 
public sector governance developments. It was clear from these proceedings that 
governance is a ‘live’ issue, in the UK and other higher education systems. It was 
suggested by van der Wende, however, that improving the effectiveness of higher 
education governance would require a greater understanding of the behaviour of 
governing bodies, the power balance between governors and management and issues 
of trust in the management of governance4 relationships. But whilst the last major 
update of the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (Higgs, 2003) at least 
prompted a debate on working relationships within and around company boards (see, 
for example, McNulty, Roberts and Stiles, 2003), this topic has not been investigated 
to any great degree in the UK higher education sector. In particular, the role and 
influence of the secretary has been largely overlooked. In the last major empirical 
review of UK higher education governance to consider the way in which governing 
bodies operate, conducted over a decade ago (Bargh, Scott and Smith, 1996), the 
contribution of the secretary to the work of the governing body, the potential for the 
secretary to have to address conflicts of interest in undertaking the role and their 
influence in managing the relationship between the board and the executive were all 
noted, but not taken any further. 
As a chartered secretary working in the field of higher education governance since the 
mid-1980s, it was apparent that the changes in the sector’s approach to governance, 
noted by van der Wende, had been profound. More recently, the case has been made 
that the secretary’s role had moved from a passive stewardship model of a behind-the-
scenes co-ordinator of governance activities, to the more proactive stance of a 
In this case, ‘management’ is taken to mean the operation of the institution and ‘governance’ the 
strategic oversight of the institution and the application of its resources. 
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manager of what Shattock (2006) called the ‘governance business’ of the higher 
education institution. As evidence of this shift, Shattock noted (ibid, p.23) that the CUC 
Guide now devoted, ‘more space to describing the role of the secretary….than to that 
of the….head of institution’ and placed the secretary as, ‘the second key figure in 
governance arrangements’ (ibid, p.21), behind the head of institution and somewhat 
ahead of the chair. 
The increased awareness of the role seemed to be a reflection of the codification of the 
secretary’s responsibilities, and, in turn, the growth of those responsibilities because of 
the greater codification of other aspects of governance, such as the increased 
emphasis placed on monitoring governing body effectiveness (CUC, 2000; see also, 
Baird, 2007) or the evaluation and monitoring of institutional performance (CUC, 2006). 
But role awareness, whilst important, needed to be seen in tandem with the influence 
displayed by the secretary in the conduct of governance business, to obtain a rounded 
picture of the contribution made by the secretary to institutional governance. 
Furthermore, it seemed clear that influential secretaries had been in place long before 
the advent of modern governance arrangements. This was not a new phenomenon, 
but had simply not been picked up because of the focus placed on the chair and head 
of institution in research on higher education governance. In my experience the 
secretary had been, for the most part, a ‘backstage’ (Mangham and Overington, 1987; 
Pye, 2002), but active participant in higher education governance, able to contribute 
from behind the scenes, and sometimes in governing body meetings, without formally 
being a member of the governing body, and use formal and informal mechanisms to 
exert influence in close working relationships with the head of institution and the chair. 
The work by Bargh et al. (1996) had previously identified some of the contributions 
made by key individuals, and the governing body itself, in decision-making and the 
setting of institutional strategy. Their study revealed, however, the difficulties 
experienced by university staff in understanding the role of senior managers in 
decision-making processes (p.118) and the problems some governors had in being 
able to determine how far they were being led by the executive (p.127). In one 
instance, it was noted that, ‘directorate reports to governors were structured with firm 
recommendations, as opposed to the presentation of a choice between several options 
and their subsequent implications’ (p.128). Bargh et al. concluded that in the 
institutions they had studied, the control held by the executive over agendas and 
strategy initiation remained ‘substantially intact’ (p.135) and the impact of governors on 
decision-making could be limited, unless enacted by way of developing close 
interpersonal relationships with the executive and helping influence their policy 
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proposals. Given the central position of the secretary in agenda setting, in the 
management of the work of the governing body, and, often, as a member of the 
institution’s executive, it seemed important to try to shed light on this role to see 
whether emerging claims about its importance could, or could not, be substantiated. 
But a cautionary note emerged during the research. In a post-interview discussion 
with a governing body secretary it was suggested that I should not make too much of 
the influence of the secretary because of the negative way in which a more ‘managed’ 
and ‘corporate’ approach to modern university governance might be viewed by the 
wider HE community. 
Shattock (2006) has recently considered the development and management of UK 
higher education governance, together with major aspects of governance practice. His 
study covered the relationship between higher education governance and the reform of 
corporate governance since the early 1990s, concluding that there had been a trend to 
push higher education towards a company model but that this had failed to recognise 
the unique structure, operating environment and widespread involvement of the 
academic community in governance and decision-making systems in many higher 
education institutions. Although guidance on the role of the secretary was provided 
(ibid, pp.21-25), his review of the way in which the secretary undertook their role and 
managed their relationship with other key people in the governance system was not 
supported with empirical data. 
Many other studies of UK higher education governance have taken a ‘structural’ 
approach, usefully describing the systems of governance in higher education 
institutions, and putting them in an historical or political context, but not addressing the 
way in which governance roles are carried out. Relatively few have taken the latter 
route, a point noted by Shattock (ibid, p.49) when referring to Bennett’s (2002) study of 
higher education governance as, ‘The only detailed piece of published research on 
how governing bodies actually function in handling operational questions’. 
The shortage of research on the way in which higher education governing bodies work, 
led me to question how this might be addressed in an approach that was meaningful, 
in an academic sense, and enlightening for governance practitioners. The conclusion 
was that this study should investigate, through the lens of the governing body 
secretary, what key members of governing bodies actually do, and how they do it. In 
conducting the research, it was hoped to contribute to the strengthening of the model 
of higher education governance described by Hall and Hyams (1998, p.33) who 
suggested that further attention was needed on, ‘Developing the role of the secretary 
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and clerk to the governing body to ensure that procedures are followed and that 
independent and authoritative constitutional advice is offered to the board – particularly 
to the chairman and vice chancellor – so that the interface between governors and 
management is harmonious and effective.’ 
The study had three principal aims: 
a) To test the hypothesis that research on higher education governance has, to 
date, underestimated the importance of the part played by the governing body 
secretary in the ‘doing’ of governing; 
b) To identify the nature of the current role of the governing body secretary in the 
practice of UK higher education governance, and to describe, in particular, the 
influences that may be exerted by the secretary on the work of the governing 
body; 
c) To develop a conceptual model and conduct empirical research to address the 
aims summarised above. 
It was intended that a comprehensive empirical review of one aspect of governance 
across a range of institutions would allow conclusions to be drawn about the 
contribution of the secretary to governance, and the secretary’s influence on governing 
within the higher education sector. The approach was informed by the conclusions of 
Pye and Pettigrew (2005, p.S28) in their contribution to the debate on research into 
boards and their effectiveness. They suggested a focus on, ‘the dynamic complement 
of relationships between individuals and group/organisation/societal levels’ as a 
method to, ‘rest attention on meaning in relationships, shifting with time and context’, 
by way of micro-process studies of board trusting, influencing and problem solving. In 
this case, the micro-process study concerned the governing body secretary. 
By adopting this approach it was intended that the complexities seen in governance 
structures, whilst not being ignored, would take second place to the practice of 
governing as seen in the management of relationships and organisational culture. 
These can impact upon the effectiveness of governance systems just as much as 
structural issues such as the composition of the governing body or the code of practice 
under which it operates. Leslie (2003), for example, noted the inherent difference 
between ‘governance’ and ‘governing’ in the higher education context. In drawing this 
distinction he likened the debate to that between evolution and ‘intelligent design’, 
concluding that governance and intelligent design suggested a: 
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‘Supreme explanatory rationale for how things ought to be, while governing and 
evolution implied that finding out how things work might (via inference) yield up 
explanations for why things work the way they do’ (p.4). 
It is recognised that studies of the ‘doing’ of governing (Pye, 2002) are not without their 
difficulties. Dahl (1961) concluded that the active involvement, and the behaviour, of 
individuals and groups varied depending on the issue, as well as over time, making 
power and influence a fluid concept that might differ from situation to situation. Pye 
and Pettigrew (op cit) picked up this theme and warned of the dangers of process 
research that can confuse issues of cause and effect and input and output across 
multiple levels of analysis such as individual and collective behaviours in the board 
setting. Human interactions therefore pose alternative problems to structural issues 
in terms of developing general theories or models, but the micro-process approach 
was expected, at least, to allow some of these issues to be addressed by 
concentrating on a limited set of functions and relationships as the base from which to 
build further research on higher education governance. 
1.2 Exploring the place of the secretary in higher education governance 
The traditional view of the secretary has been that of the institution’s most senior 
administrator, usually holding the post of Registrar, University Secretary or Clerk to the 
Governors in a unitary administration. The study by Bargh et al. (1996) used a number 
of observations from the ‘Registrar’ and ‘Clerk’ and, in so doing, distinguished 
between the model typically seen at that time in pre-92 and post-925 governance 
systems. In most institutions the governing body secretary continues to be a senior 
administrator. Since the mid-1990s, however, considerable differences have emerged 
in the operating titles and other duties associated with the position, an issue noted by 
Whitchurch (2006) in her work on the terminology associated with higher education 
management and administration. The Registrar, Secretary, University Secretary or 
Chief Operating Officer, with other variations across the sector, can be the head of a 
unitary administration or manage a specific set of functions within a flatter 
administrative structure. In post-92 institutions the secretary’s role is often designated 
by the additional title of Clerk to the Governors or Council. The type of structure, and 
background of the institution, can also lead to a more directorate-based nomenclature, 
When describing types of institutions in the sector, the terms ‘pre-92’ and ‘post-92’ are used, 
respectively, to describe the chartered universities (be they ancient, Scottish or civic) and higher 
education corporation-based universities. Unlike many other studies of UK sector governance, higher 
education colleges have also been included. They have been classified, in descriptive terms, as post-92 
institutions but are analysed as a separate group later in the study. 
16 
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where the duties of the secretary can be held by a Director of Administration, or 
Director of Corporate Affairs, each of whom may (or may not) also be the senior-most 
administrator. In other cases, the role is associated with a functional Director other 
than the head of administration, such as a Director of Finance, or by a head of 
administration holding a ‘Vice’ or ‘Pro’ position to the head of institution. In yet others, 
the person undertaking governance work may not be the head of administration, but 
could still be a University Secretary (typically where a Registrar is the head of 
administration), Clerk to the Governors or hold an assistant-level position within the 
institution. 
Shattock (2006, p.22) maintained that a distinction in the role could be drawn from the 
constitutional structure of the institution. He suggested that pre-92 university 
secretaries were, in the main, responsible for the whole governance structure, 
including the academic senate, or its equivalent. In the case of post-92 institutions he 
concluded that a company secretary approach had been followed, because of the 
more dominant nature of the governing body in this part of the sector, and that this had 
led to the secretary not being responsible for academic governance and a separation 
of the governing body’s procedures from academic decision-making. Furthermore, 
Shattock noted that the managerial responsibilities of secretaries in each type of 
structure differed, with a greater range in pre-92 institutions and a more restricted role, 
sometimes involving only governance and legal duties, in post-92 institutions. But a 
more complex pattern can be seen in both the pre- and post-92 parts of the sector, 
with a trend towards establishing new positions, or at least redefining existing posts, to 
include a greater emphasis on governance. In some institutions this has led to the 
creation of an office or unit to handle governance and related legal or compliance-
based work. 
A review of job advertisements in the period May 2005 to April 20076, identified a 
series of posts that included the role of secretary to the governing body (Table 1). 
There was no standard model of appointment, but the rise of governance as a 
functional area was reflected in new posts and new structural arrangements for the 
management of governance work. These are recent developments and it is not yet 
clear whether the allocation of additional resources to the handling of governance is 
being driven by a greater focus on institutional accountability, external regulation, a 
need to unburden some senior administrative staff from more routine compliance-
based duties or a combination of these factors. 
Job advertisements were identified from ‘The Guardian’, ‘The Times Higher Education Supplement’ and 
the website at www.jobs.ac.uk, and further particulars were obtained from the relevant institutions. 
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Nevertheless, the more complex, and evolving, nature of this position than had been 
recognised in earlier studies implied that the way in which it was carried out could 
differ widely, even within institutions of a particular legal constitution. 
Table 1: A selection of job advertisements for the role of secretary of the governing 
body: May 2005 to May 2007 
No Role Title Pre­92 Post­92 HE 
College 
Reports to Direct 
access to 
Chair? 
Governance 
Unit? 
New 
Post? 
1 University Secretary * Registrar * * 
2 
Secretary to Council & Academic 
Secretary * 
Principal 
* * 
3 
Deputy University Secretary 
* 
Secretary/ 
Registrar * 
4 
Registrar and Secretary 
* 
Vice 
Chancellor 
5 
University Secretary 
* 
Vice 
Chancellor * * * 
6 
Vice Principal (Corporate 
Services) * 
Principal 
* 
7 
University Secretary & Legal 
Adviser * 
Vice 
Chancellor * 
8 
Deputy Clerk to the Governors 
* 
Secretary 
9 
University Secretary 
* 
Vice 
Chancellor 
10 
Director of the Secretariat 
* 
University 
Secretary 
11 
University Secretary 
* 
Vice 
Chancellor * 
12 
Registrar 
* 
Vice 
Chancellor 
13 
Registrar & Chief Operating 
Officer * 
Vice 
Chancellor * 
14 
Director of Governance & Planning 
* 
University 
Secretary * * 
15 
Chief Operating Officer * Vice 
Chancellor 
* 
16 
Director of Resources * Director 
In the fieldwork for this study it was important to reach the person who was managing 
institutional governance, but not to miss the opportunity to obtain information from 
nominal role holders who could have considerable influence with the governing body 
because they hold the most senior administrative position or the secretary’s post 
identified in the institution’s constitution. Reaching the right people was likely to be 
problematic because of the lack of a single representative sector network for those 
engaged in the ‘doing’ of governing. It was therefore necessary to determine the exact 
composition of the research population by a variety of methods described in Chapter 3. 
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1.3 Why study the role and influence of the secretary? 
That the role and influence of the governing body secretary have been little researched 
is, perhaps, understandable. The duties of secretary may have been seen as only part 
of the function of a senior administrator/manager, or a lower grade role without 
considerable influence on the people who make up the governing body. But, when 
carefully combined with other management responsibilities, and exercised with 
diplomatic skill, the secretary can make a major contribution to the leadership of the 
institution. Gittleman (2004, pp.187-188) provided an example from a university in 
New England noting that the senior administrator, ‘knew that if he were perceived as 
too powerful, a raging faculty could bring down the entire structure…….He remained a 
force with the trustees…..but kept a low profile among students and faculty. People 
rarely got his title right; and they never understood the authority he had in his hands’. 
While the focus of the research by Bargh et al. (op cit) rested on the way in which the 
head of institution and chair led the work of the governing body, in one case study it 
was noted that senior managers had gained prominence in governance matters and 
often took the lead in presenting proposals to the governing body. The head of 
institution’s role, in this instance, was to moderate proposals and alert senior 
colleagues to the issues that might be raised by governors. Where a secretary holds 
executive responsibilities, they may be also be engaged in these forms of relationship 
with the governing body, either by preparing and presenting proposals, helping the 
head of institution consider ways in which the governing body might react or even in 
brokering solutions to disagreements occurring in governing body meetings. 
The secretary’s role therefore presents a somewhat unique balancing act, in which 
there is a need to create a close working relationship with, and be accountable to, the 
head of institution, but also be responsible to the governing body for the conduct of the 
business of governance. The secretary must be able to act independently of other 
senior managers in relation to governing body duties, even if a member of the senior 
management team. The secretary may be involved in the selection of both the chair 
and the head of institution, bringing further issues of relative influence into play. On 
occasion, it may also be necessary for the secretary to ensure that the head of 
institution acts in accordance with the wishes of the governing body. In all of these 
instances the secretary must effectively manage conflicting loyalties and interests. 
Lockwood (1996) summarised this aspect of the role as providing, ‘a legal and ethical 
check upon the activities of the rest of the senior management of the institution’, whilst 
Kogan (1999) noted that: 
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‘Chief administrators may be protected in the statutes (in the UK) as the 
secretary of council and senate when they have a fiduciary role. For example, 
it would be their duty to warn a vice­chancellor if he or she were infringing 
regulations or council or senate policies. There have been cases when chief 
administrators have felt it necessary to act as ‘whistle blowers’ when their 
senior colleague acts outside powers.’ (p.275) 
With an ability to act independently and provide a check upon the activities of other 
major figures in the institution, it could be argued that the influence of the secretary is 
considerable, but that not all aspects of this influence might be immediately visible. At 
times, it could also be equivalent to that of other key players in the governance 
system. Bargh et al. (op cit, p.139) reported the comments of a staff governor who 
said of their institution that: 
‘I think council could or should have a very important role and clearly defined 
role different from senate and that the two need to talk…..It depends upon the 
key figures – the vice chancellor and secretary and registrar and chair of 
council – providing that they can interact.’ 
Just as there is a need for the secretary to successfully balance the needs of a range 
of institutional constituencies, it seems likely that commitment to the institution 
amongst external members of the governing body will be influenced, from the outset, 
by the secretary. For example, the way in which the processes of governor 
recruitment and induction are handled, often by the secretary, can set the tone for the 
way in which lay members view the institution for some time to come. Similarly, the 
interplay between members and the governing body’s key office holders, such as the 
secretary, can influence the motivation and role satisfaction of all concerned, whether 
this is in the formal setting of a governing body meeting or via other informal contacts 
outside the boardroom. 
Dearlove (1998a), noted how the Nolan Committee’s (1996) recommendations on 
university governance had taken a partial view of, ‘the messy reality of organising 
university work’, whilst, ‘ignoring the more informal and ‘efficient’ aspects of internal 
university organisation that actually do the business of facilitating teaching and 
research’ (p.63). There remains a concern that guidelines produced by governance 
reform could lead simply to compliance and that a more sophisticated way needs to be 
found to relate such guidance to governing body practice and to other areas of 
governing within the institution. This is a key task for the secretary, fulfilling a 
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leadership7 role in governance that, Dearlove (1998b) later suggested of institutional 
leaders, ‘has the confidence to work with academics in relations of mutual trust’ 
(p.119). This view was supported by Kennedy (2003, p.65), who noted that because 
governance processes can create conflict in any organisation, there is a need for 
relationship building between stakeholders to ensure that the outcomes of governance 
are in the interests of the institution and not just certain sectors within it. It was 
suggested that this could be facilitated by ‘deliberative partnerships’ between the 
‘academic heartland’, ‘new managers’ and governing bodies to consider long-term 
strategic issues in their institutions, because no one part of the organisation had a 
monopoly on how best to set, or achieve, institutional objectives. Clark (1995, p.11) 
called for a greater focus on the type of leadership that could successfully reconcile 
the opposing forces of institutional leaders keen to develop and ‘position’ the institution 
and those of the, ‘professional groups that staff the operational departments and 
reflect strong disciplinary imperatives’ (p.9). To these forces we might now add those 
of governing bodies who, charged with more open monitoring of the performance of 
their institutions, also need to find a way to articulate their requirements and ensure 
that change takes place, whilst understanding the needs of the various constituencies 
within their institution. In this developing three-way engagement, the secretary could 
be a key link in forging and maintaining constructive relationships. 
It is also necessary to consider the position of the secretary when governing bodies 
get it wrong, an issue covered in some detail, in the UK context, by Shattock’s (2006) 
latest research. But these problems are not ours alone, and lessons may be learned 
from other systems where the problems have their roots in institutional politics and 
personalities. In the US, for example, high-profile cases involving the appointment or 
removal of university presidents, intervention in the curriculum and financial 
misconduct have hit the headlines. Legon (2006), reporting on crises in institutional 
governance in US universities, noted the reforms undertaken by the governing body of 
American University, in the face of proposed federal intervention, to address concerns 
arising from the activities of its former president. In one of these reforms the governing 
body had taken the controversial, and rare, step of deciding to hire a secretary who 
would report directly to the board. Legon concluded that this approach was unlikely to 
be without its problems in terms of co-ordinating the governing body’s work, but that it 
sent, ‘A clear and positive signal that it wishes to conduct its affairs as independently 
as possible’ (p.1). 
Defined (House, Hanges, Javdian, Dorfman and Gupta, 2004, p.15) as, ‘the ability of an individual to 
influence, motivate, and enable others to contribute toward the effectiveness and success of the 
organizations of which they are members’. 
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Governance crises are one thing, but Chait (2006) suggested that there is a more 
pervasive problem of substandard governance at play that, in some way, needs to be 
addressed. As he put it: 
‘Most boards are orchestras of soloists. Each trustee is a prominent or self­
proclaimed talent (the latter tend to blow their own horns). Some enjoy duets 
and quartets, others will join an ensemble now and then, but most want to be 
more than mere members of a philharmonic. The majority want to be principal 
players, and some undoubtedly hanker to be the conductor. But most trustees 
are not symphonists – and, to compound the problem, few boards rehearse.’ 
(p.2) 
Whilst recognising that most boards are unlikely to step seriously outside operating 
norms, Chait contended that individuals need those norms to be explicitly stated, to 
allow governing body members to, ‘think independently, a hallmark of effective boards’ 
but not, ‘proceed independently, based on a self­declared role and a self­determined 
scope of authority’ (p.2). In this study it will be seen that whilst it may be primarily the 
responsibility of the chair to set the cultural tone of the governing body, it is certainly 
within the scope of the secretary, formally and informally, to shape how this is 
delivered, and exert influence on the style of governing displayed by the governing 
body. Perhaps more important, however, is the central role of the secretary in 
ensuring that boards have the opportunity to ‘rehearse’, by way of wider relationship 
building outside the boardroom, are provided with a well orchestrated score to guide 
their playing, get to see the theatre in which they are performing and, from time to 
time, reflect on how the audience is enjoying the show. In essence, the secretary may 
be the stage manager, composer and arranger, lighting controller and sound engineer. 
These roles are as vital to the performance as those of the individual instrumentalists, 
their ‘conductor’ or the ‘leader of the orchestra’, and require further research if their 
contribution to the effectiveness of governance is to be fully understood. 
1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter began by introducing the reasons for and aims of the study. The 
rationale behind investigating the practice, rather than simply the structure of 
governance was reviewed. Some of the complexities in defining the place of the 
secretary in different institutions were considered and an account was provided of the 
role of the secretary in a variety of practical concerns facing higher education 
governance. 
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It was noted that this study would take a different direction than most recent research 
on UK higher education governance. The current literature is largely devoted to 
analyses and commentary on sector policy developments and their impact on 
governance. Other investigations have simply attempted to describe the systems used 
by a governing body, such as governor induction or effectiveness reviews, without a 
wider consideration of the relationships that are critical to their successful operation. 
An empirical review of a specific role within the governing body was expected to 
provide greater insight into important aspects of these relationships. The active stance 
of this type of research, which describes how key members of a group, ‘…do or enact 
their role, rather than the more static checklist of things which they do’ (Pye and 
Pettigrew, 2005, p.S35) seemed to be key to a greater understanding of the way in 
which governing bodies work. 
Kezar and Eckel (2004) supported this approach in their US-focussed analysis of 
higher education governance literature. They noted that much attention had been paid 
to governance structures and that these tended to find that: 
‘People, interpersonal dynamics, and culture affect governance processes 
most, and can be related to efficiency, responsiveness and participation – the 
three very issues that many campuses currently struggle with’ (p.381). 
In their wide ranging review they suggested that the more human dimension found in 
social and cultural theorising, amongst other approaches, was required to understand 
the interplay of governance processes – with a focus on the act of governing rather 
than the structure of governance. In short, we need to know more about the ‘doing’ of 
governing at all levels, including the individuals engaged in governing. 
To begin this investigation, and to ensure that lessons could be drawn from the world 
outside higher education, the literature review for this study considered other sectors 
and explored governance and governing across international boundaries. The 
rationale for this approach is explained in more detail at the beginning of Chapter 2. 
Investigating a complex role undertaken by senior staff is not a straightforward task. A 
multi-method approach, involving a national survey of all publicly-funded higher 
education institutions in the UK, and follow-up semi-structured interviews with 
governing body secretaries, chairs and heads of institutions in nine institutions, formed 
the basis of the empirical work. The research approach is described in detail in 
Chapter 3, and the results of the empirical work are analysed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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Chapter 6 provides a discussion of the major findings of the study and the contribution 
it makes to the field of higher education governance research, together with the 
relevant areas of higher education governance practice that might be informed by the 
project. 
In turning the spotlight on the role and influence of the secretary, the aim was not to 
temporarily illuminate a dark corner of higher education governance. Rather, it was to 
contribute an insight into role context, relationships and influencing that make up three 
cross-cutting themes that underpin the world of governance practice, and, in particular, 
the formal and informal mechanisms at work between the secretary, chair and head of 
institution. Investigating governance from this stance, and using an empirical 
approach, were important elements in moving research in this field from process to 
people, from structure to social interaction and from institution to individual, to help us 
fully understand how higher education governance works, and what works for higher 
education governance. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE WIDER CONTEXT OF HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE AND 
GOVERNING: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction to the literature review 
This chapter begins by considering the role of the secretary in relation to recent 
developments in UK higher education governance, and particularly the guidance that 
provides a framework for the secretary’s work. It was argued in Chapter 1 that a focus 
on governance structures alone would not provide an adequate explanation of the 
context in which the work of the governing body secretary takes place, and so literature 
on governing practice has been reviewed to supplement that of governance systems. 
Section 1 continues by considering the theoretical framework for the study. The major 
positions, adopted largely in the company governance and non-profit organisation 
literature, are explored whilst relating them, where possible, to higher education 
examples. The aim of the section is to try to outline how theory may be related to 
practice and how an understanding of theory may help secretaries make sense of the 
governing dynamics they see in their institutions. 
The second section explores, with examples from a variety of organisational settings, 
the ways in which the relationship between the executive and non-executive members 
of the governing body can impact upon governing, including aspects of relationships, 
power and influence and decision-making. In section three, role and influence are 
combined to consider the position of the secretary within the governance system. 
Throughout the review, examples of research are mostly taken from the UK and US 
contexts, principally because these appear to be the most developed bodies of 
literature in the field. Other research can be found on different systems, most notably 
those of Australia, Canada and some European countries, and examples have been 
included where they are relevant to the study. It is recognised that national systems of 
governance and governing are influenced by their setting, organisational and national 
cultures, standards and behavioural norms. What may be acceptable practice, or a 
well understood system or governing relationship in one location may not readily 
translate to another, even if cross-border statements of good practice in higher 
education governance, such as that recently proposed by the OECD, begin to emerge 
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(Ásgeirsdóttir, 2006). Nevertheless, the focus of the latter stages of the review on 
‘exchange relationships’ (Huisman, 2007, p12) rather than structure means that this 
issue is, in part, avoided. 
Similarly, the ‘borrowing’ of examples of the governance and governing debate from 
different organisational backgrounds may lead to a charge that the chosen settings 
may not be directly relevant to higher education. With the exception of the comparative 
review by Bargh et al. (1996, pp.152-168) and the more recent, but similarly limited, 
review by Shattock (2006, pp.40-57), research on UK higher education governance has 
not looked very far outside its own domain. This is likely to have limited the 
development of the field, particularly in theoretical and comparative terms. Insofar as it 
is argued, here and elsewhere, that there has been a corporate/academic convergence 
in higher education governance, the inclusion of company-based literature is hopefully 
self explanatory. It may have been possible to look at examples from specific public-
sector agencies such as the NHS (for a review of which, see Ashburner, 2005), but the 
particular complexity of NHS Trust-based governance, more direct government 
intervention (for example in target setting) and the wider stakeholder debate in that 
system appeared to outweigh the benefits of looking at this model. Although schools 
have similar issues of government influence and stakeholder interests, the common 
factor with the setting for this study is, at least, that of the provision of education, and 
so examples of research in this area have been considered. 
The final concern involves the variety of methodological issues that arise from 
reviewing the literature from a multi-disciplinary standpoint. The study of influence, 
decision-making, networking, and agenda-setting, each overlain with their own 
theoretical perspectives and discipline histories, is a complex mix to address within the 
scope and scale of this study. But, without some oversight of these disciplines, an 
analysis of the role and influence of the secretary would lack a rounded view into what 
might shape the behavioural, political, ethical and social responses to the relationships 
and processes encountered with their governing body. It has therefore been necessary 
to be selective, and to use research that appears to be translatable to this study, with 
the intention that this will open up to future investigators a wider range of literature than 
has previously been employed in research on UK higher education governance. 
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2.2 The role context of the secretary of the governing body 
2.2.1 The governance environment that the secretary must navigate 
The evolution of corporate governance in the UK and the creation of standards of 
conduct for those in public life (broadly defined as 'public governance' by the OECD) 
appear to have moved in parallel since the early 1990s. In higher education, these 
developments have occurred at a time when accountability for the public resources 
placed at the sector’s disposal has been a key political priority for the Government. 
Whilst attention has been focussed on governance, and in particular on compliance 
with associated guidance to improve accountability, it has not necessarily led to a 
better understanding of what makes a governing body operate effectively. As Tricker 
(2000) noted, on the question of whether there was a link between compliance with 
codes of practice and long-term corporate success, the: 
‘Empirical research to date is ambiguous. In fact most codes are based on the 
conventional wisdom in the boardroom of what constitutes good practice, not 
on empirically proven practices that are known to lead to effective performance 
and long­term corporate success.’ (pp.293-294) 
Nevertheless, since the early 1990s the drive to develop improved governance 
systems for higher education, has been accompanied by a wealth of guidance, from 
the early reports by the Committee on Standards in Public Life (Nolan, 1996; 1997) to 
the latest advice on monitoring institutional performance (CUC, 2006), all of which 
have had to be navigated by the governing body secretary (see Figure 1 which 
illustrates this point). CUC guidance (1995; 1998; 2001; 2004) has become the model 
upon which reviews of governance systems have been based, and in which the role 
and duties of those working in governance have been most comprehensively defined, 
though a more detailed description of the responsibilities for Clerks of Boards has been 
provided (HEFCW, 1997) and is currently being updated by Schofield et al. 
(forthcoming). 
The Dearing Report (1997) sought to progress the modernisation of university 
governance systems in pre-1992 universities by recommending that there should be 
greater clarity in the responsibilities held by the University Council, as opposed to those 
of the Senate or Court, as the governing body of the institution. The question of the 
effectiveness of higher education governance arose again in a study of 
university/business collaboration and governance issues commissioned by the 
Treasury. The report of the Lambert Review (2003) proposed that there should be a 
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greater distinction between management (the operation of the institution) and 
governance (the strategic oversight of the institution and its resources) in higher 
education institutions. Lambert also suggested that there should be less reliance on 
committees for decision-making and a voluntary code to help improve the effectiveness 
of governance, based on the company ‘comply or explain’ approach. Shattock (2004, 
p.231) noted that, in 1997, Dearing had suggested that a Code of Governance should 
be introduced but had not included the proposal in his list of recommendations. As a 
consequence, the CUC, with ministerial support, had been able to resist the idea. 
Shattock further suggested (ibid, p.230) that the Government’s initial response to 
Lambert was that it supported the need for institutions to have a statement of best 
practice but did not want the code to become a ‘national prescription’. Lambert, 
however, had provided a draft code and recommended that the sector should develop 
its own. The Code of Practice was published, at the end of 2004, as part of the latest 
CUC guidance. 
Dawson and Dunn (2006) noted that there was a growing pervasiveness of codes of 
practice, or ‘soft law’ in the field of governance, where, in a legal sense, compliance is 
voluntary, and concluded that this was because contract and statutory methods of 
regulation (hard law) had been found to be too cumbersome and too slow to respond to 
shortcomings or changes in social conditions. They added (p.35) that: 
‘Obligations within the middle ground left by these two methods of involvement 
have fulfilled a social need despite not being legally binding. In the governance 
context, codes of practice provide a significant example. By signing up to a 
code a party advertises how it will act, which gives a benchmark against which 
stakeholders may judge its governance enabling publicity to be given, as 
appropriate, to successes and failures.’ 
Exley and Hudson (2006) suggested that, through the adoption of the Combined Code 
and the ‘comply or explain’ approach, the UK has managed to establish a well 
developed corporate governance framework based on the principles of transparency 
and accountability. Another 59 countries8 are reported to have, or are developing, 
As listed on the European Corporate Governance Institute website at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php 
(retrieved 19 May 2007) 
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Figure 1: Major developments in UK company, public sector and higher education governance guidance from 1992 to 2006 
codes or principles of practice for corporate governance, encompassing a range of 
legal systems and cultural and political contexts (Mallin, 2004). New codes have also 
recently been developed in key areas of the UK public sector (ICGGPS, 2005; NCVO, 
2005). 
In higher education, Neave (1988; 1998) reported, in his work on Western European 
institutions, a similar pattern of change from a relationship between universities and 
governments based on legislation and procedures to justification by quality assurance 
and accountability systems. In the UK, institutions have been encouraged to adopt the 
CUC Code in exchange for a reduction in other measures of accountability. The new 
accountability framework proposed by HEFCE, which is currently being introduced, is 
seen as a way of placing greater reliance on the self-regulation of institutions’ systems 
of management and governance, to, ‘reduce the burden of providing assurance about 
the use of public funds’ (HEFCE, 2006, p.2). 
In the same way that we have seen the emergence of more self-regulated ‘new public 
management’ in this period (Farrell, 2005), it could be suggested that we are 
witnessing the development of more self-regulated ‘new public governance’ to match 
emerging approaches to company governance. Both ‘new’ approaches focus on non-
bureaucratic forms of organising public service organisations in the context of quasi 
markets (Deem, 2006). But, the new methods can hardly be described as truly ‘self-
regulated’, if compliance is likely to be closely monitored by regulatory agencies. Smith 
and Reeves (2006) argued that, ‘there is a great danger in over­emphasising state 
regulation in that it acts as an obstacle to individuals and institutions regulating 
themselves, consulting their own conscience and acting with integrity, even when it’s 
legally possible to avoid doing so’ (p.17). Nevertheless, in the face of continued 
external regulation, compliance with the code, and an equal emphasis on the practice 
of governing to demonstrate effective self-regulation, may be important tasks expected 
of governing body secretaries for some time to come. 
Despite the framework provided by external guidance there is much that remains to be 
investigated about the interactions between key members of the ‘strengthened steering 
core’ (Clark, 1998) of the institutional executive and those who govern higher education 
institutions, particularly in the way in which these relationships, and potentially 
competing interests, are managed. A ‘structure-neutral’ approach was suggested by 
Leslie (2003), based on the premise that any system of governing that involved a 
variety of constituencies, or intermediaries, would generate conflict, and had to be able 
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to, ‘sort out the normal and universal competition for those things that matter to them’ 
(p.5). He concluded that governing should substantially be seen as the art and science 
of managing conflict, where the legitimacy of those involved in the process of governing 
was held to be dependent on procedural and substantive justification, rather than on 
personal qualities or the use of power. He added that: 
‘Justification is uniquely cultural because it implies both rational explanation 
and a value matrix in which that explanation can be assessed. Decisions – or 
non­decisions, which are merely the functional equivalent of decisions – have 
to be made and are continuously made in any normal social relationship. 
Decisions large and small are both justified and assessed by some criteria – 
explicit or implicit – and those justifications accumulate…….. in the collective 
ledger of relevant constituencies as a sort of fund of goodwill. 
In this way of thinking, the right to govern derives from neither a formal 
hierarchy of relations specified in some constitutional documents (roles and 
responsibilities, for example) nor from principles about process (participatory or 
consultative patterns, for example). Rather, the right to govern derives from a 
culturally defined accumulation of decisions that meet criteria of legitimacy and 
effectiveness. The right to govern accrues to whomever has legitimacy. 
Legitimacy accrues to whomever makes the most consistently justifiable 
decisions. 
……In some settings, legitimacy accrues to individuals who have made certain 
decisions about certain things for many years, notwithstanding that they have 
no formal authority to do so. Their decisions are accepted as legitimate 
because they have good (or the best) knowledge or skill in discriminating 
between the right and wrong decisions in their field. In other settings, 
legitimacy accrues to individuals who are allowed to make decisions on a wide 
range of matters……for reasons unrelated to any particular expertise or formal 
position.’ (pp.12-13) 
The role of experienced individuals, able to bring consistently acceptable judgements 
into the decision-making arena may therefore be a further critical piece of the 
governance equation. The secretary’s role has not, hitherto, been comprehensively 
investigated to determine its part in the exercise of justification and legitimacy and its 
contribution to the effectiveness of governing. 
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Other constituencies have, at least, been afforded this attention. The contribution of 
non-executive directors to company boards has been a particular focus of research 
(Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Pye, 2002). In the case 
of schools, Deem, Brehony and Heath (1995a) investigated the ‘active citizens’ 
involved in school governance in the UK, looking not only at their board-related 
activities but the way in which they displayed influence in their role. Farrell (2005) 
studied 25 school boards, compared them to company boards and used Pettigrew and 
McNulty’s model of board involvement in strategy to investigate the way in which 
school boards were involved in this task. In the US, the motivations of school board 
membership and the power relationship between school board members and school 
superintendents were considered by Mountford (2004). In higher education, the work 
of Bargh et al. (1996) remains the major UK-based research in this area, though its 
focus, as noted earlier, was largely on the contributions made by the chair and head of 
institution. More recently, Bennett (2002), studied the boards of governors in a small 
number of post-92 higher education institutions and, by documentary review and 
survey, analysed the way in which governing bodies had addressed a range of 
‘effectiveness factors’. He concluded that Board meetings were likely to be passive, 
with only 10.2% of items submitted to boards giving rise to questioning or challenging 
behaviours in the process of decision-making. Baird (2006) considered the way in 
which support was provided to Australian governing bodies and also found examples 
where there was, ‘little sense of engagement between the board and the university it 
governed’ (p.300). 
These studies emphasised the way in which members of governing bodies, and the 
executive, are involved, in the ‘doing’ of governing in their institution. They are distinct 
from those in the recent literature on higher education governance that analyse 
governance policies and their implementation (Salter and Tapper, 2002; Buckland, 
2004; Kaplan, 2004), focus on policy developments and their effect on governance in a 
particular national or regional system (Levin, 2000; Norbäck, 2000; Jones, Shanahan 
and Goyan, 2001; Locke, 2001; Kovač, Ledić and Rafajac, 2003; and Harman and 
Treadgold, 2007), highlight the declining role of academic influence on governance 
versus the increasing part played by ‘new public management’, ‘corporate governance’ 
or, as often, the Vice Chancellor, or ‘chief executive’, in the operation of governance 
systems (see, for example, de Boer and Huisman, 1999; Nelson, 1999; Mora, 2001; 
Shattock, 2002; Waugh, 2003; and Tierney, 2004) or look at particular constituencies, 
including students, in the governance process (Zuo and Ratsoy, 1999; Boland, 2005; 
Menon, 2005). Important as these studies are, they do not get to the heart of the 
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problem of how key individuals create a culture in which governors, and the executive, 
contribute to, and help shape, the strategic objectives of the institution. 
In an early higher education study on this topic, Baldridge (1971) considered the 
phenomena of power and conflict in New York University (NYU). He investigated 
whether the university had a tendency toward oligarchy, and an ‘establishment’ power 
elite, or whether its decision system operated in a more open and democratic fashion. 
He reached no firm conclusion other than to suggest that it would be, ‘more profitable 
to ask: How are various groups involved in the decision process and to what extent is 
the university more or less democratic?’ (p.177), whilst at the same time suggesting 
that most people within the university community were little concerned about the 
university’s governance, ‘regardless of whether it was democratic or oligarchical’ 
(p.177). The role of the senior ‘officials’ power elite was, noted, but was thought to be 
tempered by a high degree of participation in decision-making by the full-time faculty, 
which could change considerably depending on the topic under debate, and where and 
when that debate took place within the university. The system was also fragmented 
when the question of spheres of influence was addressed. The trustees (governors), 
for example, were strong in areas of budgetary planning, physical plant maintenance, 
long range planning and public relations but weak in relation to academic matters. 
With new management paradigms and the growing convergence of higher education 
and corporate governance, many of these issues remain under debate, particularly the 
role of academic participation in university governance and its impact on decision-
making. McNay (1999, p.44) reports how a Vice Chancellor said that, ‘We haven’t time 
for democracy any more; funding council deadlines for responses don’t allow it!’. On 
the other hand, Barnett (2000) noted that: 
‘A certain amount of muttering occurs as to the ‘managerialism’ in university 
life, but there is no serious protest. That it does not give rise to any great angst 
is testimony to two things. Firstly, there is a consensus even within universities 
that, in the contemporary age, they have to be managed and managed well. 
Staff do not want to be part of a poorly managed institution. This point is easily 
made, but it represents an extraordinary accommodation on the part of the 
academics to the realities of university life. Secondly, there is on the part of the 
large majority of academics a view that they are only too happy for others to be 
doing the managing.’ (p.129) 
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The secretary’s contribution, via the management of governance, could be said to be 
critical. Not only must the business of governance keep pace with the demands of the 
institution and external stakeholders, but the secretary must also ensure that the 
principles of ‘shared governance’ are properly maintained in core activities of the 
institution, so as to avoid a dislocation between academic and ‘business’ aspects of the 
governing body’s work. The management of the relationship between the governing 
body, and the rest of the institution is therefore a key function of the secretary, and one 
to which we turn next by considering a number of theoretical approaches and how they 
might inform the practice of governing in higher education. 
2.2.2 Routes towards a theoretical framework for the study of roles in higher 
education governance 
Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005) were commissioned to undertake a study of the 
work and relationships of non-executive directors for the Higgs Review. They noted 
that assumptions in agency theory (for a summary of which, see Eisenhardt, 1989) had 
been a significant influence on the study of governance, particularly where board 
effectiveness was, ‘assumed to be a function of board independence from 
management, trust relations are formally discounted and the ‘control’ role of the non­
executive is emphasised’ (p.S7). They added that agency theory suggested that too 
close a relationship between executive and non-executive directors should be avoided 
because of the collusion that this might imply, and that, because agency theory 
assumed that self interested opportunism was inevitable, systems of monitoring and 
control should be put in place. They reported, however, a growing literature that cast 
doubt on the ‘real world’ application of agency theory and the realisation that, at least in 
the case of the chief executive, a strong relationship with the board, built on mutual 
trust, could be advantageous. Roberts and Stiles (1999) had earlier investigated the 
way in which chairmen and chief executives worked together and found examples of 
conflict, where the two were at a professional and personal distance from each, but 
also positive examples of collaboration. Roberts later added (2002) that a climate of 
collaboration provided a: 
‘Relationship between the chairman and the chief executive, with the chairman 
using this relationship to support the performance of the chief executive. But 
trust and openness in this relationship then creates the conditions under which 
non­executives can be recruited who are themselves able to complement, in 
different ways, the skills of the executive team.’ (p.509) 
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In her study of the role and background of UK Vice Chancellors (VCs), Breakwell 
(2006) noted that the relationship between the head of institution and chair required 
further examination. She concluded that, ‘managing the relationship properly was 
fundamentally important to the efficient functioning of the institution’ and that, ‘very 
experienced VCs talked of having established a partnership with their Chair’ (p.56). 
Buckland (2004) used an agency approach (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) to review UK 
university governance as part of his critique of Lambert’s draft governance code, and of 
current governance structures. His review noted the difficulty, in higher education, of 
separating control rights from decision rights because the producer was, ‘intimately and 
expertly involved in appraising the value of the activity being controlled’ (p.246) and 
concluded that this was a feature of all professionalised activities, citing those of 
medical practitioners as a case in point. He also reported a difficulty in identifying 
exactly who held control rights over university activity, given the diverse range of 
stakeholders involved. He considered this to be problematic because the governing 
body was separated from stakeholders, by virtue of the appointment process for its 
members, and was unable to obtain legitimacy from a clear stakeholder relationship to 
the community of shareholders that would normally be expected in a company setting. 
The codification of governance, and particularly the increased role of independent 
governing bodies and governors, has sought to assure stakeholders that institutions 
are well governed and managed and that the executive is unable to take actions simply 
for its own benefit. But does this means that agency theory is appropriate for a higher 
education setting? From his experience of the US sector, Collis (2004) noted that the 
strict application of agency theory offered little to help the improvement of board 
effectiveness because, counter to Buckland’s view on separation, there was already 
considerable goal congruence between a university’s stakeholders, the head of 
institution and the administration. He suggested that higher education should seek to 
minimise agency problems caused by a divergence of interests between stakeholders 
and the executive, but cautioned that this approach may have its difficulties. In the 
case of agent representatives on the board, for example, there was a risk that they 
might wish to further their own interests. It was proposed that to deal with this, 
membership by staff and students should be severely limited, as is already the case in 
the post-92 part of the UK higher education sector. He noted also that the separation 
of the role of chairman and chief executive was usual in the university sector (although 
there are exceptions in the UK and also in the Republic of Ireland) and that because 
the president was appointed by the board of trustees, there was already an accepted 
measure of control over the president’s actions. 
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The alternative approach of stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 
1997), suggests that managers will behave in the interests of shareholders because 
such actions will also be in their own interests, and that there should therefore be no 
inherent problem in executive motivation or need for close control (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991). Stewardship theory underlines the board’s role in developing institutional 
performance by improving strategy and decision making (Cornforth, 2005a). Elements 
of the theory are seen in higher education in the way that, in most cases, board 
members are chosen for their expertise and potential to help improve the performance 
of the institution, often on the basis of their professional expertise and skills, although 
they may not always be as closely linked to the world of higher education as the ‘inside’ 
members that would be required for the governing body to consistently make superior 
decisions (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Donaldson and Davis (op cit) suggest also that 
the system works best when the chief executive has complete control over the 
organisation, particularly so when the chief executive also holds the post of chair of the 
board, a position they called ‘CEO duality’. 
There are practical shortcomings in this approach that undermine the application of the 
theory. The codification of corporate governance has included a move to split the roles 
of company chair and chief executive in order to improve accountability within the 
board. The alignment of the leading positions within the organisation may not be 
desirable in terms of complying with external accountability measures, which are 
required to satisfy shareholders, or even possible where major shareholders call for 
board reform. In the case of non-corporate organisations, in particular higher 
education institutions, there is even less chance of CEO duality because of the 
expectation that the roles of chairman and chief executive will not be held by the same 
person. It may also be difficult for a university’s objectives to be fully aligned with those 
of its stakeholders. Consider the paradoxes, for example, of balancing the institution’s 
wish to maintain academic quality (and hence its reputation) and the desire, amongst 
students, for high examination grades (which might also have reputational implications 
for the students and the institution) or the need for an institution to increase research 
income but not accept such income from sponsors where there are ethical concerns. 
Both result in governance dilemmas that arise from the ‘supercomplexity’ (Barnett, op 
cit) of the higher education system. It is unlikely that the simple alignment of 
stakeholder and institutional interests required by stewardship theory would be possible 
and, as a result, its potential for analysing higher education governance may be 
severely limited. 
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Other theoretical approaches stress either the interests of stakeholders (stakeholder 
theory) or the public at large (the Democratic perspective). Both focus on the interests 
of the respective parties, and their impact upon the nature of governance practice used 
by the board (for an overview, see Cornforth, 2005a). In the case of resource 
dependency theory Kiel and Nicholson (op cit, p190) note that there is a different 
perspective in that it is assumed that the board, ‘acts as an essential link between the 
firm and the external resources that a firm needs to maximise its performance’. They 
suggest (p191), however, that this approach ignores the board’s role in providing 
advice, monitoring the work of the organisation and helping develop strategy. All of 
these functions are important in the work of the university governing body, to varying 
degrees, with the implication, again, that resource dependency theory alone is 
insufficient to account for the way in which governing bodies carry out their role. 
Managerial hegemony theory takes the stance that control of an organisation has been, 
‘ceded to a new professional managerial class’ (Cornforth, 2004, p.18) and that power, 
in normal times, rests with the chief executive, with the board only taking over in 
periods of crisis. It is suggested that this leads to the board acting as a ‘rubber stamp’ 
for management decisions, giving legitimacy to managerial actions. Furthermore, in 
the context of cooperatives and mutual associations, the ordinary members on boards 
are considered to have less knowledge and expertise to be able to challenge 
management proposals and decisions (ibid, p.19). The parallel with voluntary external 
members of higher education governing bodies, and the ability of the head of institution 
and other senior managers to influence the board, will be clear. Cammack (2003) 
commented on this issue during the merger of the University of Manchester and 
UMIST. He concluded that managers wanted to, ‘out-Dearing Dearing' through their 
attempts to impose a substantial lay majority of council alongside a reduced elected 
contingent of academic staff and the stripping of the power of the University Court to a 
minimum. He went on to note that University Courts, with their wide community 
representation, 'could take forward the agenda of diversity and strong local and 
regional links' and could even be responsible for the election of lay members of 
governing bodies, 'to avoid the danger of Councils becoming self­perpetuating 
oligarchies' unduly influenced by senior managers. His preference was to see lay 
majorities, ‘sit alongside substantial numbers of elected representatives of university 
staff, able to provide them with a broader view of issues than that presented by senior 
management’ (p.12). 
These theoretical approaches take contrasting views of the role and effectiveness of 
the board, but each can be shown to have shortcomings that prevent a universal 
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explanation of the processes of governance and boardroom practice. Indeed, the ‘one 
dimensional’ nature of the various theories was highlighted by Cornforth (2004, p.12) 
who noted that the complexity of governance required a meta-theory to bring together a 
number of theoretical perspectives. In this way, he argued that, ‘multiple theoretical 
perspectives are helpful in highlighting some of the important paradoxes, ambiguities 
and tensions boards face’ (ibid, p.13). Elsewhere, Hung (1998) suggested that 
corporate boards may play different roles depending upon the expectations placed 
upon them, and that an integrated theoretical framework was required to underpin 
further in-depth studies of the processes used, and the roles actually played, by 
governing boards. 
Pye and Pettigrew (2005) also called for a theoretical pluralism, to balance the 
dominant paradigm of agency theory in board process work by creating a process 
perspective that, ‘can be enriched from different angles rather than creating ‘the’ 
alternative view to agency theory’ (p.S30). Turnbull (1997) captured the essence of 
this argument when considering sociological processes in the development of 
corporate governance theory. He noted that corporate governance scholars: 
‘Need to accept the possibility of people behaving both as opportunistic self­
serving agents and selfless stewards. No one theory or model of society is 
likely to be sufficient for understanding, evaluating or designing governance 
structures.’ (p.200) 
Cornforth (2005b) proposed that researchers should use a multi-paradigm perspective 
rather than choose between them because current theorising, took, ‘Little or no account 
….of contextual factors that influence or shape board characteristics or how they work’ 
(p.237). Building on the work of Demb and Neubauer (1992), he suggested that there 
were three main tensions, or paradoxes, to be explored: 
• Who governs? – the tension between representative and professional boards 
• Board roles – the tension between conformance and performance 
• Relationships with management – the tension between controlling and partnering 
The focus of this study suggested the use of the paradox perspective as a framework, 
allowing investigation, through the controlling and partnering paradox, of the way in 
which governing body work is shaped, how issues are presented and how a balance is 
maintained between control by the executive of the governing body, and by the 
governing body of the executive. Using this approach, it was thought possible to draw 
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practical examples from other theoretical positions, including the managerial 
hegemony, stewardship and stakeholder schools, and consider a range of literature on 
relationships, power, influence and decision-making to develop a methodological 
approach to show how the governing body secretary’s role and influence impact upon 
the institutional ‘supporting’ role played by the governing body (Hung, op cit, p.105; see 
also, Baird, 2006, p.299) 
2.3 Relationships, power, influence and decision­making 
2.3.1 Managing relationships in higher education governing 
Many analyses of board practice and effectiveness (Harrison, 1998; Cornforth, 2001; 
Ingley and van der Walt, 2005), remain focussed on ‘what boards do’ rather than ‘how 
boards work’. In contrast, others look more closely at the way in which board 
members relate to each other as the basis for considering the effectiveness of the 
board. 
Forbes and Milliken (1999), in their study of social-psychological processes of group 
participation and interaction identified several factors relating to non-profit 
organisations. Amongst these was the need to appreciate the multifaceted nature of 
performance in the non-profit sector, where the relationship between board 
performance and organisational performance was likely to be complex. They noted 
that the sense of commitment shared by non-profit board members may be associated 
with high levels of cohesiveness, but also warned, as found by Golden-Biddle and Rao 
(1997), that many non-profit board members face a sharp conflict between the personal 
aspects of their association and the trusteeship duties carried in their board service. 
Golden-Biddle and Rao (ibid, p.608) suggested that, in contrast to the agency-based 
explanation of board failures because of conflicts of interest, some cases might involve 
a conflict of commitment, where the member holds a ‘hybrid organisational identity’ and 
must deal with their, ‘own strain in adhering to conflicting aspects of the organisation’s 
identity’. Using the example of university alumni who serve as governing body 
members, they noted that the ‘outsider-insider’ dichotomy of board research can be 
misleading if ‘outsiders’ become ‘insiders’ by identification with the organisation. They 
expressed concern that such ‘cultural embeddedness’ meant that some board 
members may work so closely with managers that they become unable to provide 
criticism or express dissatisfaction. This would appear to support a proposition by 
Forbes and Milliken (op cit) that a degree of task focussed cognitive conflict, alongside 
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an ability to work cohesively, but not too closely, is part of the basis for creating an 
effective board. Managing the relationship between board members and the executive 
so as to maintain a climate of productive tension between aspects of controlling and 
partnering may therefore be a valuable element in the practice of governing. 
It should not be assumed, however, that the executive and other board members 
compose two unified, but opposing, forces. Mignot-Gérard (2003) suggested that 
research on university governance tended to overlook the, ‘relations that make up the 
overall system of governance’ (p.144) and that the executive team was, ‘often 
presented as a coherent entity, and there is no de­construction of the relations between 
team members’ (p.146). The effectiveness of the governing body, and of its secretary, 
can depend upon the working relationships between members of the executive team, 
but from her survey of French university staff, Mignot-Gérard concluded that the 
interactions between executive team members could often lead to fragile alliances, 
tensions and difficult compromises. 
Levin (1991) studied three Canadian colleges on the question of the relationship 
between the governing body and head of institution. He found that both had influence 
and impact on external and internal communities, there was a high level of value 
compatibility between them, they both viewed themselves as chief authorities of the 
institution and, ‘in their expressed attitudes and actions, mirror perceived 
characteristics of the larger organisation’ (p.37). In a study of trustee satisfaction in 
higher educations institutions in Ohio (Michael, Schwartz, Cook and Winston, 1999), 
governing body members expressed the highest level of satisfaction with their 
relationship with the president, whereas it was often low with the faculty, presumably 
because of the relatively close working relationship with the former and the perceived 
distance from the latter. In schools, the issue of the governing body’s role in providing 
consent and protection was questioned by Thody (1994). He noted that governors 
would not easily break the habit of consent given to actions requested by 
headteachers, ‘since consent is the natural response to those in authority’ (p.25) and 
could be reinforced by friendship, personal knowledge, or even participation in the 
governing body’s decision to appoint the headteacher. Governors also protected 
headteachers by taking part in shared decision-making, so relieving the burden 
sometimes placed solely on the head of the institution. 
Social influence theory has been used to try to understand board relationships in the 
context of educational governance. In their study of School Boards and District 
Superintendents in the US, Petersen and Short (2001) noted that social attractiveness 
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(or referent power) represented by the perceived similarity of one person to another, 
credibility, based on trustworthiness and expertness, together with an assertive and 
emotive or empathetic social style tended to characterise those superintendents that 
would be able to develop and maintain cooperative working relationships with the 
board president and other members of the board. Where high scores for social 
attractiveness and social style were seen, there was a strong association with the 
superintendent’s, ‘ability to define, recommend and receive board support on a majority 
of policy issues facing the school district’ (p.554). 
The concept of school governing bodies taking a leadership role has also been 
explored (Earley, 2003), in a review of the way in which governing bodies and the 
headteacher set the strategy for a school. A range of empirical studies on school 
governance were reported that had concluded that under self management, governing 
bodies, ‘are more or less at the mercy of the headteacher and other senior managers’ 
(p.356). In a survey of school heads and governing body members Earley found that 
over one-fifth of heads agreed that their governing body should play a major part in 
strategic leadership, but far fewer said that it actually did so and over one-third said 
that the governing body played only a minor role or no role at all. He concluded that 
the approach and attitude of the headteacher was a major factor in the participation of 
governing bodies in the strategic leadership of schools and that, ‘Culturally embedded 
notions of power and authority vested with the headship are difficult to shift but the 
relationship between the two needs to move to one of interdependence – a leadership 
that is shared and a real partnership’ (p.365). 
The difficulties of achieving this balance were highlighted in research by the Office for 
Public Management (OPM) (Steele and Parston, 2003) that addressed the 
expectations and experiences of public service governors. Some startling results were 
obtained about the way in which institutions were being governed that appeared to 
support the view of Chait (2006) about the prevalence of substandard governing. It 
was concluded that, overall, the governing of public service organisations (in this case, 
principally health and police authorities, schools, housing associations and national 
bodies) did not work well. While in some institutions there was a constructive 
relationship between governors and their executive, in others governors were, ‘far more 
reactive than proactive, allowing the executive to control and direct the organisation 
without governors’ effective stewardship or even oversight’ (p.51). Only two of the 25 
governors they interviewed were confident that their governing body was effective, and 
most felt that although they were adding value they were not able to fulfil their complete 
role. Some considered this to be because of the, ‘attitudes or culture of the executive’ 
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(p.25) while other governing bodies appeared to have made a choice, though often not 
explicit, to hand over authority to a strong leader or executive group. 
Otto (2005) considered the roles of chairs and managers of governing bodies in 
particular types of organisations in the voluntary, statutory (in this case, schools) and 
commercial sectors, and shed some light on the relationship issues noted by Steele 
and Parston. She concluded that problems of role ambiguity and conflict were a factor 
of the ‘split’ positions of the chair and senior managers, and that the management of 
this relationship differed between the sectors. There was a greater degree of role 
conflict and ambiguity in the public sector, caused by changing governance practices, 
and a ‘greyness’ around who was in control, caused by increased authority given to 
boards, a lack of clarity in terms of the ultimate responsibilities of each party and a 
growth in associated workloads imposed on those in management positions. In other 
words the locus of power, influence and authority was not always clear and this could, 
in turn, create a climate in which there was a more negative than productive tension 
between the governing body and executive. 
2.3.2 Exploring the exercise of power and influence in higher education 
governing 
The need to understand issues of power and influence, their impact on the practices of 
senior managers and their effects, in turn, on governing has been highlighted, most 
noticeably, in studies of company boards and non-executive directors (NEDs). 
Pettigrew and McNulty (1998) looked at the use of power in the boardroom in a study 
of the conduct and behaviour of boards and directors in UK companies. They 
investigated the influence of chief executives and their senior executive team in 
shaping the activities and information flow to directors, and the way in which ideas 
were developed and tested by the executive team before being relayed to the board. 
They suggested that the board needed power, much of which was now derived from 
the regulatory environment for business, to be able to exercise its role of monitoring, 
and that it comprised structural and relational elements, combined aspects of power 
sources and a willingness to put them to use. This combination of ‘will and skill’ was 
considered to be critical, but was tempered by the context and situation in which power 
was applied, including expected norms of conduct, the pattern of selection of board 
members and their socialisation into the role. As in the case of schools, non-executive 
board members, at that time, perceived themselves to be more influential in issues of 
corporate governance and corporate management than on key strategic decisions. It 
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was argued, however, that whilst the executive’s control of a board had been balanced 
to a degree by external codes and guidance, the company board in the UK had: 
‘Cultural and normative assumptions about colleaguiality and a smooth 
problem­solving process that could nullify the potential power sources held by 
non­executives. NEDs could be outflanked by the executives not just because 
the NEDs know too little about company business…..but because the NEDs 
know too much about the normative assumptions of being a good citizen on a 
UK board, so that they are thereby neutralised in power terms.’ (p.212) 
The political exercise of power within organisations was recognised by, amongst 
others, Morgan (1997, p.154) who classified a variety of types of power in an attempt 
to establish an analytical framework for power dynamics within an organisation. 
Amongst these were: 
• Formal authority; 
• Control of scarce resources; 
• The use of organisational structure and rules; 
• Control of decision processes; 
• Control of knowledge, information and technology; 
• Control of boundaries (including access to the organisation’s elite groups); 
• An ability to cope with uncertainty; 
• Interpersonal alliances, networks and control of the ‘informal organisation’; 
• Control of counter-organisations; 
It was argued that simply possessing these attributes was not sufficient to generate 
power because wider structural factors within or outside the organisation, over which 
individuals had little control, could exert greater influence at a particular time. Morgan 
proposed, however, that organisations principally consisting of white-collar staff 
provided examples of pluralism, where authoritarian methods of power could be, ‘held 
in check by the free interplay of interest groups that have a stake in government’ 
(p.200). Pluralist managers were thought to balance and manage these competing 
interests and be able to recognise that conflict and power could serve both positive and 
negative means. 
Boston (2000), was critical of the power of domination exercised by university 
executives in the way in which governing bodies were kept informed. She suggested 
that the focus of the governing body was sometimes maintained on the oversight of a 
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planning framework rather than, ‘matters of urgency unforeseen by strategic directives’ 
(p.105) from which governing bodies could be ‘insulated’ or ‘quarantined’. She went on 
to note that her case study research had found, ‘evidence of the ‘management’ of 
council through the streamlining of committees, retreats and induction procedures, 
executive reporting, and, equally, through inefficiency, informality and obfuscation’ 
(p.106) and concluded that, ‘The governing body is a location of power within 
universities which at times is hotly contested and at others, quietly and cleverly 
manoeuvred around’. Mountford’s (2004) study of school board members in the US 
concluded that different categories of power and motive caused district school 
superintendents to, ‘walk a tightrope in determining which issues get priority and the 
consequences of not addressing a particular board member’s agenda’ (p.736). In her 
study of UK higher education colleges, Corbett (2006) reported that whilst final 
approval of the institutional strategic plan was considered to be the highest priority for 
the governing body, more time appeared to be spent on audit and accountability, 
financial stewardship and monitoring the approved strategy. It is possible that the 
‘obfuscation’ noted by Boston could have been confused with the need to deal with 
growing external accountability requirements placed on the sector, making the 
secretary’s expert task of focussing the governing body’s work on its key roles even 
more important. 
Elsewhere in the university sector, the practice of power has been considered largely, 
but periodically, on a descriptive or case study basis, probably because of the 
complexity of higher education organisations and the difficulties of access to key 
individuals. Demerath, Stephens and Taylor (1967) were early commentators on the 
power associated with the role of the US university president. They noted, at that time, 
that the structure where a ‘business officer’ was responsible to the governing body as 
treasurer, and the president only for educational matters, was in rapid decline because 
it had often been a source of internal conflict. They suggested that: 
‘Often, the business officer has worked with the board of trustees before the 
president was elected, is personally respected by the board members, and may 
appreciate the business viewpoints of some board members better than the 
president. In this situation, if the president does not guide the business officer 
in the allocation of funds, salary policies, or other matters of faculty concern, 
the faculty may come to believe ‘the business manager is running the 
university.’ Once this belief is widespread, the president’s position as top 
administrator of educational affairs deteriorates.’ (p.71) 
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Hardy and Clegg, (1996) in their review of the literature on power, noted the wide range 
of conceptualisations on offer, from a focus on behaviour to attitudinal and hegemonic 
factors, including Mechanic’s (1962) view that complex technical knowledge, such as 
that held by the secretary, might be a base for organisational power. They also 
reported a second dimension of power to that identified by Dahl (op cit) which had been 
developed by Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and where, as was later alleged by Boston 
(op cit) in the case of higher education: 
‘Issues could be excluded from decision­making, confining the agenda to ‘safe’ 
questions. A variety of barriers are available to the more powerful groups to 
prevent subordinates from fully participating in the decision­making process 
through the invocation of procedures and political routines.’ (p.627) 
Hardy and Clegg described this approach as, ‘non-decision making’, which allowed the 
‘more powerful actors to determine outcomes from behind the scenes’, and noted, ‘that 
visible decision­makers are not necessarily the most powerful’ (p.627). But it also led 
to another theme developed by Lukes (2005) in the early 1970s in which he critiqued 
the two dimensions of power, adding a third which involved the exercise of power by 
shaping peoples’, ‘perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they 
accept their role in the existing order of things’ (p.28). Shapiro (2006), whilst 
supporting the view of Lukes that a third dimension of power exists, contended that it 
was unclear how each of the dimensions of power operated in each of its forms, and 
that institutional systems had to be identified to prevent domination of particular power 
types in decision-making without interfering in the legitimate exercise of power. In the 
meantime, Hardy (1996) had identified the system itself as a fourth dimension, noting 
that power could be found, ‘in the unconscious acceptance of the values, traditions, 
cultures and structures of a given institution’ (p.S8). It is here that the secretary could 
play several critical roles; as a guardian of elements of the system’s power; in 
maintaining equilibrium in institutional decision-making processes; and in ensuring that 
the use of individual power by the withholding of decisions and the setting of an 
agenda for decision-making based on the illegitimate shaping of information does not 
cause real decision-making to be substituted by quiescence on the part of decision-
makers. 
2.3.3 Exploring decision­making in higher education governing 
It has been suggested, in the company setting as well as in higher education, that 
developments in the regulatory and compliance requirements of corporate governance 
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could distract both the board and senior managers from their key responsibilities and 
cause them to restrict, even if unwittingly, the decision-making role of the board or 
governing body (Durden and Pech, 2006). Durden and Pech further noted that, ‘the 
regulatory thrust of corporate governance could become even more pronounced, 
leading to further compliance responsibilities being placed on managers and directors’ 
(pp.88-89). If senior managers in higher education institutions are actively leading 
strategic policy development and decision-making in their institutions, the distraction of 
a more complex regime of governance could lead to a position where governing 
bodies are taken ‘out of the loop’ on the development of strategy. To illustrate this 
point, Useem and Zelleke (2006) reported how, in one US company they studied, the 
chief executive had cut the number of board meetings from seven to six, saying, ‘I’ve 
been spending too much time with the board, especially with the advent of Sarbanes­
Oxley….Simplification of process has to evolve so that we can figure out what’s 
important and what’s not and really be focussed on high leverage activities’ (p.10). 
Cutting and Kouzmin (2002), defining a decision as, ‘a judgement, assessment or 
cognitive commitment to a particular knowing’ (p.28) identified three phases in group 
decision-making. It was suggested that groups moved from an individualistic 
approach, through a dimension of group understanding to a position of group 
judgement. The ‘group understanding’ phase relied upon an in-depth assessment of 
the issue in question. The ‘group judgement’ phase was, ‘focused on the need to 
appreciate the particular reality of the complex, rapidly changing environment and 
decide what is right to do in the circumstances’ (p.29), because the complexity of 
decision-making had reduced the time available for analysis and understanding. As a 
consequence, the interpretation of complex environments and information in order to 
allow ‘group judgement’ decisions to be made had to be taken out of the group’s role 
and conducted elsewhere within the organisation, perhaps even amongst the executive 
team. In this way, key issues could be subject to a different priority for agenda initiation 
than that desired by the governing body, or even denied access to the policy agenda 
(Cobb and Ross, 1997). 
There are, of course, problems with the application of theoretical approaches to 
decision-making in the real world practice of governing, helpfully summarised, in the 
context of the study of school governing boards by Deem, Brehony and Heath (1995b, 
pp.112-114). These include the assumption that decision-making is a rational process, 
that agenda setting and non-decision making can be more subtle indices of power 
(but, in the latter case, are difficult to capture), that many decisions are necessarily 
incremental and that aspects of organisational culture, such as the degree of risk that 
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the institution is willing or able to accept, can influence decision-making as much as 
those of the personal value systems of governors. 
Decision-making in higher education institutions is also widely believed to be 
problematic because of the complex nature of system and the many demands placed 
upon it (for a review of which see, Hammond, 2004). Yet, decisions need to be made 
at all levels, not least about the matters that concern the governance of higher 
education institutions. A greater plurality of the power relationship in higher education 
sometimes becomes dominant at this point, and restricts capacity for change. Collis 
(op cit) noted how hard it is for governing bodies to say ‘no’ in universities and colleges 
under current governance structures, and that clarity of purpose is essential if the 
governing body is to exercise this right. In his view, ‘We can always gain support for an 
initiative from multiple constituencies by promising to do something for them at a later 
date. It is much harder to get consensus around stopping an activity and absolutely 
harming someone’ (p.68). There are, however, exceptions. Pusser (2003) reported, for 
example, the case of the University of California, whose politically motivated Board of 
Regents, in 1995, threw out a long-standing and widely supported policy of affirmative 
action in admissions, contracting and hiring, a decision that, ‘could not easily be 
explained using an interest­articulation framework’ (p.128). 
Pusser (op cit) also noted how Baldridge’s study of NYU identified organisational 
process, institutional subgroups, internal interests, coalition-building and bargaining as 
key features in a pluralistic organisational decision-making context, where 
administrative leaders served as ‘boundary spanners’, who mediated, or articulated, 
between internal and external constituencies. Pusser recorded how Baldridge later 
amended his model to give more attention to external context, internal agenda control, 
interest groups and legitimate authority in the decision-making process, but that, 
although shaped by external factors and interest groups, the process was considered 
to remain largely internal and administrative (Baldridge, Curtis, Ecker and Riley, 1978). 
In their study of decision-making in European institutions of higher education, 
Goedegebuure and de Boer (1996) concluded that, in Germany, central administrators 
played a less active role in decision-making than central councils (which were the most 
active from the six countries studied). The UK was distinctive because of the way in 
which academic and central administrative participants played a greater role in 
decision-making than central councils, faculty administrators and faculty council 
members. The study also looked at features within decision-making processes, where 
the UK was found to be, ‘characterised by less consultation, consensus, [a] high 
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number of conflicts, bargaining, decentralisation, informality, interest group 
participation, rivalry and time­consuming decision­making’ (p.169). 
Whatever the decision-making approach, key players within an organisation are in a 
position to determine when major issues are moved from the informal to the formal 
agenda, and the way in which ‘backstage’ preparation, such as negotiation and 
influencing, outside formal decision-making systems, is conducted. Take the view of 
Smith et al. (1999), for example, who noted in their study of the role of vice chancellors 
that: 
‘Not surprisingly vice­chancellors are sometimes involved in secret and delicate 
negotiations with financial and legal advisors about the likely effects of certain 
courses of action. Such negotiations often took place away from the gaze of 
the formal apparatus of institutional governance, though we have no reason to 
suppose that key members of management and the governing body were not 
aware of the actions of their chief accounting officers’ (p.300). 
The management of decision-making by the executive can therefore take a number of 
stages, ranging from ‘agenda initiation’ to the process of establishing support by 
informal means to determining which issues, and information, should be presented for 
consideration by the governing body. At this stage, high quality information is 
essential to the decision-making process, and its provision is one of the key functions 
of the secretary’s role. As Nunes (2005) suggested: 
‘When the board makes decisions, it does so based on information gathered 
and received – leavening, filtering, dissecting and reassembling it in 
conjunction with each member’s knowledge, expertise, experience and skills.’ 
In a study of large US, Canadian and UK financial services companies and UK and 
European non-financial services companies, Useem and Zelleke (op cit) investigated 
the way in which it was decided which issues would be put to the board and how the 
board’s agenda was set. Whilst interview data was gathered from members of the 
executive or non-executive directors, the majority of ‘informants’ were corporate 
secretaries. They reported that most companies in the sample had established annual 
calendars and about two-thirds had additional guidelines to determine which items 
were reserved for the board and which were delegated to the executive. 
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They found that executive judgement was relied upon in what the chief executive and 
other senior officers presented to their directors, and that, ‘Despite board retraction of 
some of its delegated authority in recent years, made more explicit through the annual 
calendars and decision protocols, much of the top decision making still remains largely 
in the executive court’ (p.8). New issues presented to the board were often included in 
the chief executive’s report at the start of the meeting. Chief executives either decided 
what should be included, or consulted with their legal advisor about what would be 
considered ‘material’, in terms of its potential impact on the company. In a few cases, 
a more structured approach involved the consideration of major risks through a system 
of risk committees, and management would determine, based on the committee 
reports, which should be brought to the board’s attention. Other executives learned 
what boards wished to have presented based on previous experience, by routinely 
asking their boards for feedback or by following an iterative agenda-setting process. 
Whilst there are undoubtedly differences in the processes of deciding what information 
should be presented to the board, there are also issues about how decisions are 
shaped and taken in the boardroom. In both instances there is little research on this 
topic, particularly in higher education, but there are examples from the setting of 
company governance. Carter and Lorsch (2003) suggest that the way in which board 
members interact, with themselves and with their executive, is a consequence of 
several factors, including the board’s membership, structure, processes and culture. 
Research by van Hamel et al. (1998) noted, for example, that there were a number of 
widely agreed, but unwritten, ‘codes and customs’ that operated in the boardrooms of 
companies in the Netherlands, but that there were different views about such matters 
as whether or not difficult issues should be addressed within or outside the boardroom, 
whether possible controversy within the executive team should be allowed to become 
visible during board meetings and whether direct or diplomatic language should be 
used in board meetings. Samra-Fredericks (2000a; 2000b) employed 
ethnomethodological/conversation analysis techniques in the boardroom setting and 
later (2003) in research on ‘strategists-at-work’. In her strategists study she noted that 
effective performance was relational, situation/context bound and talk-based, but also 
required interpersonal dexterity to effectively influence strategic direction. It seems 
likely that such dexterity is also required in the networks that can be seen between key 
officers of the governing body. 
Kilduff and Tsai (2003, p.5) suggested that, ‘Networks exist not only as sets of 
cognitions inside the heads of individuals in organisations, but also as structures of 
constraint and opportunity negotiated and reinforced between interacting individuals. 
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People tend to rely on others in their networks for help in making major decisions’. 
They also noted the, ‘unrealised potential for looking at two­and three person units 
within network structures’ (p.6), referring to the three person group, or ‘triad’, as the 
building block of informal networks, because it can make possible coalitions, 
mediations and other sociological processes. They reported how Krackhardt (1999) 
had suggested that triads could suppress individual interests, reduce individual power 
and moderate conflict because of the potential for coalitions between two members to 
outvote the third, or conflicts between two members to be addressed by the 
intervention of the third person. In calling for further ethnographic work on network 
formation and change, they proposed that future research might include a greater 
emphasis on cognitions about networks, or how, ‘the relatively invisible bonds that bind 
individual actors together in the absence of legal contracts’ operate and, ‘why some 
ties are regarded as trustworthy by some actors but not by others’, particularly in 
relation to, ‘the trust­based governance systems that substitute for formal legal ties in 
and between organisations’ (p.129). 
2.4 Combining role context, relationships and influence: The governing triad, 
and the role of the secretary within it 
A social network triad is seen most clearly in the practice of higher education 
governance between the chair, the head of institution and the secretary of the 
governing body. The relationship is not, however, widely documented in the research 
literature, where the dyadic unit of the chair and head of institution (and more 
particularly the Vice Chancellor) seems to have received most attention (Bargh, Scott 
and Smith, 2000; Wilson, 2005). Yet the role of the governing body secretary has a 
special place in the balance of relationships, influence and decision making in the 
higher education context. 
Hall (1994), writing about the newly formed further education corporations noted the 
importance of the secretary’s role in, ‘keeping the relationship between Governors and 
the Principal well­oiled, as the experiences of many universities has demonstrated’ 
(p.190), while suggesting that the role was likely to develop in importance as the sector 
evolved, a position now recognised in Shattock’s (2006) most recent work. 
On the other hand, sector guidance for secretaries (HEFCW, 1997), suggested that 
the role was analogous to that of a company secretary, responsible to the corporate 
body of governors and not directly to the head of institution or chair of the governing 
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body. It noted the key role held by the clerk/secretary in helping ensure the proper 
conduct of the governing body, and, in so doing, that the secretary should, 
‘….remain detached from the discussions and decisions of the governing body 
and its committees, not participating in them except to give advice on 
procedural and other issues or, when the occasion demands it because of 
his/her responsibilities, as a member of the senior management. The clerk 
also needs to be able to act as the servant of the governing body, and must in 
that capacity be able to preserve independence from the management of the 
institution despite the need to participate as a member of the senior 
management’ (p.3). 
Whitchurch (2005) reported how a service ethos was still present in the administration 
of university management, and that there was, ‘a duality in that professional managers 
need to be able to lead both from behind and in front, and be sensitive enough, 
personally and politically, to know what is appropriate for the occasion’ (p.11). In the 
case of governance, such occasions are not limited to formal meetings. The secretary 
of the governing body must be constantly aware of the duality of their position, the 
potential for conflicts of interest, the way in which they influence, during the course of 
their work and in their role as a ‘servant’ and a ‘leader’. 
Greenleaf (1991) could be said to have captured the requirements of the role in his 
‘servant-leader’ model, which involved a principle-centred approach to leadership, 
based on mutual trust and respect (Buchanan and Badham, 2004, p.138). Greenleaf 
said that: 
‘The servant­leader is functionally superior because he is close to the ground – 
he hears things, see things, knows things, and his intuitive insight is 
exceptional. Because of this he is dependable and trusted. And he knows the 
meaning of that line from Shakespeare’s sonnet: “They that have power to hurt 
will do none….”.’ (p.32) 
The HEFCW guide underlined the point about the need for propriety, confidence and 
trust between governors and the secretary, when it advised that, except when dealing 
with the secretary’s appointment, conditions and remuneration, or other issues where 
the secretary was involved, it would be, ‘unwise for a governing body to exclude the 
clerk from any of its business’ (p.4). It further noted that the role was: 
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‘Such that it will need to be undertaken by a senior member of staff. The 
individual who holds the post of clerk needs to have a close understanding of, 
and engagement with, the key business of the institution, which is not possible 
without involvement at a senior level within the management of the institution. 
He or she also needs to have sufficient knowledge, expertise and standing 
within the institution to carry sufficient weight and authority on governance 
issues with senior colleagues and governors.’ (p.4) 
Martin and Scott (1997) reached a similar conclusion in the context of US higher 
education institutions. They suggested that the role of secretary required a high 
degree of self-motivation, excellent interpersonal skills, a demonstrated commitment to 
the institution, tact and diplomacy and unquestioned personal and professional 
integrity. The extent of trust in the role, in their view, extended to the whole 
institutional environment, where the secretary might be expected to act, ‘as an honest 
broker among the campus communities’ (p.7). Others warn, however, of the potential 
of such a task to put the secretary in a vulnerable position between governing body 
members and campus constituents and suggest that, in these situations, a close 
working relationship is required with the head of institution to help manage the process 
(Chandler, 1996). 
The secretary might also, on occasion, be required to act as an honest broker amongst 
members of the governing body, facilitate communication between the governing body 
and head of institution (Hicks, 1993a; Chandler, op cit) and deal with conflicts between 
governing body members, between members and the institution or even with 
individuals who are not members of the board (Hicks, 1993b). On other occasions, the 
secretary might be expected to act as ‘gatekeeper’ to governing body members (Clark, 
2003) and handle communications with them from internal and external constituents. 
In terms of managing governance within the institution, the secretary’s role is pivotal. 
It can include participating in, or even leading, processes of board reflection and 
change that set the values and practices expected of the rest of the institution (Hill, 
Green and Eckel, 2001) and involve the bringing together of the wider executive and 
the governing body in strategic planning (Calareso, 2005). The introduction of new 
governance responsibilities, such as the accountability of university external 
fundraising (Riley, 2005) and the use of new governing techniques, such as electronic 
board meetings (Johnson and Finkel, 2005), will undoubtedly fall for implementation to 
the secretary. 
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With the assistance of the secretary and other senior staff, the promotion of greater 
interaction between governors and the institution’s staff and students is a way in which 
sense-making, shared experiences and the development of shared meaning amongst 
governors can be used to improve ‘generative thinking’ within the governing body 
(Chait, Ryan and Taylor, 2004). Equally, the secretary might be involved in promoting 
links between the governing body and external agencies, either in relation to 
institutional business or where governor development and training can provide an 
opportunity for governors to meet their counterparts from other institutions and share 
experiences in their roles. Engaging governing body members in the wider life of the 
institution and the sector is necessary because the new regime of self-regulated 
accountability, ‘calls for an understanding on campus that the definition of collegiality 
cannot exclude those charged with the preservation and deployment of institutional 
assets in ways consistent with strategic intentions’ (Metz, 2006, p.32). 
Much of this work, of course, takes place outside the formal setting of the governing 
body meeting, where the triad must generate an environment that can support the 
concept of, ‘People of goodwill cooperating to further the goals of their institution…’ 
(Martin et al., op cit, p.9). It is here that the principles of relationship building, the 
exercise of power and influence, agenda setting and decision-making are put into 
practice, and where important aspects of the secretary’s role, to be explored later in 
this study, are likely to contribute to the effectiveness of the governing body’s work. 
2.5 Conclusion: What lessons can be taken from this review into the empirical 
stages of the study? 
The literature review was expected to provide an insight into a range of research that 
would add context to the Study Aims outlined in Chapter 1. In addressing Study Aim 
(b), the review noted the growth of the importance of governance and associated ‘soft-
law’ accountability mechanisms across the private and public sectors, including the 
codification of higher education governance, over the last 10-15 years. These 
mechanisms have been used to improve standards, counter failures in governance and 
improve public trust in the operation of major institutions. It also pointed to an 
increasingly complex environment for higher education governance which is likely to 
have made governing bodies more reliant on the technical advice and support provided 
by the secretary, and on the secretary’s role as an intermediary in governing 
relationships. 
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It emerged that to promote effective governance, but more particularly governing, it is 
necessary to create a climate in which undue power and influence is moderated by the 
proactive management of multidimensional relationships, not only between the key 
players of the governing body, but also between the governing body and the rest of the 
institution. The ebb and flow of these relationships requires the exercise of ‘skill and 
will’ (Pettigrew et al., 1995) by the secretary as well as the members of the governing 
body. In this study, however, it appeared that much of the practice would be seen 
around the boardroom and not simply within it, particularly where the secretary had a 
wider senior management role within the institution and needed to juggle the inevitable 
conflicts of interest that arise from dual responsibilities. The exercise of influence by 
the secretary outside the boardroom could, therefore, be expected to be a key factor in 
creating, managing and controlling governing relationships to help structure the 
governing body’s decision-making. 
The review also revealed, however, that there is little known about the practical 
realities of the operation of higher education governance and the role of key individuals 
within it. Available research clearly emphasises the importance of forging effective 
relationships within and around the governing body, but these mostly focus on those 
between the head of institution and the governing body. A second strand of 
relationship research looks more broadly at the way in which governing bodies and 
executive teams interact. Both approaches suggest that there are positive and 
negative features in these relationships, and it is here that the ‘bridging’ role played by 
the secretary could be important in the management of institutional governance, even 
though this role does not, to date, feature strongly in higher education governance 
research. The review therefore goes some way to supporting the hypothesis in Study 
Aim (a) that the role of the secretary may have been underestimated and requires 
further consideration. 
Finally, it was suggested that a closer analysis of the theoretical influences on the 
framework of governance within which the secretary might be expected to work, and 
the way in which key relationships, influence and decision-making could impact upon 
the role, might help open up these elements of practice. A complex picture emerged. 
No single theoretical stance could adequately explain the particular features of 
governance and governing in higher education, or the role of the secretary within it. 
Aspects of the display of power in the managerial hegemony tradition seemed to be a 
focus of the education governance literature, for example in the way in which 
governing bodies were ‘controlled’ by the information provided (or not provided) to 
them, often by a strong head of institution. The growing importance placed on 
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effective governance by UK higher education funding agencies has redressed, to 
some extent, the balance between the authority expected to be demonstrated by 
governing bodies and that of the executive. But the literature also pointed to the 
independent role of the secretary who, even as a member of the executive, is required 
to act as its advisor, on behalf of the governing body, and, sometimes, even as a moral 
conscience in the conduct of institutional business. 
It was therefore necessary to look outside the single tradition and consider theoretical 
pluralism to underpin the empirical work necessary to address Study Aim (c). When 
looking at the influence displayed in the role, and, in particular, the way in which the 
secretary works with the governing body chair and head of institution, Cornforth’s (op 
cit) multi-paradigm paradox approach, with a focus, in this instance, on ways in which 
a productive tension between controlling and partnering can be created and managed 
in the relationship between the governing body and the executive, appeared to be the 
most useful frame of reference. Cornforth suggested that single theoretical 
perspectives took little account of contextual factors, and, because the secretary’s 
position was known to differ within the sector the use of this approach meant that, at 
least, issues of context could be considered. In this way, the approach also allowed a 
‘practice-based’ focus to be maintained for the later stages of the study, whilst 
enabling elements of multiple theoretical positions to shed light on the complex 
environment that the secretary must navigate. 
Researchers have tried to capture this environment in the form of models, or numerical 
techniques that describe the effective board or governing body (see, for example, 
Hilmer and Tricker, 1994; Weir and Laing, 2000; Cornforth, 2001). However, these 
approaches tend to concentrate on issues of process, or the controls that boards must 
have on the actions of the CEO or the wider executive. Models matching governance 
practice to process and outcomes are rare, and those including the secretary even 
more so, though studies that mention the contribution made by board staff in the US 
higher education sector are beginning to emerge (Kezar, 2006). To address this 
problem, it was necessary to develop a new approach based on the three main lines of 
investigation used in this study: the context of the secretary’s post, elements of the 
activities and key relationships exhibited within it and the relative influence displayed in 
those key relationships. The possible existence of a governing triad, and differing roles 
within it, suggested that a focus in this area could help combine thinking on ‘what 
boards do’ with that of ‘who does what’ and ‘how they do things’ to begin to shed light 
on issues concerning the people behind the process, and to address the problems 
identified by Pye and Pettigrew (2005). The development of the model, discussed 
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further in Chapter 3, was seen as an early way in which the governing triad, and the 
role and influence of the secretary could be explored in greater detail. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
3.1 Developing the research strategy: Issues of methodology and the multi­
method approach 
The aims of the study, identified in Chapter 1, were: 
a) To test the hypothesis that research on higher education governance has, to 
date, underestimated the importance of the part played by the governing body 
secretary in the ‘doing’ of governing; 
b) To identify the nature of the current role of the governing body secretary in the 
practice of UK higher education governance, and to describe, in particular, the 
influences that may be exerted by the secretary on the work of the governing 
body; 
c) To develop a conceptual model and conduct empirical research to address the 
aims summarised above. 
The review of the contribution of the governing body secretary in UK higher education, 
provided in Chapter 1, and the literature review in Chapter 2, helped establish that 
there was a need to understand more about the secretary’s role and influence. These 
factors had not previously been the focus of empirical research and so a research 
strategy needed to be developed to conduct an investigation that would shed light on 
Study Aim (b). This required consideration of the relative merits of a fixed (or 
quantitative) or flexible (or qualitative) research design. The former would normally 
involve the pre-specification of the research design before data collection (Robson, 
2002), limiting the ability to gather real-world experiences of governing body 
secretaries when dealing with the complex nature of their role. With flexible research 
designs alone, which might typically involve interviews or similar qualitative methods, 
there would have been difficulties in obtaining representative data and a more limited 
case study approach would have been required. A multi-method design was therefore 
chosen, using a non-experimental fixed stage to gain information from a wide sample 
range and a flexible stage to explore more detailed aspects of the work of the 
secretary. 
In the first stage a variety of methods could have been used, including, for example, 
wide-scale interviewing or documentary analysis, but these would have involved 
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considerable time and resources. A telephone survey would have posed problems of 
researcher time, access and the ability to record accurate responses to open-ended 
questions. Participants could have been asked to complete a diary of their governance 
activities over a particular time period, but this would not have identified factors in their 
approach to governance, and could have been unreliable across a wide survey 
population. Alternatively, a self-administered postal questionnaire could have been 
used. Whilst this approach would have had the advantage of being efficient and could 
have provided for anonymous responses it also had a number of disadvantages, 
including the difficulty of obtaining an adequate response rate. Feedback from my 
earlier governance research with secretaries suggested that participants would prefer 
an online instrument, and there appeared to be advantages in the distribution and 
collection of the survey results with this technique. To obtain information effectively 
and efficiently, a web-based survey approach was adopted, using a fixed, quantitative 
design and the collection of data in a standardised form. 
A variety of research methods were also considered for the second stage of the 
investigation. An observational approach was rejected because of the difficulties of 
obtaining regular access to governing body meetings and being able to use the results 
without restriction. An earlier attempt to gain access to an organisation’s board 
meetings had been positive but only on the basis that the research findings would 
remain confidential for several years. Additional problems associated with this 
approach included the validity of overt observational studies of group dynamics, 
because individuals could alter their behaviour with the group whilst being observed; 
resource limitations in terms of time required from the researcher and the subject; the 
limited scale of the study that would be imposed by the number of institutions that could 
be covered; and the need for such an approach to be longitudinal in nature, in order to 
capture significant events. This is not to say that such observational work is not 
without its merits. A major investigation of active citizenship in the governance of 
schools (Deem et al., 1995a) combined a variety of theoretical and disciplinary 
perspectives with longitudinal observation and other research techniques to determine 
who took part in school governance, how they dealt with the role and the sources of 
knowledge upon which they drew in the course of their work. Their study was, 
however, supported by major external funding and involved a team of researchers from 
outside the schools sector at a time of major governance reform. These factors are 
likely to have made access to school board activities, and the range of individuals 
involved, somewhat easier. 
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Another potential approach was the content analysis of institutional documents. 
Governing body documents, prepared for the institutional record, but also for public 
consumption, would not necessarily reveal, on their own, the true extent of influence 
exerted by the secretary because other factors come into play in the preparation of 
papers, the dynamics of the governing process and the implementation of governing 
body decisions. It seemed unlikely that other non-public documents would be readily 
available. 
The most appropriate technique for this stage of the study appeared to be in-depth 
interviews, although it was recognised that this approach would also present difficulties 
in ensuring that the interviewees did not alter their behaviour or responses during the 
interview process. A qualitative approach was expected to complement the more 
quantitative style of the initial survey, to clarify and illustrate the meaning of the survey 
findings and provide accounts of how governance systems had developed and how 
they now operated. This approach was supported by Byrne (2002), who suggested 
that quantitative and qualitative modes of investigation should be combined as, ‘The 
basis for social action’ (p.ix). 
Interviewing techniques have a number of typologies, but that used by Robson (op cit, 
p.246), based on the work of Powney and Watts (1987), provided a succinct 
classification. In this typology, interviews are classified as: 
•	 Respondent interviews, where the interviewer directs the discussion and the 
interviewee responds to questions; 
•	 Informant (or non-directive) interviews, where the interviewee guides the conduct of 
the interview and the interviewer takes notes as appropriate. 
The senior positions of the interviewees and the time that they were likely to wish to 
devote to the study, together with the need to ensure that the study was perceived as 
valid, professionally conducted and of future use to the participant, meant that an 
informant interview approach was unlikely to be successful. At the other extreme, a 
structured approach to the interview might have proved too rigid because it could have 
prevented new areas of interest being explored had they arisen during the course of 
the interview. The interview sites were to be chosen because of their ability to provide 
in-depth coverage of issues identified in the stage 1 survey. It was therefore essential 
for the interviews, as a minimum, to address these issues, whilst allowing interviewees 
to identify other matters that could be of interest to the study. Kezar (2006, p.980) 
noted how, in her study of US higher education governance, the interview was used as 
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a point of departure, and that with ‘elite’ participants it was important to allow the 
interviewee to determine, in part, the course of the interview. A semi-structured face-
to-face respondent interview technique was adopted, so that information gathered from 
the stage 1 survey could be explored in more detail but some flexibility could be 
brought into the interviewing process, to discuss other areas of governance practice 
identified by the interviewee. 
The choice of a multi-method strategy (Bryman, 2001) is not without its difficulties. 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) noted the problem of the sometimes, ‘dogmatic positions 
often taken in favour of either qualitative or quantitative research’, but suggested that, 
‘combining methods may be done for supplementary, complementary informational, 
developmental and other reasons’ (p.29). There is a further distinction drawn between 
advocates of triangulation, where different methods are used to study the same 
problem, and those who see the results of mixed methods as broadly complementary 
(Brannen, 2004). In the latter case, it is suggested that whilst not providing direct 
corroboration, the findings from different datasets can be compared to shed light on the 
research question (ibid, p.319) and to contextualise larger-scale data (ibid, p.322). An 
equivalent status design (Creswell, 2002) initially seemed appropriate for this study, 
where the quantitative and qualitative methods would be treated equally to try to 
understand the issue under investigation. However, the extent to which quantitative 
and qualitative influences pervaded the research process, from the research design to 
the methods chosen to analyse and draw inference from the results, suggested that the 
approach would be more akin to the parallel mixed model proposed by Tashakkori and 
Teddlie (1998). 
Such a focus on the research question also suggested an orientation towards 
pragmatism (ibid, p.20) rather than an outright stance of positivism or constructivism in 
the approach to this research. A conceptual model, used as a heuristic device but 
based on the adaptation of previous findings and knowledge of the work of the 
governing body secretary, was thought to be able to provide a framework for the 
planning of research. The approach allowed objective and subjective epistemological 
orientations to be used over the course of the study (ibid, p.25) a feature necessary in 
multi-method research, where inductive and deductive inferential approaches need to 
interchange during the research process. Given the view that quantification identifies 
only measurable change and not causation (Sayer, 1992) qualitative analysis was 
required to, ‘provide descriptive meaning so as to explain causal mechanisms as well 
as to add direction to that causation’ (Johnson and Duberley, 2003, p.169). It was 
therefore proposed to analyse the results in a variety of ways, using both quantitative 
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and qualitative approaches, but also allowing, in this case, the qualitizing of numerical 
data to construct a narrative description of groups under investigation, and basic 
quantitizing of some elements of the interview data to compare with information 
obtained via the survey. 
A shortcoming of this approach was that any causal relationships identified during the 
course of the study would not provide a universal ‘truth’. The complex phenomenon of 
higher education governance seemed unlikely to conform to such an outcome, not 
least over time and in the context of changing personalities and relationships within 
governance systems. But, the aim of this study was principally to find ways to inform 
the practice of governance and so, like Tashakkori and Teddlie (op cit, p.29), a 
‘cautiously optimistic pragmatism’ was adopted to guide the study strategy and develop 
the research findings to a position where causation could be explored but its limits 
recognised. It was also realised that the values held by the researcher, as a 
governance practitioner, would have to be carefully managed at each stage of the 
project to ensure that bias in the research approach was minimised. Later sections of 
this chapter outline the approaches that were taken. 
The order in which the elements of the fieldwork were planned was also important. 
Whilst the preferred route in some studies would be to conduct a series of interviews to 
determine the issues to be investigated in a survey, the opposite approach was taken 
in this case (Brannen, op cit, p.324). This was thought necessary because so little is 
known about the practice of higher education governing that the selection of interview 
sites before obtaining some indication of the wider operating environment would have 
been problematic. Not only could there have been difficulties in gaining access, but the 
sites might not have been exposed to, or interviewees willing to discuss, important 
aspects of the study, such as the handling of conflicts of interest or the management of 
difficult relationships with other key players in the governing body. Conducting the 
survey before the interviews allowed the existence of issues such as these to be tested 
so that they could be explored further during the interviews. 
It should also be remembered that the survey population was relatively small and many 
participants were likely to be known to each other, or at least be members of the same 
professional organisations. Had the interviews been conducted first, it might have led 
to more sensitive topics under investigation being ‘leaked’ before the survey took place, 
with the consequence that the survey results might have been altered or that fewer 
people might have participated. Finally, the survey provided background material for 
‘informed’ interviews to be conducted, so that survey responses could be put into 
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context and basic questions about the structure of the institution’s governance could be 
avoided. As a result, it was hoped that a degree of trust would have already been 
established between the interviewee and the interviewer, allowing the interviewee to be 
frank about their experiences in the relatively short time that was likely to be available 
for the interviews. 
It is recognised, however, that there were also inherent problems with this approach. 
Firstly, the selection of interview sites may have been subject to bias on the part of the 
researcher. The method adopted for the selection, which is explained later in this 
chapter, addressed this concern. Secondly, the prior knowledge of the institution 
gained from the survey may have skewed the interview approach towards particular 
issues. In some ways this did occur, but only because the survey enabled follow-up 
questions to be asked. On the other hand, there were no particular problems in dealing 
with the question set apart from the ability of chairs and heads of institutions to rate 
aspects of influence, as described in more detail later in this chapter. Finally, it is 
possible that the survey, based on a conceptual model developed by the researcher, 
could have been biased by the researcher’s preconceptions about the secretary’s role 
and influence, leading to interviews that were similarly biased in terms of the issues 
under investigation. It could be argued that this would also have been the case if the 
interviews had been conducted first, unless they were completely unstructured. The 
benefit of working with the survey in the first instance was that it exposed the 
researcher’s thinking to a wider set of people so that any inherent bias, or ‘argument 
building’ could be identified at an early stage. The pilot of the survey, described later, 
also proved helpful in obtaining feedback on whether or not the survey question set 
was comprehensive, appropriately structured and/or biased in any way. 
3.2 Conceptualising the role of the secretary and identifying potential elements 
of role and influence 
Two principal research questions, related to Study Aims (a) and (b), were defined: 
a) What is the nature of the current role played by the governing body secretary in 
the practice of higher education governance and governing? 
b) What are the major influences that may be exerted by the secretary on the work 
of the governing body? 
To address these questions a conceptual model was created to describe the range of 
potential roles and areas of influence held by the secretary. The model, shown in 
Figure 2, presents elements of practice in ‘groups’ derived from guidance provided to 
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governing body secretaries and personal experience of the researcher. The model 
also drew upon the framework provided by the controlling and partnering paradox 
described in Chapter 2 (Cornforth, 2005b). This was evident, for example, in the 
extensive range and varied nature of the working relationships that was expected to be 
seen between the secretary and members of the governing body (as shown in the 
relationships group), the advisory role played by the secretary versus that of ‘shaping’ 
the information used by the governing body (as shown in the ‘governance in action’ 
group) and the influence of the secretary in key processes such as nominations and 
induction even though they are not formally a member of the governing body (as shown 
in the governance system group). 
The complex nature of the role is indicated by the links between the various elements 
in the diagram. These take a number of forms. Some may be formal, as between the 
nature of the role (an element in the Personal/Role group) and the contribution made to 
determining governance systems and structures (an element in the Governance 
Systems group). Others may be informal, or judgement-based, such as the way in 
which interactions take place between key members in the governing process when 
dealing with elements in the ‘Relationship’ and ‘Judgement’ groups. Yet others may be 
operational, working at either the formal or informal level, or have a greater emphasis 
on accountability mechanisms within the institution. The judgement links in Figure 2 
demonstrate how pervasive this theme can be, ranging from the management of 
governing body relationships to the ability, on occasion, to stand up to senior figures 
when dealing with conflicts of interest or a governing body that wishes to act outside its 
terms of reference. It was also apparent that cross-cutting themes of the context of the 
role, relationships and influencing, identified towards the end of Chapter 1 and 
considered in Chapter 2, underpinned many of the elements and groups identified in 
the model. To use a simple analogy, the elements and groups were the data and 
applications on a computer desktop, familiar to the average user or learned over time. 
The themes were the largely unseen operating system, essential to the smooth running 
of the machine but taken somewhat for granted unless the system needed to remind 
you about something, failed or received the occasional upgrade for which retraining 
was required; in this case, a change in the head of institution or chair. 
A conceptual model of a particular function or set of operating circumstances may be 
problematic. The first issue is the over simplification of the ‘real world’ that the model is 
attempting to represent. Each factor, or even a particular element within it, could, at a 
particular time, be dominant and alter the way in which the influence of the secretary is 
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Figure 2: Key factors in the role and influence of the governing body secretary 
perceived and acted upon by the governing body. Other factors are difficult to analyse 
with any degree of certainty. These include, for example, the perception of the role of 
the secretary by other staff within the institution, which might be unreliable because of 
the difficulty in separating these perceptions from those of other institutional roles held 
by the secretary. The view of the governing body at a particular time may also be 
significant. The secretary may often be in the front line when reporting on certain 
functional issues because of other responsibilities they hold within the institution. For 
the secretary to report honestly, and to properly separate their responsibilities to the 
governing body and those they hold in other institutional roles may then be difficult. 
Whilst the personal integrity of the secretary is a fundamental requirement in the role, it 
does not easily lend itself to investigation. To illustrate this, although members of 
higher education governing bodies, including the secretary, are encouraged to follow 
the principles of public life (Committee of Public Accounts, 1994) there is no objective 
test that can prove that they are being followed or that they influence individual or 
collective decision-making in the conduct of governing body business. Nevertheless, 
there are cases where the integrity displayed in the secretary’s role can be shown, by 
proxy, in their management of cases of conflicts of interest. Examples of this aspect of 
governance were therefore explored in the field research. Despite these shortcomings, 
the framework, building upon topics identified in the literature review, proved effective 
in identifying major factors that could be researched. In particular, elements of the 
triadic relationship between the secretary, head of institution and chair, identified in 
Chapter 2, could be seen in the activities undertaken by these key players. 
3.3 Ethical review 
As the research strategy developed it was necessary to consider the ethical 
implications of conducting the research. An ethical review was required for two major 
reasons. Firstly, it was important to ensure that the project was conducted with 
sufficient ethical awareness to justify the method of enquiry and the professional 
standards applied to the study. Secondly, it was necessary to consider the way in 
which the researcher brought to the project aspects of his own history, philosophy, 
aims and ethical priorities (Johnson et al., 2003, p.188) and how these could have 
influenced the research approach and the results of the investigation. The higher 
education sector has seen a growing debate about ethical practices and behaviour, 
most recently in guidelines for addressing ethical issues in higher education that extend 
the principles of ethical review beyond its application in the conduct of research (CIHE, 
2005). The desire to encourage strong ethical values has also been apparent, for 
some time, in the US higher education system, where trustee guidance on ethics and 
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values notes that, ‘Integrity has a short shelf life. An institution’s reputation….can be 
cancelled out quickly by ethical missteps or breaches of truth’ (Corts, 1998, p.2). Both 
the UK and US systems reflect an increasing emphasis on transparency and 
accountability in the field of corporate governance. Given that this project concerned 
the role and influence of key players in higher education governance, and involved 
aspects of the ethical values and problems faced by these individuals, it was incumbent 
on the researcher to ensure that the highest possible ethical standards were 
maintained in the construction and execution of the study. 
The ethical review was conducted in two parts. The first involved an assessment of the 
research approach against the ethical guidelines produced by the Social Research 
Association (2003) and other related guidance prior to the launch of the pilot stage 1 
survey. The review covered the entire project, but focussed on the survey and issues 
of access and contact with survey participants. The second involved an update of the 
ethical review, which took stock of the survey process but had a particular emphasis on 
the stage 2 interviews. Monitoring ethical issues through the research programme, and 
considering lessons learned from the stage 1 survey, proved a useful tool in the 
management of the project. It also enabled the researcher to consider further, during 
the project, issues of his own professional background and practice in the conduct of 
the research. This was particularly so in stage 2 of the project where the researcher’s 
values and assumptions could have influenced: 
•	 The questions asked of the participant, the interpretation of their answers and the 
recording and reporting of interview responses; 
•	 The perception of the researcher by the participant, which could have altered the 
answers provided; 
•	 The perception of the participant by the researcher which might have altered the 
tone of the discussion (perhaps by the use of non-verbal signals), and hence the 
interview responses; 
•	 The availability of participant institutions to the stage 2 research population (eg if a 
participant had been known to the researcher to the extent that it would have 
altered the dynamics of the interview). 
At all stages of the project, it was made clear that respondents would be able to decide 
whether or not they chose to participate in the research. In the stage 1 survey this 
principle, together with a commitment to keep the identities of the respondents and 
their institutions confidential, was set out in introductory material about the survey and 
in the instrument itself. The stage 2 interviews also required consideration of later 
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guidelines produced by the LFHE on the conduct of projects that formed part of its 
research programme (LFHE, 2005). 
Although there are mixed views about the potential effect on access of obtaining a 
signature as evidence of consent, Wiles et al. (2003) noted that, ‘There is an 
increasing expectation that researchers will gain signed consent from research 
participants and many researchers view it as important that study participants actively 
‘opt in’ to research studies by signing consent forms’ (p.16). To address these points, 
a project summary and consent form was provided for each interview participant, and a 
post-interview data release form was used to ensure that interviewees had given 
consent for the use of their interview material for later publication (Appendix 1). 
3.4 Data Collection: Stage 1 
3.4.1 Selecting the stage 1 survey population 
The aim of this stage of the study was to gain information from a wide range of 
secretaries to assess the major influences upon, and methods used, in their role. The 
survey approach required initial consideration of the selection of a sample of individuals 
from a known population (Robson, op cit, p.230). Kinnear and Taylor (1991, p.393) 
considered the definition of a sample to include five essential components: 
•	 Element – the unit about which information is sought; 
•	 Population – the aggregate of all the elements prior to the selection of the sample; 
•	 Sampling Unit – the element or elements available for selection at some stage of 
the sampling process, the selection of which can take a number of stages; 
•	 Sampling frame – a list of all of the sampling units available for selection at a 
stage of the sampling process; 
•	 Study population – the aggregate of elements from which the sample is drawn 
and from which inferences can be made. 
Furthermore, Kinnear and Taylor (ibid, p.394) suggested that it was essential to define 
the population by reference to the elements under consideration, the sampling unit, the 
extent of the study and the time of the sampling. In the case of this study, the 
population was defined as: 
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• Element:	 Higher Education Governing Body Secretaries; 
•	 Sampling Units: Higher Education Institutions funded by one of the 4 UK funding 
agencies; 
• Extent:	 United Kingdom; 
• Time:	 June/July 2005. 
At the time of the survey there were 166 higher education institutions in the UK funded 
by HEFCE (129), SHEFC (19), HEFCW (14) and DENI (4). A small number of privately 
funded higher education institutions in the UK were not included in the target 
population because, whilst their accountability regime might have been similar in some 
respects (in terms of legal requirements, for example), in others it might have differed 
from publicly funded higher education institutions. Whilst there are also different 
requirements placed upon governance arrangements by each funding agency, most of 
the principles of governance within the target population were expected to be similar, 
with some exceptions in Scotland where SHEFC governance guidance is considered, 
by some, to be more directive (Cannon, 2001). Furthermore, the agency-funded 
institutions were expected to have applied CUC guidance in their governance practice, 
and therefore have a common benchmark for some governance processes. 
A number of approaches could have been used to create a sampling frame from the 
166 higher education institutions, although each would have had its problems. In the 
case of random sampling, Landesman (1999) noted that: 
‘Studies that rely on randomly selected samples provide typical cases of 
‘inductive inference’. Induction is a method of fixing belief through sampling the 
members of a population. If the sampling is conducted properly we are then 
inclined to believe that the characteristics of the members of the sample in 
which we are interested match or are representative of the same 
characteristics in the whole population. We then have evidence in favour of 
statistical generalisation to the effect that a certain proportion of the population 
possess the characteristics in question.’ (p.135) 
However, a sample, random or otherwise, would have had to take account of the 
developmental history and structure of the higher education institution, its legal 
constitution, the role of the secretary and a wide range of other variables. A more 
structured sampling technique could have led this stage of the project to become a 
series of case studies, bound by institutional type, when a more general overview of 
the population was required. The selection of a sample of institutions would therefore 
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have been fraught with difficulties in constructing a sampling frame, particularly if the 
method adopted to select the sample had been regarded as biased or otherwise faulty. 
Given the size of the population there was also a risk that a sampling frame would 
provide only a small number of survey responses, thereby reducing the ability to 
generalise from this element of the project, and, in turn, the potential usefulness of the 
study in the development of governance practice. To deal with these points the study 
attempted to obtain information by way of a census, using all available elements of the 
defined population (Kinnear and Taylor, op cit, p.392), rather than take a sample 
survey approach. 
3.4.2 Obtaining access to the ‘elite group’ of survey respondents 
Research amongst ‘elite groups’ can be notoriously difficult. Burgess (1991) noted that 
access must be, ‘negotiated and renegotiated throughout the research process’ (p.43) 
and Odendahl and Shaw (2001) suggested that, ‘Gaining permission to interview an 
elite subject typically requires extensive preparation, homework and creativity on the 
part of the researcher, as well as the right credentials and contacts’ (p.307). It was 
known that obtaining access to governing body secretaries, and achieving a good 
response rate, would not be easy tasks. Not only are such people overloaded with 
requests for information, but they may also have concerns about revealing aspects of 
their working practice that might be regarded as potentially harmful to their personal 
reputation or that of their institution. A considerable period was therefore devoted to 
communication with key sector individuals and organisations, with the aim of raising the 
profile of the research project so that participants would be forewarned about the 
nature and purpose of the study. 
This was not a straightforward exercise. The complex nature of the higher education 
sector is reflected in the number of sector organisations that lay claim to an interest in 
governance. It will be evident from Table 2, which provides a summary of the main 
organisations and their recent work in this area that, during the preparatory stage of 
this project, there was a lot of national level governance-related work in progress. The 
place for a ‘niche’ study of one aspect of governance had to be established in the midst 
of this busy work programme. 
Early contacts with the Leadership, Governance and Management programme at 
HEFCE and the Standing Conference of Principals (SCOP, now GuildHE) elicited 
support for the project. The opportunity was provided to present earlier research on 
governance in HE Colleges (Llewellyn, 2003), and a brief description of the new 
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project, at a SCOP Governance Network meeting in May 2004. An initial contact with 
the Committee for University Chairmen (CUC) in April 2004 led to a similar 
presentation at a workshop during the national launch of the CUC Guide in November 
2004. 
Table 2: HE sector organisations with an interest in higher education governance 
Organisation Organisation 
represents 
Recent work on governance 
Committee of University 
Chairmen (CUC) 
Chairs of governing 
bodies in universities 
(but not HE Colleges) 
Guide for Members of Governing 
Bodies of Universities and Colleges 
in the UK; 
Governance Code of Practice 
Standing Conference of 
Principals (SCOP) 
HE Colleges HE College Governance Network; 
HE Governance website (adopted by 
the LFHE in 2004); 
Induction/Training Materials for HE 
Governors 
Leadership Foundation for 
Higher Education (LFHE) 
HE sector Governor development programme; 
Research programme; established 
by UUK and SCOP 
Higher Education Funding 
Council for England 
HE sector in England Leadership, Governance and 
Management programme; 
Good Management Practice funded 
projects on governance (SCOP) and 
risk management; 
Funds LFHE 
Scottish Funding Council 
(SFC), Higher Education 
Funding Council for Wales 
(HEFCW) and Department for 
Education, Northern Ireland 
(DENI) 
HE sectors in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern 
Ireland 
Efficient Government Initiative in 
Scotland; 
Contributors to CUC guidance; 
Fund LFHE 
Universities UK (UUK) Universities across the 
UK 
Good practice guidance for 
governing bodies and HE managers; 
Association of Heads of 
University Administration 
(AHUA) 
Heads of university and 
some HE college 
administrations across 
the UK 
Governance Working Group 
Association of University 
Administrators (AUA) 
All university and HE 
College administrators 
Special Interest Group on 
governance issues proposed 
In parallel with these developments, the opportunity arose for endorsement of the 
project by the LFHE when it was awarded one of 13 research programme grants in 
December 2004. This enabled support for the project to be obtained from the 
Association of Heads of University Administration (AHUA) and the Committee for 
University Chairman (CUC). The CUC, LFHE, AHUA and SCOP later allowed their 
names to appear on introductory letters and the survey questionnaire. Cross-sector 
recognition was important to distinguish the project from other surveys conducted by 
these organisations. It was also vital, if the aims of the project were to be met, for 
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organisations from various sections of the HE community to support the study so as to 
encourage a high degree of participation. 
It was also recognised that research on the role of the secretary in the UK context was 
very limited. International work was investigated, via contact with the US Association 
of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges (AGB). This led to an opportunity to 
participate in the AGB Board Professional Staff Workshop in April 2005 and agreement 
that data from its 2004 survey of US secretaries could be offered, along with the results 
of the project survey, as an incentive to take part in stage 1 of the research. 
3.4.3 Developing the online survey instrument 
While the above contacts were being established the survey instrument was 
developed. Most elements of the model in Figure 2 were used to generate questions 
for the survey instrument (shown in the blue boxes in Figure 2), while a smaller number 
(shown in pink boxes in Figure 2) were reserved for the second stage interviews. The 
elements of practice that were explored fell into three main categories. These were the 
contextual, role management and influence factors summarised in Table 3. 
Table 3: Identifying the areas for investigation 
Elements of 
practice 
Detailed areas for investigation 
Contextual issues • The professional background of the secretary and how this 
influences the conduct of their role 
• The formal governance structure in which they operate 
• The informal governance structure in which they operate 
• Their relationship with other members of the governing body 
• Their degree of influence on governance systems within the 
institution 
Role issues • Their degree of influence on the design and shape of the work of 
the governing body 
• The way in which they prepare for governing body meetings, and 
the degree of autonomy that they have in so doing 
• The way in which they manage governing body meetings and 
events that occur within them 
• The way they have sought to contribute to improved governing 
body effectiveness 
Influence issues • Other roles they hold within the institution and how these impinge 
on their governing body work 
• The way in which they deal (or have dealt) with potential conflicts of 
interest arising from other institutional roles or their relationship with 
other key individuals 
• The way in which they guide the governing body on constitutional 
issues 
• The way in which they guide the governing body on other issues 
71 
Feedback on an early version of the instrument was obtained from governance 
contacts at the LFHE and SCOP. In general, the response was that the instrument 
was thorough and covered the major issues. The survey had 29 question areas, with 
33 question screens and 51 questions requiring, in some cases, a multiple response. 
The issue of questionnaire length and its effect on response rates was difficult to 
resolve. A balance had to be struck between obtaining sufficient information to cover 
the ‘life cycle’ of governing body work while keeping the questionnaire manageable and 
interesting enough for participants to complete. For these reasons, a mixture of 
question techniques was employed, with as many pre-categorised answers as 
possible. 
The validity of a questionnaire can be affected if the questions are not carefully 
composed and logically designed, and hence affect access because of the way in 
which the questionnaire is initially viewed by the recipient. The quality of presentation 
therefore had to be extremely high so that senior personnel would spend time 
completing the questionnaire properly and submitting their response. The 
questionnaire also had to stand out from many other requests for information in the 
way it was delivered to the intended recipient, assure the recipient about the 
importance of the survey and establish trust in the purpose of the research and the 
researcher’s credibility. A web-based on-line survey appeared to address most of 
these issues. 
On-line surveys are relatively new and research on the approach is still developing. 
The advantages of this technique, summarised by Bourge and Fielder (2003) are: 
•	 The ability, subject to availability of accurate e-mail addresses, for the survey to be 
sent directly to secretaries, thereby helping to ensure its completion by the correct 
respondent rather than a third party; 
•	 The relative ease of distribution and management of responses; 
•	 Near simultaneous delivery, reducing, to some extent, external influences on 
respondents; 
•	 A reduction of order effects, where the respondent reviews later questions, which 
leads them to alter their response to the question in hand; 
•	 The relative ease, for the respondent, of returning the questionnaire; 
•	 A reduction in the potential for multiple completions, which would lead to inaccurate 
survey results. 
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On the other hand, researchers have identified a number of potential problems with on-
line surveys (Dillman, 2000; Bourge et al., op cit): 
•	 Computer literacy, and access to computer equipment, may not be consistent 
across the survey population, although these issues were not expected, in the 
context of the institutions being surveyed, to present major problems; 
•	 Computer equipment and operating systems could vary between institutions, 
altering the on-screen image of the questionnaire, so its design had to be clear; 
•	 The software must enable re-entry after partial completion of the questionnaire, in 
order to avoid respondents abandoning the survey; 
•	 There may be a perception amongst respondents that an on-line questionnaire is 
less secure than a postal questionnaire, and this could alter responses to some 
questions; 
•	 The response rate for on-line surveys is thought to be worse than for postal 
surveys, although it is thought to be generally higher than the postal method for 
professional membership organisations; 
•	 Many higher education institutions use anti-spamming software that can prevent 
bulk mailing being received, and this issue needed to be considered in the 
distribution method for the questionnaire; 
•	 Relatively little is yet known about the effect of on-line survey construction on 
response rates or the best methods to adopt for follow-up surveys to help improve 
response rates. 
Methods to incentivise survey responses, for example by making a small pre-payment 
to respondents, can be used to improve response rates, but they may lead to problems 
of ‘uninformed responses’, where respondents deliberately guess an answer, so 
reducing data reliability (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2003). Apart from sharing the 
survey results, and those of the AGB survey, with respondents, incentives were not 
considered appropriate for this type of study. 
The questionnaire was converted to an online format by an external contractor. The 
online version underwent a series of developmental iterations, to incorporate design, 
format and content improvements by the researcher, and to deal with technical matters. 
Most of the issues arising in this phase of development were related to the presentation 
of questions on-screen and methods to improve navigation through the questionnaire, 
both of which required testing in the field prior to the circulation of the instrument to the 
survey population. 
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3.4.4 Piloting the survey instrument 
A pilot survey was conducted to assess the ‘face validity’ of the instrument (Saunders, 
et al., op cit, p.309) and to test its online delivery. It was important, given that a census 
approach had been adopted, to avoid exposure of the questionnaire to any of the likely 
participants. Odendahl and Shaw (op cit, p.307) noted that elite individuals who are 
centrally positioned, ‘can direct the researcher to other individuals in his or her network, 
or agree to contact potential subjects and even make introductions on the researcher’s 
behalf’. This route was followed, via the CUC and SCOP, to identify 9 ‘recently retired’ 
governing body secretaries to form the pilot survey population. 
The pilot was conducted using the approach planned for the main survey. Each 
participant was contacted by letter describing the purpose of the study, the date on 
which they would be sent an e-mail with a link to the survey website and instructions on 
how to complete the questionnaire. A set of questions relating directly to the pilot stage 
was added to the instrument. These covered: 
•	 The respondent’s frequency of use of IT equipment and information about their type 
of internet access (both of which could have affected the completion time for the 
questionnaire); 
•	 The time it took them to complete the questionnaire; 
•	 The ‘look and feel’ of the questionnaire, in terms of font size, readability and ease of 
navigation; 
•	 The clarity of questions asked in the survey; 
•	 Other comments about the instrument or the research approach. 
The pilot survey obtained eight responses. The main point of feedback was the lack of 
opportunity for respondents to describe the complex way in which governance worked 
within their institution. To address this point, sections for open-ended responses were 
added to survey questions where the subject area was likely to result in particularly 
complex answers. The introductory comments to the survey instrument noted that 
respondents could use the open-ended responses to explain their institutional context, 
and that these factors would be investigated further in the stage 2 interviews. 
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3.4.5 Management of the stage 1 survey 
A mailing list was compiled for the survey population using information provided by 
AHUA and SCOP, but it required completion by web-based research in order to 
identify, or correct, the names of some secretaries, their e-mail addresses and other 
contact information. A number of institutions were missing from the database, because 
they were not members of either organisation. These were identified from a HEFCE 
contacts publication (HEFCE, 2004) and funding agency websites, whilst further web-
based research, together with telephone calls to several institutions, completed the 
relevant records. 
An introductory letter was sent to the project contact list in mid-June 2005. This 
outlined the purpose of the project, the support it was receiving from sector 
organisations and the offer to share the results of the survey with those who 
responded. Telephone calls were made a few days later to all 166 institutions in the 
survey population to check that the letter had arrived and that the contact details were 
accurate. The verification exercise proved extremely valuable, in that it identified a 
number of errors in the original list, particularly in e-mail addresses, and helped raise 
awareness of the project, either directly with the governing body secretary, or with their 
immediate office assistant. In the latter cases, the support of key office staff, able to 
encourage participation in the survey, was undoubtedly an important element in 
improving the response rate. 
The survey (Appendix 2) was launched by e-mail in late June 2005, with a two and a 
half week period for completion. E-mail reminders were circulated each week to 
ensure that those who had not responded remained aware of the survey. A balance 
was maintained between issuing too many reminders and trying to encourage 
responses. In mid-July, however, it became apparent from e-mail requests that 
because of the availability and workloads of some secretaries it would be necessary to 
keep the survey open for a few more days to enable some respondents to take part. A 
general announcement was issued by e-mail to the whole survey population to extend 
the survey deadline to late July 2005, at which point access to the website was closed. 
A total of 126 responses to the survey were received. On further investigation it was 
apparent that a number of respondents had looked at the survey but had not completed 
any data fields beyond the initial introductory pages. In thirteen cases, usable data 
was not provided and the responses were removed from the dataset. In three cases, it 
was clear, from the IP (network) address submitted with the response, or a repeat line 
in the dataset, that the respondent had submitted two returns to the survey. In these 
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cases the most complete set of data was retained and the partially completed 
submission was removed. This left a study population of 110 unique responses, or 
66.26% of the population. 
3.5 Data Collection: Stage 2 
3.5.1 Selecting the stage 2 interview population 
To investigate the environment in which the secretary was operating in greater depth, 
and provide better contextual information, it was necessary to conduct a more detailed 
analysis of a number of institutions. Deem et al. (1995a, p.10) noted that they adopted 
a similar approach, ‘to generate deeper theoretical understandings than would have 
been possible using a survey method, as well as gathering more detailed data about 
the process of governing schools than would have been possible if we had relied on 
questionnaires or interviews alone’. The stage 1 survey results were used to identify a 
number of practices, issues or events that could be followed up in stage 2, so as to 
incorporate more about the participants’ perspective into the project’s findings (Robson, 
2002). 
Stage 2 required a method of selecting a limited number of interview sites. The stage 1 
survey had asked whether the secretary would be prepared to take part in the 
interviews, and this provided a group of 89 institutions that were initially willing to 
participate. Sampling was required because of time and budget constraints on the 
number of in-depth analyses that could be undertaken. A non-probability sampling 
approach was used. Whilst this meant that statistical inferences could not be drawn 
from the interviews, some generalisations were thought to be possible. 
There are several techniques for the selection of non-probability samples, usefully 
summarised by Saunders, et al. (op cit, p.171). These include quota sampling, which 
is a method, like probability sampling, that attempts to represent the total population 
and has similar requirements for determining sample size. At the other end of the 
spectrum, convenience and self-selection sampling provide little control over the 
sample content. In between these extremes lie snowball and purposive sampling 
techniques. Quota sampling is more usually used in cases of large study populations 
where the population is likely to be stratified. Convenience sampling involves the 
random selection of participants until a required sample size has been reached, and 
snowball sampling relies upon the identification, by participants in the study, of further 
participants. These approaches would not have been appropriate because of the 
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need, in this study, to carefully manage access to interview participants. Self-selection 
carried with it the risk that only the most enthusiastic governing body secretaries would 
volunteer to take part in the interviews. Purposive or judgemental sampling allowed the 
use of researcher judgement to select cases that would enable the research questions 
to be addressed (Gobo, 2004), an approach suggested by Neuman (2000) to be 
appropriate for small samples where particularly informative cases need to be 
identified. 
Saunders et al. (op cit, p.175) noted a number of types of case that could be selected. 
These were: 
•	 Extreme case or deviant sampling, where data from extreme situations could 
provide a better understanding of more typical findings; 
•	 Heterogeneous or maximum variation sampling where information about key 
themes can emerge, even from a small sample with wide variation; 
•	 Homogeneous sampling, where the sample is based on a subgroup of similar 
cases so that the subgroup can be studied in more depth; 
•	 Critical case sampling, where the sample can make a point dramatically or because 
it is important in understanding what is happening in the case so that logical 
generalisations can be made; 
•	 Typical case sampling using an illustration from a representative case as part of the 
overall research project. 
At the research design stage, a sample of between 8-10 institutions (and their 
relationship to the above categories) was envisaged, based on: 
•	 Examples of innovative practice in the role of the governing body secretary (rather 
than simply in governance processes) (Extreme); 
•	 Examples of conflicts of interest (potential or otherwise) secretaries encountered in 
their role (Critical case); 
•	 Examples that demonstrated the influence of the secretary on the work of the 
governing body, or in the relationship with the chair and head of institution (Critical 
case); 
•	 Practical examples of how senior managers combined their wider responsibilities 
with the role of governing body secretary (Maximum variation); 
•	 An example of a governing body secretary who was not a senior manager and the 
practical issues they encountered in this approach (Extreme case). 
77 
It was intended that the selection criteria would help avoid researcher bias, but 
because more than the required sample of institutions fell into the above categories, a 
secondary process was needed. This involved the selection of a number of factors 
related to the above criteria that were likely to impact upon the influence of the 
secretary (for example, a particularly active or passive chair) and where the secretary 
had distinctive role features, such as a professional qualification, a particular type of 
appointment or was willing to discuss more difficult governance issues. The factors 
also aimed to maintain a broadly representative sample of institutions from across the 
UK. The cross-UK approach reinforced that this was a sector-wide project that was 
looking at a functional issue, and was not simply related to any particular UK 
jurisdiction, funding regime, institution type or institution size. 
The selection criteria are summarised in Table 4. Each criterion was scored (as shown 
in brackets) and the sum of each set of criteria was obtained. In some cases, it was 
necessary to look for high scores that would reflect regional location or innovative 
practice. In others a low score in a certain area of practice was considered equally 
valid because this indicated that there could be a relative lack of interest in governance 
or a lack of influence on the part of the secretary. Each end of the spectrum was 
thought worthy of further investigation. 
Table 4: Selecting institutions for the stage 2 interviews 
Criteria Proxy measure Survey data to support proxy measure 
Influence of 
the secretary 
Governance activity 
measures 
Active chair (10) 
High contact between secretary and chair (10) 
Passive chair (15) 
Low contact between secretary and chair (15) 
Secretary sets agenda (10) 
Restricted access to chair (10) 
Secretary appraised by head of institution (10) 
Combining 
roles 
Secretary factors External appointment (10) 
Part-time appointment (10) 
Appointment not Registrar/Secretary (10) 
Age 50-59 (5) 
Age 30-39 (10) 
Private sector background (5) 
Professionally qualified (10) 
Innovative 
practice 
Open responses on 
secretarial practice 
Open response cases (10) 
Dealing with 
judgement 
factors 
Conflicts of interest Willing to discuss in stage 2 (10) 
Size and type 
of institution 
Student population Small (under 3,000) (5) 
Medium (3001-15,000) (10) 
Large (15,000 plus) (15) 
Specialist institution (15) 
Location Region (used to 
identify institutions 
outside England) 
Wales (15) 
Scotland (15) 
Northern Ireland (15) 
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A shortlist was developed by scoring each of the 89 volunteer institutions and carefully 
analysing the results. An exception to this approach had to be made for external 
secretaries, where a limited number were prepared to be interviewed. In this case, it 
was necessary to make a selection that maintained a balance with other institutions 
chosen by using the scoring method. 
The purposive nature of the sampling technique was supported by the scoring method 
rather than it being a simple quantitative approach. At the same time, the criteria could 
have led to researcher bias towards more unusual settings or practices of higher 
education governance, or extreme cases where governance seemed to matter and 
where it seemed not to be a major concern. From a maximum score of 165, those of 
the 89 volunteer institutions ranged from 5 to 95. Every institution received a score in 
more than one category apart from one small specialist college. 
Nine institutions were selected for the interview stage, with total factor scores, shown in 
brackets below, ranging from 40 to 85. In the case of the institutions outside England, 
the location scores have also been removed to show the residual score in italics, and 
the amended range is then from 40 to 70. 
• Northern Ireland (either pre- or post-92) 1 (80; 65) 
• Scotland (either pre- or post-92) 1 (85; 70) 
• Wales (either pre- or post-92) 1 (85; 70) 
• English pre-92 university 2 (HEI 1: 50; HEI 2: 70) 
• English post-92 university 2 (HEI 1: 40; HEI 2: 40) 
• English mixed faculty Higher Education College 1 (50) 
• Specialist institutions (any location, pre- or post-92) 1 (50) 
A further 8 institutions were chosen for a reserve list. 
Apart from the initial survey contacts and the secretary in one interview location, the 
secretaries, chairs and heads of institutions in the selected institutions were not known 
to the researcher in a personal capacity. In the case of the interview location, the 
secretary had been a senior work colleague for a short period and contact had not 
been maintained in the intervening period. The scoring approach also managed to 
identify at least one selected institution that had been critical, in part, about a number of 
questions asked in the stage 1 survey. This was considered to be a challenge in terms 
of obtaining access for the interview process, but also beneficial in that it allowed the 
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secretary to address concerns expressed about the closed nature of some questions, 
and to use the interview to allow him to describe, more fully, his experiences in his role. 
3.5.2 Obtaining access to the selected institutions and their interviewees 
The secretaries in each of the selected institutions were approached by e-mail in mid-
November 2005, with a request that they take part in the interview programme. An 
introductory note about the project was supplied shortly after the initial request, asking 
for three individual interviews to be arranged in each institution, involving the secretary, 
the chair and the head of institution. It was made clear in these early contacts that the 
names of participants and their institutions would remain confidential. This was 
thought to be an important factor in obtaining the consent of the institutions to take part. 
At the same time, desk-based research was undertaken, using institutional websites, to 
provide further information about each governance system. 
The initial approach received a mixed response. Five institutions replied positively in 
the period between late November 2005 and early January 2006 and dates were set 
for the interviews in the period December 2005 to March 2006. The other four sites 
proved more problematic, and for a variety of reasons the interview sites and logistical 
arrangements needed to be changed, sometimes more than once. The process 
therefore took longer than initially expected. Whilst at one interview site, the head of 
institution decided that he did not want to take part in an interview, but it was agreed 
that the interviews would continue with the secretary and chair. Several other 
interviews needed to be rearranged, because of illness or unavailability, so the 
interview programme was not completed until May 2006. 
The experiences in obtaining access to this particular ‘elite group’ underlined the need 
for a good list of reserve institutions. It was also essential to be sufficiently flexible to 
provide alternative opportunities for interview sessions, sometimes in locations outside 
the institution, and to fit in with the busy timetable of key institutional representatives. A 
degree of insight was also required to know when to persevere to establish dates for 
the interviews or to look for an alternative interview site. This was particularly so in two 
of the categories identified for the interviews, the post-92 English institutions and the 
small specialist higher education college, where two or three approaches were required 
to obtain access for the interview programme. 
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3.5.3 Developing the semi­structured interview instrument 
The stage 1 survey was used to establish a set of questions for the semi-structured 
interviews (Appendix 3). The interviews with the secretary were designed to take 1 
hour, whilst those with the chair and head of institution were expected to take about 45 
minutes each. Questions to the secretaries were tailored to the survey responses 
where, for example, the respondent had either indicated that they were, or were not, 
able to talk about a conflict of interest or their other roles within the institution. The 
interviews with the chairs and heads of institution followed a similar format, but sought 
to obtain their views about the role and contribution of the secretary in relation to the 
governing body. In these cases, a ‘funnel interview’ model was used, to enable 
‘closed-ended’ questions to be asked towards the end of the interview (Tashakkori and 
Teddlie, op cit, p.102). Two questions from the survey were used to obtain ‘quantitized’ 
views about the understanding of the secretary’s role by various constituencies within 
the organisation, and the way in which they rated their own influence, and those of the 
other two interviewees, on a variety of governance factors. 
In developing the interview questions, it was necessary to consider how best to reach 
beyond issues of governance structure to look at the way in which governing was 
addressed within the institution. The question sets were therefore designed to lead 
progressively to more detailed aspects of how individuals worked together and how the 
secretary contributed to the work of the governing body. A key question, mid-way 
through the interview, asked the interviewee to comment on who, in the boardroom, 
had the power to influence, what form it took and how it was used. This resulted in 
some quite different answers, between institutions and between individuals within each 
institution, which are explored in Chapter 5. 
3.5.4 Piloting the interviews 
The availability of people to review the question sets for the interview stage was 
limited. It was, however, possible to test them for face validity with an experienced vice 
chair of a governing body. This provided useful information about the way in which the 
chair, in particular, might respond to some of the questions and areas where further 
clarification was required. Rehearsing the question sets also allowed them to be 
adjusted in terms of interview timing, though it was recognised that each interview 
experience would be unique and that control of the interview process would have to be 
balanced with the need to allow people to give their views freely, despite time 
constraints. 
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3.5.5 Management of the stage 2 interviews 
The order of interviews depended upon the availability of the individuals concerned but 
was not expected to have a significant effect on the conduct of the interviews, 
particularly because of the earlier background information gathered about the context 
of the secretary’s role from the stage 1 survey. Each interview began with an 
introduction which described the purpose of the project, the way in which the resulting 
material would be used, the need for recording and transcription, the right of the 
interviewee not to answer any question or to stop the interview at any point and signing 
of the consent form. The question set was then followed to allow the structure of the 
interview to be as consistent as possible across all interviewees and interview sites. In 
many cases, supplementary questions were asked, based on comments made by the 
interviewee, to follow up particular emphases they had placed on their replies, or 
examples of governing practice that seemed worthy of further investigation. 
In general, sufficient time was available for the question sets to be covered whilst also 
allowing interviewees to expand on their answers and address related issues. Whilst 
no major problems were encountered with the interview process in the 27 interviews 
that were conducted, some minor issues of interpretation needed to be addressed in 
one or two instances. These tended to be in relation to some chairs who were a little 
less willing to discuss relationships between members of their governing body. It was 
also difficult with the chairs, on occasion, to get beyond comments on the ‘good 
practice’ work that their governing body had addressed to look, in more detail, at the 
way in which the governing body actually worked. In several cases it proved difficult for 
chairs to deal with questions where they were asked to rate the relative influence of 
themselves, the head of institution and the secretary in aspects of the institution’s 
governance. They required time to reflect on their answers and occasionally could not 
be clear about the score attributed to the rating exercise. 
On the other hand, secretaries and heads of institutions proved more than willing to 
discuss issues of relationships and respective roles in the work of the governing body, 
and were often quite open about difficulties experienced in the operation of the 
governing body. The interviews were therefore more straightforward, but still required 
active management, with appropriate follow up questions so that interviewees could 
explain the context of their answers or provide further examples. 
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3.6 Data Analysis 
3.6.1 Analysing the survey dataset 
The survey results were analysed using a series of statistical functions in MS Excel and 
the SPSS 14.0 software package. A range of statistical tests was employed (Chi 
Square, Kruskal Wallis and k-means), providing a number of significant relationships in 
the data that helped shed light on the study aims. Where further investigation was 
required that was not open to standard statistical tests, simple methods to provide 
comparative analyses were adopted (such as, for example, the use of weighted scores 
to determine the incidence of conflicts of interest by institution type). A background 
dataset to support later Tables and Figures is provided at Appendix 4. 
The responses from different types of institution, and the equivalent UK distribution, are 
summarised in Table 5. A separate category was used to describe a number of 
teaching-led institutions that had just gained university title at the time of the survey. It 
was thought that the process of applying for university title might have caused a greater 
than normal focus on governance issues, particularly in terms of levels of advice 
provided by the secretary to the governing body. In the later analysis of the provision 
of advice, they have been kept as a separate category, but in other tests they have 
been combined with the post-92 group, an approach supported by the initial evaluation 
of the dataset. 
Table 5: The distribution of survey responses 
Institution type Count % UK Count % 
Pre-92 university 
Post-92 university 
University title just obtained 
Higher education college 
46 
32 
8 
24 
41.8 
29.1 
7.3 
21.8 
73 
44 
10 
39 
44.0 
26.5 
6.0 
23.5 
Total 110 100.0 166 100.0 
An assessment of the dataset was conducted to determine whether or not it reflected 
the expected distribution of the survey population. A chi-square test was undertaken 
(Neave and Worthington, 1988) to check the distribution of responses against the 
expected frequency of two variables: the regional distribution of higher education 
institutions (across 12 regions) and the type of institution (across the 4 institution types 
shown in Table 5). These variables could be determined with relative ease from 
published data or knowledge of the institution. Other variables were considered, such 
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as the number of students in each institution, but information supplied in the survey 
responses was thought likely to be different to published data, which is often several 
years out of date. A critical test chi-square value was used, the results of which are 
shown in Table 6. The entries marked (a) indicate that both chi-square results were 
less than the critical chi-square values, so the null hypothesis (H0) that there was no 
difference in the distribution of sample respondent institutions from the national 
distribution was accepted. 
Table 6: Results of the critical chi­square values test 
Variable Critical chi square value Chi square** df 
Regional distribution (a) 
Institution type (a) 
Regional distribution (b) 
Institution type (b) 
19.68 
7.81 
9.49 
5.99 
2.70 
0.74 
0.73 
0.68 
11 
3 
4 
2 
** Significance level 0.05 
To reduce the possibility of a Type II error, a second test was run with the 8 new 
universities amalgamated into the post-92 group and the regions reclassified into 5 
(Scotland, North, Central, South and London) to remove smaller original categories. 
The results in Table 6 marked (b) confirmed that the H0 could still be accepted. 
Despite the ‘goodness of fit’ of the survey sample, there were instances of a significant 
number of missing values in response to other questions in the survey, making reliance 
on parametric statistical techniques problematic. The overall size of the respondent 
population further suggested that non-parametric statistical tests should be employed 
in later analyses, interpreted by reference to the source dataset. 
In order to determine whether there were any underlying structures in the way 
respondents had answered certain survey questions, a cluster analysis was performed 
using the k-means method. The k-means cluster technique is an algorithm in which a 
fixed number of desired or hypothesised clusters are formed to which observations 
may then be assigned, ‘so that the means across clusters (for all variables) are as 
different from each other as possible’ (Statsoft Inc, 2004, p.6). In this way it is possible 
to ‘segment’ scale-based data to see if the resulting clusters can be characterised in 
any way (Walley, Custance and Parsons, 2000). Specified cluster numbers were 
incrementally increased until a solution provided a very small cluster group, and the 
cluster level immediately before this iteration was employed. The investigation was 
initially conducted on two scale-based survey questions, also used later in the interview 
stage of the project, where a sufficient response had been obtained for the analysis. 
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The questions concerned (a) the understanding of the role of the secretary (survey 
question 22 with 7 elements; 94 cases) and (b) the influence of the secretary, chair and 
head of institution on a range of governance factors (survey question 29 with 10 
elements in each of 3 sets; 87 cases). In each analysis three clusters were apparent 
from the data but their relationship to other variables in the dataset proved difficult to 
determine. A chi-square cross-tabulation of these cluster groupings with a range of 
other variables did not provide any significant results where the minimum expected 
frequency test was satisfied. A further analysis of the amount of time spent by key 
people on governance matters (survey question 20 with 6 elements; 94 cases) 
produced a very small cluster group in the four cluster solution and two small cluster 
groups in the five cluster solution. The optimal solution was therefore deemed to be 
three clusters (Table 7). 
Table 7: Cluster groupings from the k­means cluster analysis (survey question 20: time 
spent by key people in the governance system) 
Clusters used in Number of cases observed in each test result 
each test iteration 
2 3 4 5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
27 
67 
-
-
-
43 
28 
23 
-
-
6 
41 
19 
28 
-
7 
27 
13 
43 
4 
Valid cases 
Missing cases 
94 
16 
94 
16 
94 
16 
94 
16 
When the three clusters were cross-tabulated with other variables, the chi-square value 
for the association between the clusters and type of institution (with the newly 
established universities amalgamated into the post-92 group) was 12.58 with 4 degrees 
of freedom and a significance probability of 0.013. This appeared to suggest that 
there was an underlying relationship between the time spent by key people on 
governance matters and type of institution in the population from which the sample of 
110 respondents was drawn. 
The question set on time spent on governance was derived from the relationship 
factors group in the conceptual model in Figure 2 (page 63). Further data from 
questions based on this group and the ‘governance in action’ group were used to 
characterise the clusters (see pages 131-133). The characterisation specifically used 
data derived from a set of survey questions concerning the contribution to institutional 
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governance of the governing body, its key players and external guidance, as well as 
the provision of support by the secretary to the governing body’s work. These 
questions were expected to provide an insight into the perceptions of the secretaries on 
institutional governance that was distinct from information gained about governance 
practices covered elsewhere in the survey, for example the contribution of key players 
to the nominations process. 
Despite the association shown between the time spent on governance and institutional 
type it seemed likely that any potential cluster grouping from the survey data would be 
the, ‘property of complex and contingent mechanisms in reality’ (Byrne, 2002, p.105). 
The clusters were therefore not intended to identify causal processes but to help 
identify groups of secretaries that had a similar view about, and attitudes towards, the 
governance of their institution so as to develop a new typology of governance practice 
and a greater understanding of the role and influence of the secretary in different 
institutional settings. The analysis also suggested that unless there were special 
reasons to separate out the newly established universities they should be combined, in 
further tests, with other post-92 institutions. 
3.6.2 Analyzing the interview dataset 
A data display and analysis approach was adopted for the interview material (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994), involving the reduction of the main question themes (Appendix 3) to 
a matrix-based summary (Dey, 1993; Strauss et al., 1998) for each of the three key 
governance players (the secretary, chair and head of institution). The interview text 
and matrix summaries (Appendix 5) provided the means to code the responses of the 
interviewees in terms of the frequency of particular approaches to the question at hand 
or in cases where governance relationships were of particular interest. The analysis 
enabled patterns in the interview data to be identified, between members of each set of 
key players and between the key players in each institution, from which it was then 
possible to extract sections of text that reflected the main interview findings whilst 
helping to illustrate, or ‘add qualification’ (Walker, 1985, p.16) to the results of the 
survey through the ‘voices’ of key participants in the governance process. It was 
expected that the interview material would complement the quantitative findings, with 
the survey providing a structure for the qualitative analysis and the interviews providing 
a means for commentary on the results of the survey (Walker, 1985, p.16). 
Interviewees were first categorised by role, type of institution and gender. The type of 
institution was used to check the influence of institutional structure on key issues in the 
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interview schedule, such as the range of roles held by the secretary. The interview 
responses were then classified initially across each role to identify common threads 
and their frequency of occurrence. One example was the widespread view amongst 
secretaries (67% of interviewees) of the importance of being engaged in governor 
induction programmes. Second-level analyses looked at particular features that the 
interviewees had highlighted in their responses (in this case, for example, the 
importance of social interactions during induction, or the desire to highlight the role of 
the secretary described in Chapter 4 (pp.101-103). Interesting or novel views outside 
the majority response (or occasionally within it) were identified to shed light on new 
perspectives. In this instance, the view of one interviewee about the longevity of the 
secretary’s influence with new governors following their induction programme (Chapter 
4, p.103) provided a glimpse into the nature of relationships between governing body 
members and the secretary. 
A third aspect of the analysis concerned the comparison of responses, in each 
institution, between the secretary, chair and head of institution. Cases where there 
was an agreement in views were identified, such as in a pre-92 institution where the 
head of institution was regarded by all three as the most influential of the key players 
(Chapter 5, p.146). Differences of opinion also emerged between the key players that 
pointed to tensions in the governance system and some difficulties in personal 
relationships (Chapter 5, p.141). Other cases have been used to provide a ‘voice’ for 
the views of the key players about their colleagues, and their respective positions and 
contributions to the institution’s governance. 
3.7 Conclusion 
The research design and implementation was based on a considerable degree of 
preparation, which undoubtedly assisted the research process at both the survey and 
interview stages. Despite difficulties associated with access to the survey population, a 
large amount of data and contextual information was obtained. 
The initial analysis of the survey dataset suggested that it was representative of the 
overall population of higher education institutions in the UK, although the same degree 
of significance was not apparent for the response to more detailed questions, 
particularly on sensitive governance or relationship issues. Nevertheless, the survey 
dataset represented a comprehensive view of the perceptions of secretaries about their 
role and position within the governance systems of their institutions, and provided a 
valuable resource with which to conduct later analyses. The interview process was 
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illuminating in that it allowed the views of heads of institutions and chairs to be 
gathered in a comprehensive way, to build upon the knowledge base gained from the 
survey data. 
In order to present this material in a logical format, it was necessary to consider 
whether the quantitative and qualitative elements of the results should be presented 
separately, or in some other way. The approach of separating the results appeared to 
reinforce the distinction between the two methods rather than find ways in which the 
strengths provided by their interplay might be exploited (Strauss et al., 1998, p.33). In 
particular, given the feedback from the survey group about the importance of local 
nuances in governance practice, it was thought necessary to find a way to allow the 
qualitative findings to lend context to the quantitative results. Complementarities within 
the data could then address slightly different aspects of the research findings, with 
qualitative data used to enlighten social processes and quantitative data to examine 
associations, and ways in which they might be generalised (Hammersley, 1996). To 
this end, a themed approach was adopted, enabling the main areas of the study to 
drive the presentation of the empirical work, whilst allowing some overlap between the 
themes and, thereby, reflecting the ‘real-life’ application of governance practice. 
Chapter 4 therefore concentrates on presenting and considering the results of the 
research in relation to the role of the secretary, whilst Chapter 5 moves on to present 
and consider the influence of the secretary’s role in governing relationships and the 
work of the governing body. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH RESULTS AND ANALYSIS: THE ROLE OF THE SECRETARY 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the role of the governing body secretary by exploring some of 
the elements derived from the ‘key factors’ model provided in Figure 2. The first 
section looks at the background of the survey group using basic demographic 
information and data about previous careers and professional qualifications. The parts 
played by the chair and the head of institution in the oversight of the secretary’s role 
and appraisal arrangements are then considered, to determine whether they have any 
bearing on the relationship between the three key players. The second section reviews 
how the secretary helps shape the work of the governing body, by considering the 
selection and induction of new governors, the way in which the secretary manages 
other institutional functions and participates in decision-making systems, the 
preparation and management of governing body meetings and the provision of advice 
in those meetings. 
In some sections in this Chapter, and in Chapter 5, the results of the survey and related 
interview material are shown alongside each other. Percentage figures are provided 
with the interview material to reflect the occurrence of similar comments amongst 
interviewees. The quantitative and qualitative results are, however, intended to 
complement, rather than provide corroborating evidence for each other, as discussed 
in Chapter 3. 
Throughout the following analyses, the names of those who contributed, and of their 
institutions, are not provided so as to preserve the anonymity of the survey participants 
and interviewees. References to a specific name, or element of the governance 
structure, for example an untypical name given to the governing body, have also been 
altered and appear in square brackets in the interview extracts. In these extracts, the 
type of institution has been identified to give the reader an insight into the background 
of the institution and an alphabetical coding system indicates the range of interview 
material that has been used. In presenting the interview material there was a concern 
that a verbatim account would detract from the impact of the key issues raised in the 
text. In some cases, therefore, the extracts were edited to remove repeated phrases, 
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or verbalised hesitations, so that the essence of the point made by the interviewee 
would be clear. 
4.2 The background of governing body secretaries and oversight of their role 
4.2.1 Demographic information and career history 
To begin to understand the secretary’s role, basic demographic information about the 
survey respondents was obtained. The results (Table 8) show a respondent group 
broadly two-thirds male and one-third female. The vast majority of the group were 
directly employed by their institution, with only two contracted to undertake the role by 
way of an external appointment. Similarly, most were employed full-time, with both 
external post-holders falling into the smaller part-time category. 
Table 8: Survey respondent profile 
Survey response Male or Female Type of Appointment Full or Part Time 
Male Female Internal External Full-time Part-time 
Count 
Percentage 
74 
67.3 
36 
32.7 
108 
98.2 
2 
1.8 
97 
88.2 
13 
11.8 
The majority of secretaries had been appointed in the last 5 years (Table 9), but the 
range of ages was broad (Table 10), with two full-time secretaries in the 30-39 cohort 
and only twelve in the age range over 60. The majority of secretaries were between 50 
and 60, as might be expected given the seniority of the role, but the number in the 40-
49 cohort, representing over 33% (n=110) of respondents, was higher than expected 
and covered a range of institution types and sizes. The institutions of 33 respondents 
in this age bracket could be identified from the survey returns, revealing that 14 came 
from multi-faculty pre-92 universities, 12 from multi-faculty post-92 universities and 7 
from specialist institutions of either classification. The even spread of the younger age 
band of secretaries belies the older image of the ‘Registrar’ found in earlier studies, 
particularly given that 17 of the 26 people in the multi-faculty institutions in the 40-49 
age category appeared to hold the most senior administrative position in their 
institution. 
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Table 9: The year of appointment of governing body secretaries 
Year Count % 
1980-89 9 8.2 
1990-99 41 37.3 
2000-05 60 54.5 
Total 110 100.0 
Table 10: The age ranges of governing body secretaries 
Age Count % 
Under 30 0 0.0 
30-39 2 1.8 
40-49 37 33.6 
50-59 59 53.6 
Over 60 12 10.9 
Total 110 100.0 
The respondents were asked to indicate their immediate work background prior to 
taking on their current role (Table 11). The majority had worked in the higher education 
sector beforehand, with less than 10% (n=109) originating from the private sector. 
These results differed, somewhat, from the report of a survey undertaken by AHUA 
(Hoad, 2003), in which, from 79 respondents, 53 (67%) had worked outside the HE 
sector, although information on the areas of work outside HE was not provided. 
Table 11: The immediate sector background of governing body secretaries 
Sector Count % 
No response 1 -
Higher Education 
Public sector 
Private sector 
80 
19 
10 
73.4 
17.4 
9.2 
Total 109 100 
The spread of career backgrounds (Table 12) was more diverse, although many had 
been in a higher education setting. With 58.2% (n=110) of respondents having a 
background in academic or general administration, the ‘generalist’ nature of the wider 
roles attached to that of secretary was very apparent. The lack of a background in 
legal or governance work did not appear to have been a principal concern for those 
appointing secretaries from within the sector, where only 4 had this specialist 
experience. Secretaries from a public sector background were also most often 
generalist administrators, with only 2 having a legal/governance background. This 
could indicate a priority given to the other roles often held by the secretary and for a 
requirement for general management skills over a range of subject areas rather than 
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Table 12: Career backgrounds of governing body secretaries 
Area of Work Count % 
Financial administration 
HR administration 
Academic administration 
General administration 
Legal/Governance 
Academic 
Other University function 
Other background 
8 
2 
35 
29 
13 
4 
5 
14 
7.3 
1.8 
31.8 
26.4 
11.8 
3.6 
4.5 
12.7 
Total 110 100 
the specialist knowledge required to deal with governance alone. Yet, of the 10 
secretaries with a private sector background, 7 came from a legal/governance career 
path, including the two ‘external’ secretaries noted earlier. A chi-square test of 
independence was used to examine the relationship between sector background (see 
Table 11) and type of institution. It was necessary, in this case and with other chi-
square tests of independence, to pool the HE Colleges and post-92 universities into a 
single group so as not to invalidate the analysis. On the basis of these broad 
governance ‘constitution-based’ groups, the difference between the variables was 
significant, X2(2, N = 109) = 8.93, p = .011. Pre-92 institutions tended to have more 
secretaries with a higher education background, there was a broadly even spread of 
those with a public sector background, and those with a private sector background 
were more prevalent in post-92 institutions. 
4.2.2 Professional qualifications 
Career paths are also partly related to demonstrable expertise, so participants were 
asked to provide details of their professional qualifications. The results (Table 13) were 
difficult to analyse because the interpretation of ‘professional’ was taken very widely, 
with many respondents noting their academic qualifications in the ‘other’ category. The 
question was not intended to suggest that other qualifications were unimportant, 
particularly where, for example, respondents held academic qualifications relating to 
corporate governance or similar disciplines, but to investigate whether the secretary 
tended to have a professional qualification that might enable a particular level of 
‘expert’ influence to be brought to bear on the governing body. Given the generalist 
nature of the backgrounds in this role, it was thought possible that a certain ‘push 
factor’ on governance practice might be found where respondents held the qualification 
of a professional body engaged in promoting ‘good governance’. 
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In the event, the lack of any type of professional qualification by two-thirds of 
respondents was of equal interest, emphasising, perhaps, the mostly academically 
qualified background of many of the post-holders. Where relevant professional 
qualifications were held, they were mainly of five types: legal, chartered accountants, 
chartered personnel managers, chartered secretaries and chartered managers. Some 
chartered accountancy organisations have been particularly active in work on corporate 
governance, as has the Chartered Institute of Secretaries and Administrators. All told, 
these five qualifications accounted for 26 individuals (23.6% of the survey population, 
n=110), including the four secretaries holding two such qualifications. 
Table 13: Professional qualifications held by governing body secretaries 
Qualification Count % 
No response 2 -
Do not hold a professional qualification 
Legal 
Chartered Accountant 
Chartered Secretary 
Chartered Personnel Manager 
Chartered Manager 
Other 
66 
8 
5 
8 
5 
4 
16 
58.9 
7.1 
4.5 
7.1 
4.5 
3.6 
14.3 
Total 
4 hold 2 qualifications 
112 
4 
100.0 
Total 108 
An analysis was undertaken of professional qualifications, by age and gender of the 
secretary, which required account to be taken of those with dual qualifications by 
crediting each category with 0.5 of a qualification. This was necessary to be able to 
analyse professional qualifications against total survey respondents. The dual 
qualifications are indicated in Tables 14 and 15 by letter after the respective 
qualifications (such that the links between people with both a legal and Chartered 
Secretary qualification are shown as (a) and so on). From this analysis (Table 14) it 
can be seen that the 40-49 age cohort had more professionally qualified secretaries 
(29.7%) than the 50-59 age cohort (16.9%). Both of these cohorts were lower than the 
relatively small 60-65 age cohort. The Chartered Managers were exclusively male and 
the other professions were divided (Table 15) in terms of gender, with a greater 
proportion of males than females holding professional qualifications. 
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Table 14: Professional qualifications by age cohort 
Qualification/Age 30­39 40­49 50­59 Over 60 
Legal (a) (a) (b) 
Chartered Accountant 
Chartered Secretary (a) (a) 
Chartered Personnel Manager (c) 
Chartered Manager (b) (c) 
2.5 
2 
2 
3 
1.5 
2 
3 
3 
1 
1 
2 
2 
0.5 
0.5 
Total 0 11 10 5 
Population by age (%) 1.8 33.6 53.6 10.9 
Population % with qualifications 0 29.7 16.9 41.7 
Table 15: Professional qualifications by gender 
Qualification/Age Male Female 
Legal (a) (a) (b) 
Chartered Accountant 
Chartered Secretary (a) (a) 
Chartered Personnel Manager (c) 
Chartered Manager (b) (c) 
3.5 
2 
6 
3.5 
3 
3 
3 
1 
1 
0 
Total 18 8 
Population by gender (%) 67.3 32.7 
Population % with qualifications 24.3 22.2 
A chi-square test of independence examined the relationship between types of 
qualification (‘professional’, ‘other’ or ‘no role-related qualification’) and type of 
institution (‘pre-92’ or ‘post-92’). On this basis the difference between the variables 
was significant, X2(2, N = 107) = 6.74, p = .034. Pre-92 institutions had a lower 
proportion of secretaries with professional qualifications, and a higher reported rate of 
secretaries with no role-related qualification, than post-92 institutions. More post-92 
institution secretaries claimed other (often academic) qualifications related to their role 
than pre-92 institution secretaries. 
The following interview extracts, one from an external secretary with a legal 
background and the other from an internal secretary with a personnel qualification, 
reflected the general view (89% of secretaries) that a professional background was 
helpful in the technical delivery of the role, but that it was more important to have the 
skills to establish a link between governance and decision-making elsewhere in the 
institution, and an ability to manage governing relationships: 
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“Well, I mean the legal background obviously is useful even though I wouldn't say I was a 
legal professional in this field……..It does give you a certain familiarity with the way the law 
works and a certain comfortableness about coping with documentation. But I think in some 
ways the thing that helps me most in this is actually my local authority experience, because 
having sat in and chaired local government meetings gives you a hugely deep 
understanding of how committees work, how structures work, how agendas should work, 
how minutes and papers should work. You do get a very, very clear feel for that relationship 
between the policy directors, ie the councillors, or in this case the governors and the 
executive staff.….” 
HEC Secretary (H) 
“In so far as personnel, it was pretty close to the corporate heart of the institution I suppose 
rather than being peripheral, so I think it was relevant in that sense. I’m not sure that 
beyond that the actual specialisation in personnel…..carries any particular weight with the 
governing board now other than it was a corporate function, which meant that I’d got a lot of 
experience of being close to the heart of the university.” 
Pre-92 Secretary (A) 
An understanding of the academic environment was also particularly important (78%), 
possibly because of the background of most governing body secretaries, but also 
because of the technical and procedural experience that this provided in lieu of any 
particular type of professional training: 
“I was particularly involved in academic policy development and academic regulatory work 
and quality assurance……in my early career so those have obviously been directly helpful. 
It gives me an understanding, I think, of the nature and the heart of the institution and what 
it’s about and that I think then lends credibility to advice I give to governors, particularly on 
issues around the boundary between the role of the board and the role of the senate, or the 
role of Vice Chancellor versus the role of the board.” 
Post-92 Secretary (F) 
One interviewee noted that higher-level academic qualifications, as well as experience, 
could lend credibility to the role amongst academic colleagues and counter the 
perception of a comprehensive drift towards ‘corporatism’ and ‘managerial values’ in 
higher education: 
“If you’ve got a group of administrators who have got similar qualifications as the 
academics hold, actually you’ve gone quite a long way to narrowing the so-called us and 
them gap because at least one has some sympathy and understanding of what they’re 
doing….. I think also it does….help the council to remember what they’re doing - you know 
that we are an academic organisation, we’re not a PLC.” 
Pre-92 Secretary (O) 
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4.2.3 Oversight of the secretary’s role 
When asked about their reporting line in their role of secretary, the majority indicated 
that they reported to the chair (56%, n=109) but a significant number said that they 
reported to the governing body (25.7%). Nine (8.3%) replied that they reported to the 
head of institution whilst the remaining eleven (10.1%) had dual reporting lines to the 
chair and head of institution, reported to a senior administrator (3 cases) or were not 
clear about their reporting line (2 cases). Responsibilities for other functional areas 
were more clear cut, with 78.1% (n=96) reporting to the head of institution, 12.5% to a 
Deputy or Pro Vice Chancellor and 7.3% to a senior administrator. Two respondents 
had multiple reporting lines. 
The arrangements for appraisal of secretarial work were different, as shown in Tables 
16 and 17. Slightly fewer secretaries (47.5%, n=101 versus 56%, n=109) were 
appraised solely by the chair than were considered, by the secretary, to be responsible 
to the chair, although the position was balanced somewhat by the 9 cases who were 
appraised jointly by the chair and head of institution, and others where the chair was 
involved in the process with another member of the institution’s staff. More surprising, 
when the independence of the role of secretary is considered, was the significant 
number of secretaries appraised solely by the head of institution. In one of these cases 
(an ancient university), this was because of an overlapping role between the chair and 
head of institution. In another, the appraisal arrangements for the other roles held by 
the secretary were not supplied and in a third, the secretarial role was appraised by the 
head of institution and other roles by a member of administrative staff. In the remaining 
18 cases, however, the head of institution appraised all of the duties held by the 
secretary. Over half of these cases occurred in pre-92 institutions (Table 18). 
Table 16: Appraisal arrangements for the role of governing body secretary 
Appraisal in Secretary Role Count % 
No response 9 -
Chair 
Chair and Head of Institution 
Head of Institution only 
Chair/Senior member of staff 
Chair/Deputy Chair 
Senior member of HEI staff 
Remuneration Committee 
Board 
Not sure/no-one 
48 
9 
21 
1 
2 
9 
4 
2 
5 
47.5 
8.9 
20.8 
1.0 
2.0 
8.9 
4.0 
2.0 
5.0 
Total 101 100.0 
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Table 17: Appraisal arrangements for other roles undertaken by governing body 
secretaries 
Appraisal in Other Roles Count % 
No response 9 ­
Head of Institution 
Deputy/Pro Head of Institution 
Senior member of HEI staff 
Other Manager 
Remuneration Committee 
Chair/Head of Institution 
Not applicable or no-one 
76 
9 
6 
4 
2 
2 
2 
75.2 
8.9 
5.9 
4.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
Total 101 100.0 
Table 18: Appraisal of the secretarial role solely by the head of institution by institution 
type 
Type of Institution Count % 
Pre-92 institution 
Post-92 institution 
HE College 
Institution type not provided 
11 
1 
4 
2 
61.1 
5.6 
22.2 
11.1 
Total 18 100.0 
The interviews suggested that in some cases (22%), where the formal appraisal was 
held only by the head of institution, there was a discussion about it with the chair, so 
that all three parties were at least aware of the general issues arising from the 
process: 
“I think I’m not alone in being discussed by the Vice Chancellor with the chairman, as part 
of his own appraisal I suspect, and I’m comfortable with it……And having said that I’m fairly 
clear that I’m accountable in both directions and so I do see myself as accounting to the 
chairman for my actions from time to time, even though there’s no involvement in the 
appraisal…..” 
Post-92 Secretary (F) 
Other institutions (44%), had adopted a joint approach to appraisal to ensure that the 
work of the governing body, and other institutional responsibilities, were seen to be on 
a par and were reviewed in an integrated way: 
“I think it works reasonably well in so far as that system recognises my split responsibility. 
Yes, you could have two separate appraisals but then you get the issue of do they pull 
apart…..So in that sense doing it together I think emphasises the importance of the three of 
us understanding what we’re all doing….” 
Pre-92 Secretary (A) 
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“It’s all seen as one…. The annual appraisal, review as we call it, is undertaken by the 
chair, the vice chair and myself, but generally we haven't actually sat down and said ‘let’s 
look at this role separately from that role’, it’s looking at the two together.” 
HEC Principal (W) 
In yet others (22%), separate appraisal discussions took place between the secretary 
and the head of institution and chair. This had occasionally proved problematic: 
“….The old chairman took no interest in managing me really, he just sort of saw that I was 
there to provide advice and to make sure that the (governing body) ran effectively and so I 
effectively reported to the Vice Chancellor for everything. But the new chairman has taken 
everything that’s in the CUC governance guide very literally and very seriously, so he’s 
insisted on having an appraisal with me and setting objectives and things, and it has 
caused me quite a bit of difficulty……” 
Post-92 Secretary (Y) 
The chair of the same institution suggested that the way in which the separate 
appraisals by the head of institution and chair were ‘joined up’ was rather more 
straightforward: 
“We sit down together and just agree what the results of the two pieces are and obviously 
his is a much bigger piece than mine…….” 
Post-92 Chair (Z) 
It was apparent that the ‘independence’ of an appraisal system, at least in the 
institutions that were interviewed, was less important than the ability of those 
conducting the interviews to have an understanding of the culture of the sector and to 
be able to find an effective way of communicating the results between all three key 
players in the governance system. This sometimes extended to an openness, on the 
part of the head of institution, to having their targets and objectives discussed with the 
secretary in order to help create a stronger ‘team approach’ to institutional priorities. 
4.3 The secretary’s role in shaping the work of the governing body 
The secretary undertakes a range of activities that impact upon the management of 
governance and governing relationships within their institution. Important stages 
include the recruitment and induction of new governors, the management of other 
functions and participation in decision-making systems within the institution, the 
preparation and management of governing body meetings and participation in those 
meetings. The management of more formal interventions on governing body 
effectiveness are yet another way in which the influence of the secretary might be 
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seen. The survey questionnaire sought to obtain information from secretaries about 
each of these processes, and the participation of key individuals within them. A 
chronological approach was adopted, where each task was broken down into a series 
of sub-tasks, to help participants follow what was expected to be a familiar pattern of 
activity in governance-related duties. By undertaking this form of review it was hoped 
that patterns of engagement would emerge that would usefully describe the role of the 
secretary in each of the task and sub-task areas. 
4.3.1 The recruitment of new governors 
The Nominations Committee typically identifies and selects new members of the 
governing body, and so has a major role to play in shaping the membership, style and 
effectiveness of the governing body. Survey participants were asked to identify who, in 
their institution, dealt with various elements of the recruitment and selection process. 
The responses (Figure 3) indicated that the secretary had a major part to play in all 
aspects of the committee’s work, apart from the sub-task of making the first approach 
to potential new members, where the responsibility was more evenly split between the 
chair (26.2%, n=103), the head of institution (26.2%, n=103) and the secretary (35.9%, 
n=103). The contribution of the secretary inside Nominations Committee meetings 
was investigated in the interview stage of the project. The interviews complemented 
the survey findings in the majority of cases. In the first instance, 67% of secretaries 
thought it important to be involved in the selection of governors so as to be able to 
keep a watching brief over the constitution, and effectiveness, of the governing body: 
“I think it’s important. At the nominations stage it’s keeping an eye on the overall shape of 
the council…..Now within that….whenever there are vacancies you would tend to home in 
on particular areas. But, that having been said, nominations committees always have a 
tendency to say, ‘Ah yeah but we’d like’ or ‘isn’t X such a good chap?’, if he is a chap! So I 
think it’s useful to be involved at that stage, both to have some influence on the way the 
debate is going and to get a feeling for who’s in the frame…..” 
Pre-92 Secretary (A) 
“…..I think one of the things that I would like to think that I’ve had at least some influence 
on over the last two years, and certainly acted as a catalyst for because other people have 
got into it, is actually the quality and the calibre of the people who are now coming on to 
our council…. " 
Pre-92 Secretary (O) 
It was also clear that whilst some chairs and heads of institutions (33%) 
acknowledged the part played by the secretary, which often extended to sharing 
views on the merits of particular candidates, they had a tendency to conclude that 
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Figure 3: Tasks related to the work of the Nominations Committee 
the influence was no greater than other members of the Committee and that 
decisions remained committee-based: 
“It's a very important role of the secretary to remind the governors on the nominations 
committee that governing bodies shouldn't just be full of accountants, for example …..” 
Post-92 VC (AA) 
“His views in relation to the nominations process would be seriously considered but I think 
that, up until now, he hasn’t had the opportunity really of having a strong influence that 
would determine who’s coming and who’s not. I think he makes his contribution.” 
Pre-92 Chair (Q) 
“…at the end of the day the decision of the committee is the decision of the committee, and 
the clerk’s role actually is to carry that decision through.” 
HEC Principal (W) 
In other institutions (55%), however, the influence of the secretary was demonstrated 
in the backstage processes that underpinned the work of the Nominations Committee. 
In particular, the opportunity for the secretary to meet with potential new governors, or 
to share their knowledge of candidates, was considered vital, not just by the secretary: 
“We then come back and narrow it down hopefully to one person. That person then has to 
come to lunch with the Vice Chancellor, the Registrar and myself…..At the end of that….if 
we don’t think the person’s appropriate for whatever reason, we say no. They may say 
no.” 
Pre-92 Chair (B) 
“The chairman and I…..then do a general trawl for nominations and the chairman and I 
then sit down together, scrutinise those nominations and recommend to the committee the 
people that they might want to explore further so that there’s some steer by the time it goes 
to the committee….I will have had a hand in that steer.” 
Post-92 Secretary (F) 
In one institution, the process was very much in the hands of the head of institution, but 
that did not mean that the Nominations Committee always agreed: 
“…..What actually happens is that a lot of interesting people come forward, the Principal 
does have his own set of nominations and tries to get it through. It’s fascinating watching 
because the governors are strong, they won’t be brow-beaten and often [the Principal] will 
find he doesn’t get his own way.” 
HEC Secretary (V) 
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“I don't feel entirely comfortable with the process as adopted at the moment and I think … 
it’s going to change anyway. If it wasn’t going to change, I think I would probably be 
suggesting that we should change it….It’s this group of critical friends thing isn’t it. You 
can’t really let the people you're critical of choose the group and I think the balance isn't 
quite right there.” 
HEC Chair (X) 
So, even though the secretary could have a major role in the processes supporting 
governor selection, this does not mean that they always played a part in decision-
making by the Nominations Committee, although, in practice, many secretaries 
seemed able to contribute their views in a way equivalent to that of a committee 
member. The role of the secretary may, however, be more evident in background work 
associated with the selection process, including informal ‘pre-selection’ discussions or 
activities, particularly with the chair and head of institution. 
4.3.2 The induction of new governors 
Early relationship building can also be reinforced by the way in which governor 
induction is managed, particularly if the role of the secretary is as extensive, even if 
backstage, as that seen in the nominations process. Figure 4, again, takes a task 
based approach to this question. In this case, however, the role of the chair is more 
apparent in certain aspects of governor induction, particularly in determining the format, 
timing and content of the programme and evaluating its effectiveness. It still falls to the 
secretary, however, to manage these elements and, in many cases, but most often with 
the head of institution, take part in the delivery of induction. 
Most of the interviewed secretaries (67%) suggested that it was important for them to 
be involved in governor induction to help establish an early relationship with governors 
and emphasise the role of the secretary with the governing body: 
“It’s important….on two levels. Part of the induction is obviously about governance matters 
which I’m clearly the person able to make an input on, and also in terms of forming a 
relationship…..It’s all….part of forming that relationship and actually establishing myself as, 
in a way, the key source of information.” 
Post-92 Secretary (F) 
“Oh I think it’s vital, I think it’s vital at the very beginning to set the scene….It’s mainly that 
they can get an idea of what the role is about and what the institution’s about. I think the 
induction training session that I would have with everybody, it’s vital for me as much as it is 
for them…..I can say to them then things that I feel, the basic things, I want them to know 
about their responsibilities about the role, and then about the particular job that you might 
see them do as far as the sub committee structure’s concerned.” 
Post-92 Secretary (K) 
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Figure 4: Tasks related to governor induction 
The social aspect of the induction process was further recognised both by secretaries 
and some heads of institutions (33%): 
“It’s very useful. I think it’s actually useful just having the informal lunch process so you can 
chat to people over that and just make them aware that you are there.” 
HEC Secretary (H) 
“The way we do it here is it is principally….the responsibility of the secretary. I will have a 
slot in the induction programme because, apart from anything else, it’s useful if I don't 
know the individual, to, if you like, establish a social rapport.” 
Post-92 VC (E) 
In one institution, however, the social process was less important than establishing the 
place and role of the secretary in the governance of the institution: 
“I don’t try and form a social relationship with them really. I prefer to keep it a bit more 
arm’s length but in terms of people coming to me for advice and information and so forth, I 
don't think there’s any problem with that. Some of the governors who were here before I 
came maybe will still talk to the Vice Chancellor because they know him better, but new 
ones, it’s fairly clear that it’s this office they deal with.” 
Post-92 Secretary (Y) 
Opinion was divided as to whether induction provided the secretary with any influence 
with new governors. There were some (44%) who felt that it helped establish 
governors in their new role and that the secretary’s contribution was therefore 
important and influential: 
“In terms of induction they [the secretary] have a very important role because they organise 
it and how well or how badly it’s done depends on how well the governor feels he or she is 
prepared to take on the task of being a governor. So, important role in terms of making 
sure that they get a rounded view, they know where the problems are, they know where the 
opportunities are, they are able to come up to speed so while they are at the board 
meeting, they can contribute from a position of knowledge…..” 
Pre-92 Chair (D) 
“It’s a process which gives a clear stamp from the secretary…and the chair to make sure 
that people have an opportunity really, in the absence of myself, to ask those idiot 
questions which you sometimes you feel you need to ask in those early days, without being 
over exposed.” 
HEC Principal (I) 
Other interviewees (22%) felt that influence arising from induction was no greater than 
other aspects of governance, and could soon be lost or replaced by other factors: 
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“I understand that it could possibly lead to a very strong relationship, but in reality it 
doesn’t. I would say definitely it doesn’t and the reason is simply that I’m recognised as an 
officer…and….on taking part in the first governing body meeting, they align themselves to 
other governors….” 
HEC Secretary (V) 
Overall, however, the value of governor induction, and of the key role played by the 
secretary in its organisation and delivery, appeared not to be in dispute. 
4.3.3 The secretary’s role in institutional management and decision­making 
structures 
The questionnaire asked for information about the range of activities managed by 
respondents because the wider role of the secretary within the institution was expected 
to impact upon the nature and influence of the position. The resulting picture was 
complex, reflecting the issues about titles and role-range noted earlier, but three broad 
categories emerged: secretaries who had no other functional responsibilities (12.8%, 
n=109); those responsible for all administrative functions (20.2%) and those where the 
functional range was more limited. Where specific functions were managed (67%) they 
are shown, in Table 19, in rank order (with percentages against the 109 responses 
received and including multiple responses). A final category of ‘Other areas’ covers a 
range of responsibilities not easily classified elsewhere. 
The survey questionnaire highlighted, for ease of response, the major functional 
categories in a typical university administration, but did not include areas such as a 
legal work or risk management. Both of these functions might therefore be 
underrepresented if they were not identified by the respondent. Nevertheless, the 
management of other areas tended towards academic support services, health and 
safety and human resources. There were relatively few cases where the finance 
function reported to the secretary, possibly because of ‘flatter’ administrative structures 
where, in many cases, the head of finance reported directly to the head of institution. 
Another major element of the secretary’s role involves participation in the institution’s 
committees, either as secretary or in an advisory capacity. Many respondents felt that 
they played both roles in their work as secretary to committees, and so, again, the 
responses provided a complex picture with multiple responses (Table 20). It was not 
possible to analyse this data further across the survey population, because some 
institutions do not have certain committees (for example a separate estates 
committee). Nevertheless, the review of the secretarial and advisory role played by 
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many governing body secretaries in areas such as finance and audit/risk management 
demonstrated a role range, and potential influence, that extended beyond the major 
functional areas directly managed by secretaries in their other institutional roles. 
Table 19: Functional areas managed by governing body secretaries 
Function Count %Respondents 
No others 
All administrative functions 
14 
22 
12.8 
20.2 
Registry/Academic Services 
Health & Safety 
Human Resources 
Estates 
Public/External Relations 
Commercial (eg catering, residential etc) 
IT/Information Management 
Fundraising/Development 
Legal/Compliance 
Finance 
Insurance/Audit/Risk Management 
Planning 
Industrial Liaison 
Student Related (including Sport) 
Quality Assurance 
Research 
38 
27 
23 
17 
15 
13 
13 
11 
11 
7 
7 
7 
5 
2 
2 
1 
34.9 
24.8 
21.1 
15.6 
13.8 
11.9 
11.9 
10.1 
10.1 
6.4 
6.4 
6.4 
4.6 
1.8 
1.8 
0.9 
Table 20: Rank order of committee secretary and advisory roles undertaken by governing 
body secretaries (including multiple responses) 
Committee Secretary % Committee Advisory % 
Nominations 
Audit/Risk 
Finance 
Remuneration 
HR/Staffing 
Senate/Academic Board 
Estates 
Planning/Strategy 
Health & Safety 
Commercial 
Fundraising/Development 
89 
75 
70 
59 
44 
34 
31 
30 
19 
14 
7 
77.4 
65.2 
60.9 
51.3 
38.3 
29.6 
27.0 
26.1 
16.5 
12.2 
6.1 
Finance 
Audit/Risk 
Senate/Academic Board 
Nominations 
HR/Staffing 
Planning/Strategy 
Estates 
Health & Safety 
Remuneration 
Fundraising/Development 
Commercial 
47 
44 
39 
34 
33 
32 
31 
29 
21 
17 
15 
40.9 
38.3 
33.9 
29.6 
28.7 
27.8 
27.0 
25.2 
18.3 
14.8 
13.0 
A chi-square test of independence examined the relationship between the range of 
functions managed by the secretary (‘no other functions’, ‘all administrative areas’ or a 
‘limited range of functions’) and type of institution (‘pre-92’ or ‘post-92’). On this basis 
the difference between the variables was significant, X2(2, N = 109) = 7.16, p = .028. A 
greater proportion of secretaries in Pre-92 institutions managed the whole 
administration than in post-92 institutions and a greater proportion of secretaries in 
post-92 institutions had no other managerial responsibilities outside their governance 
role. 
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The implications of the data in Tables 19 and 20 and the chi-square test are twofold. 
Firstly, the ‘representative influence’, where the governing body may rely upon the 
secretary as the ‘expert’ in the relevant field, may be limited in terms of management 
roles (particularly in some post-92 institutions) but could remain considerable in terms 
of committee work, and related decision-making, even in functional areas they do not 
directly manage. Secondly, the ability of the secretary to work with, and influence, 
other senior administrative colleagues holding ‘expert’ roles who do not report to the 
secretary, may need to be a greater than the ‘Registrar’ model suggests, but that 
participation in committee work, either as a secretary or advisor, may be one way in 
which that influence might be brought to bear. 
Membership of the institution’s senior management team could also be helpful in this 
respect, providing the ability to work directly with other senior managers and exchange 
information more readily with them. The survey revealed that the vast majority of the 
respondents (80.9%, n=109) were members of the senior management team, although 
a significant minority (18.2%, n=109) were not. In an attempt to cross-check the 
interpretation of ‘senior management team’, respondents were asked if they were a 
member of the institution’s executive group (for example, a Vice Chancellor’s Group) 
(Table 21), which revealed that there were fewer members of the executive group than 
those who considered themselves to be part of the senior management team. 
Table 21: Governing body secretary membership of the institution’s executive group 
Response Count % 
No response 7 -
Not a member 
Member of Executive Group by virtue of senior position 
Secretary but not member of Executive Group 
Representative of Board 
Other role 
13 
75 
8 
3 
4 
12.6 
72.8 
7.8 
2.9 
3.9 
Total 103 100.0 
A clear majority indicated that they were a member of the executive group by virtue of 
their senior position within the institution. Three secretaries jointly classified their 
membership because of their seniority and because they considered that they were 
representing the governing body, which has been taken as the primary response for 
the purposes of this table. Other roles were either as an internal advisor (for example 
on legal issues) or, in one case, as a member of an ‘outer’ executive group but not the 
‘inner’ group. Of the 13 people who were not members of a group, 9 responded that 
they did not consider themselves to be part of the institution’s senior management 
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team, but 4 responded that they did. Three of these were in post-92 institutions and 
only one was from a pre-92 institution. 
4.3.4 The secretary’s role in setting the governing body’s agenda 
Some of the most important aspects of the secretary’s role include the preparation of 
the governing body’s agenda and of supporting material on which decision-making is 
based (Petersen et al., 2001, p.559; Kezar, 2006, p.990; Nadler, Behan and Nadler, 
2006, p.85). Participation in this element of governing body work appears to be limited 
to a few key individuals, notwithstanding guidance that suggests that better performing 
boards have a hand in determining the agenda for their meetings (Ingram, 2005). It is 
also here that the influence of the chair becomes more apparent, as can be seen in 
Figure 5. In 56.3% of responses (n=103) it was said that the chair decided which items 
appeared on the governing body agenda and 41.3% (n=104) had a hand in 
determining the order of business of governing body meetings. As might be expected, 
it is the chair who most often (55.7%, n=106) decided the timing of business at 
governing body meetings, but a significant number of secretaries (31.1%, n=106) also 
undertook this role. The head of institution decided which items appeared on the 
agenda in only 16.5% of responses (n=103). In the same number of cases the head of 
institution briefed the chair on relative priorities for the meeting, though this task was 
most often carried out by the secretary (81.5%, n=104). 
The picture is more complex when looking at the way in which papers are prepared for 
governing body meetings, and who actually presents this information in the meetings. 
Much depends upon the other functional responsibilities of the secretary. For example, 
the major role in preparing papers on strategic planning issues appeared to fall to the 
head of institution (40.8%, n=103), other staff with a planning brief (34.0%, n=103) or 
the secretaries themselves (18.4%, n=103), but the presentation of this work most 
often rested with the head of institution (71.3%, n=101). The head of institution was 
also predominant in academic developments. The contribution of heads of the finance 
function could be seen in the preparation of papers (73.3%, n=101) but their 
presentation was divided between people in this role (53.5%, n=99), non-executive 
governing body members (20.2%, n=99) and heads of institutions (13.1%, n=99). 
Other contrasting relationships can be seen in Figure 6, which maps both sets of data 
against a series of typical governance responsibilities. Some of the more significant 
contributions of the secretary included support service functions, though this was 
balanced by contributions from other staff; risk management and audit, where the task 
of paper preparation was shared with other staff and the presentation with non-
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Figure 5: Tasks related to the preparation of the agenda for governing body meetings 
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Figure 6: The preparation (Prep) and presentation (Pres) of papers/reports to governing bodies by role and topic 
executive governors (most likely the chair of the audit/risk committee); and in the 
preparation of summary reports of committee meetings, though, again, their 
presentation was split between the secretary and a non-executive governor (most likely 
the chair of the relevant committee). In work relating to corporate governance systems, 
the secretary took an overwhelming lead in both the preparation (89.4%, n=104) and 
presentation (81.2%, n=101) of information to the governing body. 
The interviews provided further detail on working practices which, again, varied widely 
from institution to institution. Much depended upon the relationship between the chair, 
the head of institution and the secretary, with elements of institutional custom and 
personal style determining how often each might get involved. In some, it was a formal 
process, with regular meetings between a wider set of key governors, usually the 
committee chairs, and the executive. Even so, the process was often (78%) initiated 
by the secretary: 
“We don’t usually discuss agendas much in advance of the agenda being produced. He 
doesn’t want to see the agenda pre the agenda if you like; the university’s business is a 
juggernaut that moves along…..” 
“…There maybe instances where there’ll be a particular issue and he will ring me up or pop 
in, or email me these days, and say, ‘Are we going to talk about X or Y or how should we 
handle that?’, but generally it’s down to me to produce the agenda.” 
Pre-92 Secretary (A) 
In some cases (44%), whilst it was left to the secretary to provide the necessary 
information, the business to be conducted was subject to review by the executive: 
“In terms of which business we put to council where there’s a choice, which things we 
engage them in, in discussions, and which things we put to them as clear 
recommendations, not expecting them to engage in much of a discussion – ‘this is the 
executive's view, please agree’ - then we’ll talk about that on the senior management team 
because you can’t have council trying to micro-manage or second guess the 
executive…...On the other hand you’ve got to get them sufficiently engaged in what’s going 
on so it's an interesting job and you can tap their expertise, otherwise why are they sitting 
there?” 
Pre-92 VC (M) 
The preparation of high quality papers for the governing body was an issue of 
considerable importance to the majority of interviewees (89%), and was one over 
which certain participants had firm views: 
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“The secretary plays a huge role in a whole number of ways. First of all he tends to be 
responsible for the preparation of all the papers so if they come forward in a sensible, well 
organised, proper executive summary, that’s a huge plus, and if they come forward thirty 
pages filled with jargon and incomprehensible to lay people, it’s an absolutely massive 
minus.” 
Pre-92 Chair (N) 
In order to deal with this matter, secretaries took a keen interest in the papers to be 
presented to the governing body, refining them where necessary to ensure that they 
were clear and appropriately structured: 
“I’m not very likely to interfere very much with a paper unless I think it’s wrong, or if I think 
the recommendations are unclear…..We like to have a clear recommendation at the end of 
each paper, and I will change a recommendation but I would talk to the report writer if he is 
available. And so I’d change the recommendation without changing the tenor of the paper, 
I would change the recommendation, ‘because this is what you meant to say’. Making 
sense of it, yes, not changing the direction of it. I think there is an expectation that if I’m 
not happy with a paper, I wouldn't just send it out…..” 
Post-92 Secretary (K) 
“Apart from papers that are routinely presented in a standard format, there isn’t a paper 
that goes out, without my having seen it, to the board or the board’s committees. I always 
scrutinise them, I mean standard committee servicing stuff, to make sure that it’s clear at 
the outset what the committee’s being asked to do with it, it’s clear at the end of the paper 
whether there’s a decision or whether the committee is being asked to simply receive it for 
information and, if so, what the nature of that decision is,…..whether the resolutions are 
couched appropriately, all of those sorts of issues, whether sufficient information is 
available for the board to take an informed decision…” 
Post-92 Secretary (F) 
In this particular case, the intervention could also extend to those papers produced by 
the head of institution: 
“I’ll write papers and when I write a resolution or something, my resolutions end up in the 
format of, ‘hey guys, will you agree this and give me total power to get on with it’. By the 
time [the Secretary’s] had a go at it, it’s a slightly greater level of formality. That’s the way 
it works, it’s a collaborative process….” 
Post-92 VC (E) 
The aim of this was to ensure that the best possible information was presented to the 
governing body: 
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“I think that’s part of the role in a way….As you know I’ve got an assistant secretary….I 
would expect her…. to ensure that colleagues are actually writing papers of the right 
calibre and the right type. But also certainly because of my role as Registrar, who’s writing 
the papers, the senior officers in the functional areas, so clearly there is some influence 
there about actually what is being presented in terms of arguments or debate for Council. 
Council can’t free form ideas precisely at their meeting can they? There has to be some 
balance between them clearly being able to take a view, and being clear that they’re not 
just rubber stamping, but equally feeling that they’re getting good advice from senior 
officers and the Vice Chancellor and his team, about what should be done.” 
Pre-92 Secretary (O) 
4.3.5 Providing advice to the governing body 
The ability of the secretary to provide information and advice to the governing body, 
and the frequency with which they have to do this, could determine the influence that 
they are able to show in their ‘expert’ role during governing body meetings. In some 
institutions there is a tendency for the secretary not to contribute greatly to meetings 
unless it is on a specific issue concerning a governance or regulatory matter, whilst in 
others the secretary has much more of a free rein. The survey attempted to investigate 
this issue by asking how often secretaries had been required to provide advice to their 
governing body on a range of governance topics over the last three years. The topics 
were defined as: 
•	 Legal advice to support decisions concerning institutional business; 
•	 Constitutional advice (including institutional governance arrangements); 
•	 Procedural advice (for example, on meetings procedure or related matters such as 
the powers of the governing body); 
•	 Ethical advice (to ensure that high standards of governance were maintained by 
governing body members). 
Legal advice (Figure 7) is provided by another member of staff or an external advisor in 
about 20% of cases, but the responsibility for most legal and other types of advice rests 
with the secretary. Some secretaries responded that their governing bodies required 
legal, constitutional or procedural advice at each meeting of the governing body. In 
order to test which types of institutions these were, a simple analysis was conducted. 
Institutions were included where the returns indicated that they had: 
113 
1
1
4
 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
Legal Constitutional Procedural Ethical 
%
 
R
e
s
p
o
n
d
e
n
t
s
 
No reply Every meeting 
Twice a year, on average Once a year, on average 
Never Advice provided by another member of staff or external advisor 
Figure 7: Advice provided by secretaries to their governing bodies over the last three years 
•	 At least two responses of ‘Every Meeting’ in the legal, constitutional and procedural 
categories, or; 
•	 At least one ‘Every Meeting’ response in any of the aforementioned categories plus 
a ‘Twice a Year’ return in the Ethics category (for which no institution had indicated 
an ‘Every Meeting’ return) 
The results (Table 22) show a close relationship between the pre-92 and post-92 
university governing bodies, with very few institutions in the ‘University Title Just 
Obtained’ (which had recently been HECs) or HEC groups. When the results for the 
universities were analysed further (Table 23), the range of types and sizes suggested 
that this was not simply a feature of the scale of operation, and assumed complexity, of 
the institution. Whether it also implied that certain governing bodies required a 
relatively high degree of support, at least in the perception of their secretary, was 
unclear because this was not a statistically robust classification. Nevertheless it began 
to provide an insight into the varying roles played by secretaries in the conduct of 
governing body meetings and the way in which they could be called upon, sometimes 
on a routine basis, to advise the governing body in important areas of its activities. 
Table 22: High levels of advice provided to governing bodies by institution type 
Institution Type Count 
Pre-92 
Post-92 
University title just obtained 
Higher Education Colleges 
8 
8 
1 
2 
Total 19 
Table 23: High levels of advice provided to governing bodies by type and size of 
institution (student numbers) 
Institution Type Institution Size (Student Numbers) 
5-10,000 10-15,000 15-20,000 20-25,000 >25,000 
Pre-92 
Post-92 1 
2 
1 
5 
3 1 
1 
2 
Total 1 3 8 1 3 
The type of intervention by a secretary can extend to dealing with extremely sensitive 
issues where the interests of the institution need to be placed before those of individual 
governors. These can sometimes involve handling ‘conflicts of interest’ where the 
secretary has to manage a breakdown in the fiduciary relationship between the 
member and the governing body or in some other form of governance relationship. 
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Conflicts of interest can also occur in the personal dealings of the secretary with the 
governing body, particularly in relation to other senior management responsibilities they 
hold in their post. A considerable element of judgement is required to deal with these 
issues, backed by constant personal questioning of the secretary’s own motives, 
ethical stance and actions in their governance practice. This is an issue rarely covered 
in studies of higher education governing, but it is fundamental to the independent role 
that the secretary is supposed to have, and the influence that they may be expected to 
exert in difficult circumstances. 
Survey participants were asked to identify whether they had dealt with a conflict of 
interest in their role against three specific categories. The results are shown in Table 
24. The overall counts mask a wide variety of responses, with a number of secretaries 
reporting more than one type of conflict. 
Table 24: Responses to the question, ‘Have you ever had to deal with a conflict of 
interest?’ 
Response Count 
No response 
Yes - in relation to role as secretary and as a senior manager 
Yes - between members of the governing body 
Yes - in relation to a member's role on the GB or other institutional business 
No 
11 
24 
16 
41 
44 
Total 136 
It was apparent that conflicts of interest were reasonably well-spread across the sector. 
In fact, a conflict was reported by the secretaries of 56 institutions, nearly 51% of the 
total sample of survey participants. It was not possible to determine from the survey 
more precise details about all of the types of conflicts that had been encountered, and 
it may be that what one secretary perceived to be a conflict might not have been 
reported by another. The responses therefore need to be treated with care. 
Nevertheless, the extent of the reported levels indicates that there is an underlying 
need for secretaries to be able, and prepared, to use their influence to resolve difficult 
governance problems. 
To try to understand this issue in a little more depth, the incidences of high levels of 
advice reported in Table 22 were mapped against reported incidences of conflicts of 
interest. An extended typology took account of all cases where secretaries had 
reported that they provided advice on a particular governance area at the ‘Every 
Meeting’ level, or where the category for ‘Ethical’ advice was reported as taking place 
at the ‘Twice a Year’ level. The matched types were: 
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•	 Type A: 3 advice types at ‘Every Meeting’, plus a rating of ‘Twice a Year’ for ethical 
advice 
•	 Type B: 2 advice types at ‘Every Meeting’, plus a rating of ‘Twice a Year’ for ethical 
advice 
•	 Type C: 1 advice type at ‘Every Meeting’, plus a rating of ‘Twice a Year’ for ethical 
advice 
•	 Type D: 3 advice types at ‘Every Meeting’, plus a rating less than ‘Twice a Year’ for 
ethical advice 
•	 Type E: 2 advice types at ‘Every Meeting’, plus a rating less than ‘Twice a Year’ for 
ethical advice 
•	 Type F: 1 advice type at ‘Every Meeting’, plus a rating less than ‘Twice a Year’ for 
ethical advice 
In each of the above cases institutions were only counted if they reported at least one 
of the three categories of conflicts of interest. A further type (Type G) was used to 
identify institutions where no advice types were reported in the ‘Every Meeting’ 
category and the ethical rating was less than the ‘Twice a Year’ value, but at least one 
category of conflict of interest had been reported. The results of this classification were 
then mapped against institution type (Table 25). 
The results showed a relatively high proportion of conflicts reported by pre-92 (10) and 
post-92 (7) institutions where advice types were less than ‘Every Meeting’ or the ‘Twice 
a Year’ Ethical category. There were instances, however, when high advice levels 
were accompanied by high levels of reported conflicts of interest, notably in post-92 
institutions (at the 2 types of conflict level) and pre-92 institutions (at the 3 types of 
conflict level). By comparison, those institutions that had just moved to University 
status and the Higher Education Colleges had relatively low advice levels and reported 
conflicts of interest. 
Although these results merely provided observations which would be difficult to test 
statistically because of low values and the lack of a robust technique to classify advice 
types, they suggested that the balance seen in Table 22 between pre- and post-92 
universities, in their requirements for advice and steering by the secretary, may be 
distorted by the relative complexity and frequency of reported incidences of conflicts of 
interest. In particular, it should be noted that it was only in pre-92 institutions that 
cases of high levels of advice were seen with conflicts experienced in all three 
reportable categories, although the case numbers were relatively low. By weighting the 
responses (Table 25) it was nevertheless possible to construct an approximation of 
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Table 25: Analysis of institutions where high levels of advice are provided by secretaries, and their 
relationship with reported conflicts of interest, by institution type 
High Levels of Advice Provided by Secretary 
(see Figure 5 for Advice Types) 
Weight 
Weighted 1 
No Reported Conflicts of Interest 
Weighted 2 
1 Type of Conflict of Interest 
Pre­92 Post­92 UTJO* HEC Pre­92 Post­92 UTJO* HEC 
Type A 
Type B 
Type C 
Type D 
Type E 
Type F 
3 types 'Every Meeting' plus high 'Ethical' value 
2 types 'Every Meeting' plus high 'Ethical' value 
1 type 'Every Meeting' plus high 'Ethical' value 
3 types 'Every Meeting' 
2 types 'Every Meeting' 
1 type 'Every Meeting' 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
3 
1 
2 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
1 
1 
Sub Total - 4 3 0 0 6 3 2 0 
Type G No 'Every Meeting' or high 'Ethical' responses 1 1 10 7 2 
Totals - 4 3 0 1 16 10 4 0 
* University Title Just Obtained 
High Levels of Advice Provided by Secretary 
(see Figure 5 for Advice Types) 
Weight 2 Types of Conflict of Interest 
Weighted 3 
3 Types of Conflict of Interest 
Weighted 4 
Pre­92 Post­92 UTJO* HEC Pre­92 Post­92 UTJO* HEC 
Type A 
Type B 
Type C 
Type D 
Type E 
Type F 
3 types 'Every Meeting' plus high 'Ethical' value 
2 types 'Every Meeting' plus high 'Ethical' value 
1 type 'Every Meeting' plus high 'Ethical' value 
3 types 'Every Meeting' 
2 types 'Every Meeting' 
1 type 'Every Meeting' 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
2 
1 
1 
Sub Total - 2 6 0 0 4 0 1 0 
Type G No 'Every Meeting' or high 'Ethical' responses 1 2 1 1 2 
Totals - 4 7 0 1 6 0 1 0 
complexity in the reported experiences of secretaries when working with their 
governing bodies. Table 26 indicates that pre-92 institutions may, on this proxy basis, 
provide a more complex working environment for the secretary, when measured across 
the survey sample, than other higher education institutions, even when adjusted for the 
total number of survey respondents in each type category. In the adjusted figures, 
those having just obtained university title revealed a slightly higher index than post-92 
universities, possibly reflecting the assessment processes in which they had been 
engaged in the period immediately before the survey. 
Table 26: Reported advice/conflicts scores by type of institution (total weighted 
averages) 
Type of Institution Advice/Conflicts Score (Total 
Weighted Averages (TWA)) 
TWA/No of Type 
Respondents 
Pre-92 
Post-92 
University Title Just Obtained 
Higher Education Colleges 
190 
109 
28 
4 
4.13 
3.40 
3.50 
0.16 
The approximations involved in this analysis, together with the problem of singling out 
particular variables on which to base judgements about the state of governance in the 
sector has a number of difficulties. The results of this test should therefore be seen as 
an indication of the relative need to apply ‘expert’ aspects of the role of the secretary 
rather than providing evidence of differences between types of institution that might 
suggest that some governing bodies are more difficult to manage than others. Many 
other variables may play a role, including the timing of the survey; the timing of the 
conflicts of interest dealt with by the secretary (which may have been historical rather 
than in their current post); the style of other key players in the governing body and the 
way in which this impacts upon the secretary; or the understanding of the role and 
responsibilities of members of the governing body. At the same time, some of the 
conflicts of interest were related to the balance of the secretary’s role and other roles 
rather than with other people. These types of conflicts may or may not be as easily 
managed as the other categories, and this factor was not reflected in the weighting 
scores because the relative complexity of each case was unknown. What the analysis 
does point to, however, is that a large proportion of secretaries have had to deal with 
difficult personal, or interpersonal, issues outside the relationship boundaries that need 
to be managed as a normal part of their role. 
The wide-ranging nature of the secretary’s duties, including, in many cases, 
involvement in the senior management team and in a range of formal and informal 
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institutional decision-making arenas, means that somewhere along the line, the 
problem of how to manage relationships, and to balance potential conflicts generated 
by the different models adopted for the secretary’s role, must arise. For those 
interviewees looking at this issue from the institutional angle, the senior 
manager/secretary model was often considered to be a ‘unitary’ system, where the 
roles of senior manager and secretary to the governing body were combined in the 
same person. However, this simple classification does not take account of the 
separation of responsibilities expected from the holders of such posts. By turning the 
spotlight on the secretary’s relationships with the executive and the governing body, it 
may be more appropriate to regard such a structure as having a dual-role. 
The need to deal with this type of duality, particularly in working relationships, was 
identified by all of the interviewed ‘internal’ secretaries (78%): 
“I mean it’s always a challenge, not because every time an issue comes up there are 
obvious conflicts of interest or whatever else but I think you get into the mindset almost of 
trying to step outside yourself whenever there is an issue coming up and saying, ‘well okay, 
take off that hat, look at it from a council point of view’. I think you just get used to that 
approach of almost being schizophrenic and trying to look at it both ways.” 
Pre-92 Secretary (A) 
Preference for a ‘dual-role’, where the secretary has other senior management 
responsibilities, or a ‘single-role’ where the secretary dealt only with governance 
matters, was largely related to the system currently in place. Despite the issues with 
‘duality’ interviewees with this structure could not see how a single role approach would 
work because of the way in which the secretary was expected to be the person able to 
act as a link between the governing body and management: 
“…..We believe here that the arguments and advantages of keeping the two combined 
outweigh the disadvantages. The disadvantages are that if we went about our work in a 
different way, you could have an inherent conflict within one person, that’s the 
disadvantage. However here there’s enormous advantages in that the key individual 
provides the bridge between governance and management, and there is no reason at all 
why that bridge can’t be one based on harmony and cooperation and positive aspects as 
opposed to negative ones.“ 
Pre-92 Chair (B) 
“I'm the integrity chip if you like, able to identify issues that members of the management 
team are merrily progressing as part of their management roles, and identify the point at 
which some intervention of the board may be necessary in the decision making process. 
So I think there’s enormous value to the institution and to the board in having somebody 
who’s a permanent employee and aware of what is happening across the university at 
corporate level, and engaged in daily discussions with the senior management team.” 
Post-92 Secretary (F) 
120 
“…..Certainly in your first few years in a big institution you need someone who really knows 
what’s going on, not so much from the governing body point of view but from a 
straightforward management of the administration,……and if there’s a unitary system, it is 
natural for that person to be secretary to the council because they can meet all of the 
‘knowing what’s going on’ requirements.” 
Pre-92 VC (M) 
There were a limited number of cases (33%) where the dual role had, at least, been 
questioned, either as part of succession planning for the secretary’s post, a review by 
auditors or because of other governance work: 
“It’s something that we’ve looked at. It’s something where we haven’t really felt that the 
resource is something that you could justify, plus the fact of course that anybody who takes 
on the role of clerk has got to have an understanding of the institution as well….. Though 
the questions have been raised, we’ve always come back to the same answer: that we 
can’t justify splitting the responsibilities, neither can we justify it in terms of the relationship 
with those responsibilities.” 
HEC Principal (W) 
In most cases, however, there remained a clear desire to keep the model known to the 
institution, to the extent that it was not even questioned: 
“I’ve not personally had it challenged……I think that actually my experience is that if the 
council members consider you to be competent, then frankly they probably recognise that 
your role as an advisor to them is enhanced by the fact that you have a deep 
understanding and stake in the way the university is being run, which ought to be helpful to 
them in an advisory role. I know that other universities operate differently and clearly I’m 
prejudiced in the way that I am used to, but I do actually think that is true.” 
Pre-92 Secretary (O) 
In those institutions with an external secretary (22%) the desire to maintain the 
independent role was particularly clear. Sometimes this was borne out of previous 
experience of an ‘internal’ post holder where support for the governing body had not 
worked well, and there had been a wish, on the part of the governing body and the 
institution, to separate the secretary’s duties from other senior management 
responsibilities. Once established, a single-role approach was thought to have 
particular strengths, particularly, but not only, amongst the chairs to governing bodies: 
“….it’s perfectly true that you could have somebody inside the organisation but if you’re 
inside the organisation, you’re directly accountable to the Principal, therefore you have a 
hierarchical situation. You may or may not wish to draw attention to certain things, maybe 
more or less easy to do so, but our external secretary……simply concentrates on the legal 
issues and has no other responsibility and is accountable only to the governors.” 
HEC Chair (G) 
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“I do actually quite like the simplicity of the accountability arrangements and the very 
specific nature of the task here, and it does not confuse many of the aspects of governance 
with executive responsibilities….Therefore the position of the secretary is pretty well 
protected, as it were, from potential pressures of being part of an executive machinery that 
actually intersects with the executive function of the Vice Chancellor as chief executive.” 
Post-92 Chair (J) 
“Because we’ve gone through various iterations in the six years since I’ve been in college, 
the secretary does have a clear job description and person specification…..There’s a 
strong view that the governing body should have independence of support. I go along with 
that.” 
HEC Principal (I) 
Some institutions have adopted a structure where the secretary’s role, though identified 
in the statutes or governing instruments, is a nominal position held by a senior 
administrative member of staff, and another person is principally responsible for the 
work of the governing body. This approach, somewhere between the dual-role 
‘Registrar’ (in their multiple guises), and the external single-role, introduces a further 
level of complexity into the single role model, such that it could be reclassified as either 
single-role (external) or single role (internal). The latter introduces the prospect of a 
further relationship between the ‘working’ secretary and the nominal secretary that 
needs to be navigated by both parties, and, for that matter, the chair and the head of 
institution. The secretary, in such cases, is not independent of the executive, but may 
also not be able to establish quite the same working relationship with the head of 
institution as in the dual-role approach. In one example, the nominal secretary 
highlighted the need for a close relationship with the person engaged in the detailed 
day-to-day work of the governing body: 
“….Often in more operational aspects of strategic matters, I would delegate the day to day 
communications. If it’s agreeing agendas or matters of organisational matters around 
organising induction programmes or those types of things, I will just, enable [the person] to 
do that on his own. I mean, we talk a lot, we work together very closely so we have regular 
briefings; there's nothing really happening at that level that I’m not fully aware of and he 
wouldn't be going off and doing things that I wouldn't have asked him to do in a sense…..” 
Pre-92 (Nominal) Secretary (U) 
Despite this high level of co-operation and close working, there remained concern, in 
44% of cases, about the ability of the ‘working’ secretary to have direct access to the 
head of institution, an issue that might be considered by institutions seeking to 
establish governance units under the charge of a ‘nominal’ secretary: 
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“I...feel… that the secretary to the council ought to have a way to the Vice Chancellor. I 
think that the Vice Chancellor also ought to recognise that the council is the governing 
body, that this person serves that governing body…..Now if those relationships are not 
working at the appropriate level, then there are great difficulties.” 
Pre-92 Chair (Q) 
4.4 Conclusion 
The analysis of the role of the secretary provided an insight in to the way in which the 
management of governance takes place in higher education institutions. The fieldwork 
found that the role remained a generalist administrative activity and that there were 
very few secretaries qualified in the field of ‘corporate governance’. The part played by 
professional qualifications also did not appear to be significant when compared to 
experience, and the ability, to act as a safe pair of hands in the management of the 
governing body’s work. Nonetheless, the ‘expert’ contribution of the secretary on 
corporate governance and matters of a legal nature was apparent in the analysis of 
advice provided to governing bodies in recent years. 
Other areas, such as the contribution of the secretary to the operation of the 
Nominations Committee and governor induction, which provide ‘early contact’ with new 
governors, and responsibility for setting, or at least contributing towards, the agenda for 
the governing body, all provide, to varying degrees, potential points of influence in 
governance processes. Even when the direct inputs to governing body meetings may 
be restricted to specific functional domains, the presence of many secretaries at sub-
committees is likely to impact upon decision-making in these areas. 
There appears, however, to be a lack of clarity around the reporting lines of the 
secretary, with 34% (n=109) of respondents suggesting that they either report to the 
governing body or the head of institution, rather than the chair, as recommended in 
CUC guidance. The secretary, in such cases, might require a particular awareness of 
the political and ethical considerations arising from the act of balancing the role with 
other institutional duties, and the way in which the two functions are effectively 
separated. Appraisal arrangements, also vary widely, with 29.7% (n=101) of 
respondents having no input from a member of the governing body. Again, the 
oversight of the secretary’s activities suggested by the CUC may not always be seen in 
practice. 
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It was nonetheless evident from this analysis that the secretary’s role concerned the 
safeguarding of governance standards. On occasion the secretary may be involved in 
handling conflicts of interest that can emanate from their own responsibilities, or from 
relationships within the governing body. This is the most difficult balancing act of all, in 
that it depends upon the ability of the secretary to navigate a complex environment of 
relationship management, see what is going on and, on occasion, to intervene, whilst 
at the same time remaining independent. Intervention can carry a degree of personal 
risk, but it is a fundamental requirement of the role, and one that, from this study, 
appears not to be being ignored. 
In summary, there was much from the analysis of the survey data and interview 
material that suggested that the role of the secretary was critical to institutional 
governance and may have grown in importance, in parallel with the place of 
governance within the HE system, in recent years. There were also indications, 
however, that the influence of the secretary was bound up with issues of working 
relationships with the chair and the head of institution, requiring further insight into the 
nature of those relationships and their impact on the effectiveness of governance 
arrangements. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH RESULTS AND ANALYSIS: WORKING RELATIONSHIPS AND THE 
INFLUENCE OF THE SECRETARY 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the influence of the secretary when working alongside others 
in the delivery of governance and the management of governing. The results from 
Chapter 4 pointed to a ‘triadic’ relationship between the chair, head of institution and 
secretary, so this set of relationships provides a focus for the survey and interview 
analyses that are, again, combined to bring a practice-based context to the research. 
Investigating the application of influence by direct means was unlikely to be possible 
without detailed longitudinal or observational studies, each of which had practical 
problems, such as the observer effects, described in Chapter 2. Influence can also 
take many forms, making it difficult to capture aspects of hidden thought and meaning 
(Pettigrew et al., 1998; van der Walt and Ingley, 2003). An indirect approach was 
therefore employed, using survey and interview questions about the relative influence 
of the secretary, chair and head of institution, combined with other measures to gain a 
broader picture of the working relationship between these individuals and their potential 
areas of influence. The first section of the chapter considers the time spent by the 
secretary on governance business with the chair and head of institution. The 
perceptions of secretaries about the time spent by the chair and head of institution on 
governance work are then explored, to uncover messages from the data about the 
contributions made by key players in the governance system, some of which are tested 
by statistical means. The cluster analysis described in Chapter 3 is extended to 
characterise each cluster group by way of other survey variables, and to consider 
perceptions of influence provided by each group via the survey questionnaire. 
The second section investigates further the relationship between the secretary, chair 
and head of institution, by drawing on the ‘voices’ from the interview material to 
illustrate positive and negative aspects that might impact upon the secretary’s 
influence. The third section returns to the analysis of perceptions of influence, but this 
time concentrates on the views of the three key players gathered from several 
institutions during the interview sessions. These results are compared with the wider 
survey sample to see where the secretary features most strongly in influencing 
governance and governing in their institution. 
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5.2 How does the secretary work with other key individuals? 
People engaged in the work of the governing body might spend a varying amount of 
time with the secretary and their level of contact could impact upon the influence of the 
secretary in their dealings with the person concerned. It is recognised that influence 
can not be directly related to the time people spend together. A greater amount of time 
could, for example, be the result of the perceived need of one party to provide more 
assistance to the other, the product of a person who is overly interventionist or simply 
the inefficient use of time by one or both parties. The amount of time can also vary 
depending upon the circumstances of the parties or their institutions. More time may 
be spent between the secretary and the chair, for example, during the selection 
process for a new head of institution, in conjunction with board effectiveness reviews or 
at a point of crisis for the organisation. Notwithstanding these important caveats, the 
analysis was expected to shed light on the relative importance of key governing 
relationships. 
The survey asked participants to state, on average, how many hours per month they 
had contact on governing body business, including agenda preparation, with various 
categories of governing body members. The response rates varied significantly (Figure 
8), with ‘no responses’ ranging from 15 participants in the case of chairs and heads of 
institutions to 47 and 45 participants respectively for vice chairs and treasurers, In the 
latter case, this may simply be because the position is not seen in every institution, so 
the results should be treated with caution. Nevertheless they indicated some wide 
variations in practice that were thought worthy of further investigation. Analysis was 
conducted using the Kruskal-Wallis test, a non-parametric alternative to a one-way 
between-groups analysis of variance (Levin and Rubin, 1998). Time spent by the 
secretary with a range of individuals was tested against the following categorical 
variables: 
• Type of institution 
• Size of institution 
• Region in which the institution was based 
• Age of the secretary 
• When the secretary was appointed 
• Immediate sector background (Private, Public, HE) 
• Principal work background 
• Professional qualifications held by the secretary 
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Figure 8: Time spent by the secretary with members of the governing body (hours per month) 
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Table 27 summarises the statistically significant results. The relatively high level of 
contact with the chair and treasurer in smaller (but not the smallest) institutions could 
be the result of work, at the time of the survey, on degree awarding powers and 
university title being conducted by some institutions in this size category. There were, 
however, two well established pre-92 institutions that fell into this group. The results 
for the ‘Over 60’ secretaries, showing a wider group of significant working relationships, 
were of particular interest. Only two secretaries in the ‘Over 60’ age range came from 
institutions in the 3,001-5,000 size category, and none had an immediate background 
from the private sector or a career history principally in HR administration, so these 
working practices appeared to be distinctive, signalling a degree of relationship building 
outside the chair and head of institution ‘triad’ that is relatively higher than in other age 
categories. Whether this is related to the institutional culture, or the ‘wise counsel’ of 
older secretaries is unclear, but given the much reported changes in managerial 
approach within the sector, time spent with staff and student members may still be 
seen by this group as an important factor in managing governing relationships within 
the wider institutional community. 
A series of questions was asked to try to establish the contribution made by members 
of the governing body and the secretary to the work of the governing body. As a proxy 
measure, secretaries were asked to indicate the number of days various categories of 
people spent on these tasks. The results are shown in Figure 9. Again, it was 
necessary to remove non-responses from the sample, and these were significant in 
some categories, possibly for the reasons noted in the previous analysis. Whilst the 
non-participant figures for the chair (19), head of institution (21), secretary (20) and 
non-executive members (16) were fairly constant, those for the vice chair (38) and 
treasurer (43) were much higher. Despite this, the data again reveal some interesting 
insights. Chief amongst these is the high level of days believed to be spent by the 
secretaries on governance work, and the two main bands for the chair, peaking in the 
first instance at 21-25 days and reoccurring with a second group of ‘high-input’ chairs in 
the 46-50 and >50 days categories. Heads of institutions show a slightly more 
fluctuating trend, with peaks at 11-15 days and in the 25-35 days range, with similar 
levels to chairs in the 46-50 and >50 days categories. Of equal interest, however, was 
the proportion of ‘high input’ treasurers (ie above 30 days) even though the returned 
data for this category was lower than that of most other groups. This could indicate 
that despite smaller numbers, and a relative lack of contact with secretaries (see Figure 
8), they are an active group within governance systems. 
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Table 27: Summary of Kruskal­Wallis Test of time spent by the secretary with other members of the governing body 
Time spent with: Type of 
institution 
Size of 
institution 
Age of 
Secretary 
Background of 
Secretary 
Mean Rank Chi­Square df Asymp. Sig.** 
Chair 3,001-5,000 57.27 13.653 6 0.034 
Treasurer or equivalent 3,001-5,000 55.81 18.083 6 0.006 
Non-executive members Post-92 53.74 6.912 2 0.032 
Non-executive members Private sector 54.88 6.551 2 0.038 
Treasurer or equivalent Over 60 51.21 7.898 3 0.048 
Elected staff members Over 60 66.44 12.877 3 0.005 
Student members Over 60 66.44 9.412 3 0.024 
** Significance level 0.05 
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Figure 9: Perceptions of secretaries on the time spent on governance activities (days per year) 
The mid point on each category of days, with the top category set at 52 days, the 
highest response given to this question, was used to compute a weighted average of 
the number of days spent on governance per year. The ranked results are much as 
expected, except that the treasurers spend, at just under 20 days, more time, on 
average, than vice chairs at just over 16 days per year (Table 28). Because these 
figures are averages, they may not sound familiar to some institutions, but they may at 
least help establish the general relativities of time spent on governance and the 
apparent similarity of time spent by the chair and head of institution on this field of 
work. 
Table 28: Weighted average days spent on governing body work per year 
Category Weighted average 
days pa 
Secretary 40.11 
Chair 23.84 
Head of Institution 23.81 
Treasurer or equivalent 19.73 
Vice Chair 16.38 
Non-executive member 12.10 
The cluster analysis introduced in Chapter 3 suggested that there could be 3 ‘groups’ 
of institutions in which the time spent by various people on governance could be 
characterised by institution type. However, a closer inspection of the membership of 
the clusters revealed that each contained all types of higher education institution in 
different proportions (Table 29). 
Table 29: k­means cluster analysis of time spent by key people on governance 
Cluster Pre­92 Post­92 HECs Total 
HEIs 
No of 
complete 
cases 
Mean days 
in complete 
cases 
SD Interview 
sites 
1 12 21 10 43 18 56 8 2 
(26%) (52.5%) (42%) 
2 16 4 8 28 19 31 7 3 
(35%) (10%) (33%) 
3 9 12 2 23 23 82 12 3 
(19.5%) (30%) (8%) 
Not in Cluster 
Group (no 
reponse to 
question set) 
9 
(19.5%) 
3 
(7.5%) 
4 
(17%) 
16 - - 1 
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Cluster 1 was dominated by ‘high input’ secretaries and relatively ‘low input’ chairs and 
heads of institution and also had a high proportion of post-92 universities and higher 
education colleges. Cluster 2 appeared to contain those institutions where the input in 
all instances was relatively low and was dominated by pre-92 institutions. In Cluster 3 
the input from the secretary, chair, head of institution and treasurer was high and pre-
and post-92 universities formed the majority of the membership. Fully completed 
responses were used to produce the mean number of days spent on governance in 
each cluster group. Though based on a subset of data for each cluster it provided an 
illustration of the relativities between each group. For completeness, the distribution of 
interview sites in Table 29 shows a spread across each cluster group, with only a slight 
weighting away from Cluster Group 1. 
Other survey questions, based on the relationship and ‘governance in action’ factor 
groups in Figure 2 (page 63) were used to characterise the type of governance 
approach in each group. Four types of survey question data were employed. Mean 
scores were prepared for questions relating to the understanding of the secretary’s 
role, the view of the secretary about their governing body and the approach of other 
key players, and a number of statements about sector governance. Data on advice 
provided to the governing body and on the timing of effectiveness reviews was 
analysed by percentage responses for each cluster. A ratio-based summary of types 
of conflicts of interest (number of reported cases per number of institutions in the 
cluster) was calculated for each cluster group. Finally, a set of questions on the 
relative importance of a number of factors in the effectiveness of the governing body 
provided a set of rank orders by cluster group. The results (Tables 30 and 31) 
suggested a variety of ways in which the original cluster findings could provide a broad 
classification of approaches to governance taken by secretaries. 
Cluster 1 (where the input from the secretary was high but relatively low for other key 
players) reported a higher result than the other groups on the question of whether the 
development of governance in their institution was being driven by external 
accountability measures. These institutions tended to have a higher level of procedural 
advice-giving, and a lower level of provision of ethical advice than the other clusters. 
They also had a relatively high incidence of dealing with conflicts of interest in relation 
to governing body members and other institutional business. Just over 37% of the 
institutions were in the process of conducting a governance effectiveness review at the 
time of the survey. Cluster 2 (where the time input to governance was relatively low 
across the board) had a relatively low understanding of the secretary’s role by the head 
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Table 30: Cluster characteristics from the survey question set (A) 
Serial Survey question set Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Q22 Understanding of the secretary's role and responsibilities by: 
Chair 
Head of institution 
Other non-executive governing body members 
Staff members of the governing body 
Student members of the governing body 
Other members of the institution's staff 
Other students in the institution 
4.48 0.86 
4.51 0.96 
4.00 0.85 
3.88 0.85 
3.37 0.98 
2.63 1.07 
1.35 0.75 
4.39 0.69 
4.11 1.07 
3.82 0.77 
3.57 0.84 
3.25 1.00 
2.68 0.86 
1.38 0.57 
4.78 0.42 
4.57 0.73 
4.43 0.59 
4.17 0.72 
3.83 0.78 
3.30 1.06 
1.91 0.79 
Q23a 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Do you consider your governing body to be: 
Proactive on HE governance issues 
Only responding to CUC guidance to reduce accountability burden 
Inactive on governance unless prompted by the secretary 
Lacking the time to develop improved governance practices 
Aware of the importance of good governance practices 
3.60 1.07 
2.00 1.08 
2.24 0.97 
2.21 1.00 
4.00 1.04 
3.50 0.92 
2.11 0.79 
2.36 1.19 
2.21 1.03 
4.19 0.62 
4.29 0.85 
1.95 0.84 
1.59 0.96 
2.00 1.11 
4.64 0.58 
Q23b 
1 
2 
3 
4 
How would you rate the approach (where 1 = laissez faire and 5 = 
interventionist) taken by your: 
Chair 
Head of institution 
Vice chair 
Treasurer 
3.67 0.82 
3.70 0.83 
3.27 0.88 
3.26 0.81 
3.89 0.80 
3.89 0.89 
3.09 1.00 
3.46 0.83 
3.86 0.96 
3.67 0.97 
3.42 0.90 
3.31 1.01 
Q24 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Would you agree that, in general: 
Governance arrangements in the higher education sector need further strengthening? 
Governance arrangements in your institution need further strengthening? 
The governing body has an important role to play in improving the academic strategy 
of your university/college? 
The governing body has an important role to play in improving public perception 
about the quality of your university/college? 
There is sufficient sector guidance available for you to properly fulfil your duties as 
secretary to the governing body? 
There are sufficient professional development opportunities available to you in your 
role as secretary to the governing body? 
HE governance is more complex for you to manage than it was 10 years ago? 
Measures to develop governance in your institution are being driven by external 
accountability requirements rather than to meet institutional priorities? 
2.62 1.10 
2.67 1.23 
3.14 1.06 
3.79 0.94 
3.98 0.91 
3.44 1.08 
4.13 1.04 
3.09 1.09 
2.39 0.83 
2.46 1.20 
3.36 0.83 
3.82 0.82 
4.11 0.83 
3.57 1.07 
4.15 0.83 
2.96 1.07 
2.62 0.97 
2.59 1.10 
3.71 1.15 
4.05 0.90 
4.36 0.73 
3.77 1.15 
4.00 1.14 
2.95 1.00 
Serial Survey question set Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
% % % 
Q26a 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
How often have you been required to provide legal advice: 
Every meeting 
Twice a year, on average 
Once a year, on average 
Never 
Advice provided by another member of staff or external advisor 
9.3 
25.6 
37.2 
4.7 
23.3 
3.7 
29.6 
37.0 
14.8 
14.8 
13.6 
36.4 
27.3 
4.5 
18.2 
Q26b 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
How often have you been required to provide constitutional advice: 
Every meeting 
Twice a year, on average 
Once a year, on average 
Never 
Advice provided by another member of staff or external advisor 
18.6 
46.5 
30.2 
2.3 
2.3 
14.8 
44.4 
40.7 
0.0 
0.0 
22.7 
63.6 
13.6 
0.0 
0.0 
Q26c 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
How often have you been required to provide procedural advice: 
Every meeting 
Twice a year, on average 
Once a year, on average 
Never 
Advice provided by another member of staff or external advisor 
21.4 
40.5 
31.0 
4.8 
2.4 
7.4 
29.6 
63.0 
0.0 
0.0 
40.9 
45.5 
13.6 
0.0 
0.0 
Q26d 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
How often have you been required to provide ethical advice (%): 
Every meeting 
Twice a year, on average 
Once a year, on average 
Never 
Advice provided by another member of staff or external advisor 
2.3 
14.0 
37.2 
44.2 
2.3 
0.0 
11.1 
70.4 
18.5 
0.0 
0.0 
18.2 
63.6 
18.2 
0.0 
Q16b 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
If an effectiveness review is currently in progress or planned is it: 
No response 
We do not conduct governing body effectiveness reviews 
Currently in progress to address the 2004 CUC guidance 
To be conducted later in 2005 to address the 2004 CUC guidance 
To be conducted in 2006 to address the 2004 CUC guidance 
Not intended to address the 2004 CUC guidance but to deal with internal governance 
matters 
20.93 
2.33 
37.21 
23.26 
13.95 
2.33 
28.57 
3.57 
32.14 
14.29 
14.29 
7.14 
13.04 
0.00 
47.83 
17.39 
17.39 
4.35 
Serial Survey question set Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Q27 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Have you ever had to deal with a conflict of interest (reported events per 
institution in cluster): 
In relation to your secretary role and that as a senior manager 
Between members of the governing body 
In relation to a governing body member and other institutional business 
No 
0.23 
0.16 
0.47 
0.37 
0.32 
0.11 
0.25 
0.50 
0.22 
0.22 
0.52 
0.39 
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Table 31: Cluster characteristics from the survey question set (B) 
Serial Survey question set Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Q25 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Rank order of contribution to an effective governing body: 
High quality institutional governance systems and procedures 
The quality of the Chair 
The relationship between governing body members 
The quality of members of the governing body (other than the Chair) 
members 
The role played by the Head of Institution 
The role played by the governing body Secretary 
The CUC Code of Governance Practice 
Development opportunities provided to governing body members by sector 
agencies/organisations 
5 
1 
6 
3 
7 
2 
4 
8 
9 
2 
1 
7 
4 
5 
3 
6 
8 
9 
3 
1 
7 
2 
6 
4 
5 
8 
9 
of institution. This group felt that their governing bodies needed more prompting by the 
secretary to deal with the development of governance practice and felt most strongly, 
though only marginally above Cluster 1, that governance was more complex to manage 
than it was ten years ago. The group was regularly engaged in providing procedural 
advice, but at a lower level than either Clusters 1 or 3, and had the highest level of 
provision of ethical advice in the ‘once a year’ category. In contrast, the group also 
recorded the highest level of ‘No’ responses to the question of whether the secretary 
had ever had to deal with a conflict of interest. In terms of governance effectiveness 
reviews, this was the group with the lowest proportion undertaking a review at the time 
of the survey, and the highest category of ‘no responses’ to this question. 
Cluster 3 (where all three key players appeared to be very active on governance 
matters) reported higher ratings for the understanding of the secretary’s role than both 
other groups. A higher proportion of secretaries declared their institutions to be 
proactive on governance issues and aware of the importance of good governance 
practice. They consistently reported higher scores for questions concerning the 
importance of the governing body to academic strategy, public perception about the 
institution and the availability of sector governance guidance. They reported the lowest 
score for their assessment of the complexity of governance compared to ten years ago 
and (marginally under Cluster 2) in their view about external drivers for the 
development of institutional governance. The group had the most routine provision of 
legal and constitutional advice, relatively high levels of procedural and ethical advice 
and the highest reported level of conflicts of interest involving governing body members 
and other institutional business. The group also had the highest level of effectiveness 
reviews in progress at the time of the survey. 
The rank order analysis (Table 31) suggested that the factor with the greatest impact 
on governing body effectiveness across all three clusters was the quality of the chair. 
At the other extreme, the CUC Code and development opportunities for governing body 
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members were ranked the lowest. Relationships between governing body members 
were also low on the list. More interestingly, perhaps, was the relatively low ranking 
given to governance systems and procedures by Cluster 1, which, together with their 
earlier rating on external influences, suggests a ‘process-averse’ approach to the 
management of governance. This cluster placed the role played by the head of 
institution above that of the quality of the non-executive members of the governing 
body, whilst the reverse was the case for Cluster 3. Cluster 2 also placed a relatively 
high priority on governance process, and on the role played by the head of institution, 
despite suggesting that the time spent on governance by the head of institution was 
relatively low. 
Figure 10 illustrates this point, by comparing, for each cluster, ratings of the influence 
of each of the three key players against a set of governance factors used in survey 
question 29. Secretaries were asked to rate their own influence, and that of the chair 
and head of institution (on a scale of 1 = ‘no influence’ to 5 = ‘very influential’). There 
was a maximum no-response return of 18 secretaries for one factor relating to the head 
of institution, and a minimum of 13 secretaries for a range of factors relating to the 
secretary’s role. This meant that the response rate was generally good, with between 
92 and 97 secretaries taking part in this section of the survey. The factors were: 
•	 Communications: Communication between the institution and 
governing body members; 
•	 Selection and appointment: The selection and appointment of new governing 
body members; 
• Induction:	 The induction of new governing body members; 
• Planning meetings:	 The planning of governing body meetings; 
•	 Debate in meetings: The contribution to debate in governing body 
meetings; 
•	 Decision­making: The quality of decision-making by the governing 
body; 
•	 Relationships: The relationship between the governing body and 
the rest of the institution; 
•	 Motivation: The motivation of individual governing body 
members and their satisfaction in their role; 
•	 Effectiveness: The overall effectiveness of the governing body in 
terms of leading the institution’s development; 
•	 Management: The overall management of governance in the 
institution. 
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Figure 10: Influence ratings for each cluster by key player, as perceived by the survey respondents 
Cluster 3 (high time input to governance) appears to have chairs that were more highly 
rated in terms of their influence, whilst Cluster 2 (low time input to governance) 
revealed a relatively low set of ratings for the secretarial role compared with the other 
clusters. The pattern for heads of institutions appeared to be more consistent, apart 
from the relatively low ratings for communications and selection and a higher rating for 
induction for Cluster 3, a higher rating for Cluster 1 (high input secretaries) in promoting 
relationships between the governing body and the rest of the institution and slightly 
higher ratings for debate and effectiveness for Cluster 2. This could mean that despite 
the relatively low input of time from heads of institutions in Cluster 2, they are dominant 
in terms of influence at critical points in governance work, a finding consistent with 
earlier results from other cluster analysis variables. 
These findings were also backed up by the group of questions relating to the style of 
the key players, which could range from ‘interventionist’ to ‘laissez faire’ (Table 30). 
Whilst vice chairs appeared to be more interventionist in Cluster 3, Cluster 2 reported 
consistently higher mean scores for the chair, head of institution and treasurer, despite 
the fact that the time spent on governance in all three categories in this cluster was 
low. It was also apparent, however, that Cluster 2 had the highest proportion of 
secretaries (17.9%, (n=28), compared to around 4-5% in the other groups) where the 
secretary reported only to the head of institution for governance matters. It is possible 
that this could have skewed the result towards a perception of greater intervention by 
the head of institution in this cluster. 
In the following interview extracts, the cluster groups have been shown (including 
institutions that could not be included in the cluster analysis) to allow the interviewee’s 
comments to be related to the cluster characteristics. 
5.3 How does the relationship with other key individuals work? 
Although there was a reluctance to consider other models in those institutions where 
the dual-role was working effectively, there were suggestions (44%) that, on 
occasion, the issue of potential conflicts in the roles could surface and become a 
problem for the secretary: 
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“….From time to time there is the disadvantage that [the Clerk] is part of the management 
structure, he is responsible to [the Principal] and yet in this critical aspect of our critical 
friend role if you like, that can sometimes put [the Clerk] in a difficult position in that we may 
be challenging strategic decisions that are being made within the organisation, strategic 
directions being proposed. We’re saying ‘hang on a minute, not sure about that one’ and 
[the Clerk] then finds himself torn between defending the management decision and that 
recommendation which is coming from the senior management of the organisation, and 
supporting the governing body in its criticism of that position.” 
HEC Chair (X)	 Cluster 2 
In some instances, where the chemistry was not ideal, there had been examples of an 
independent secretary siding too far with the governing body and causing a rift in its 
relationship with members of the institution’s executive. As one secretary noted: 
“When I took over the job we had a similarly independent clerk to the governors who’d been 
appointed as I was…..he had seen his role very strongly with the governors and had 
actually, I don't think he’d gone out of his way but he had upset, irritated, driven the 
executive, particularly the Principal……to utter, utter distraction so that actually 
relationships were becoming quite tricky.” 
HEC Secretary (H)	 Not in Cluster Group 
(see Table 29) 
The interviews identified a need for secretaries to be clear about the position they hold 
between the institution’s executive and the governing body, and of the potential 
disruption that could be caused to the relationship between them should they get that 
balance wrong. It was evident that the relationship with the head of institution was 
particularly important. In the case of dual-role secretaries the need to step outside the 
reporting relationship for other managerial functions to act as an independent ‘critical 
friend’ of the head of institution, on behalf of the governing body was often (67%) 
apparent: 
“…I think if we’re being honest there are always going to be tensions in universities 
between Registrars and Vice Chancellors. I mean those tensions may be….healthy 
because tension often is, but sometimes we’re going to try and occupy the same 
ground…..and that is something one has to live with, by accepting that in the end he has 
the title of chief executive ……and so he can tell me ultimately that that is what he’s going 
to do. But, my role with him is as a kind of special advisor, I think, and also to gain his 
trust,….so that actually he takes my view seriously….” 
Pre-92 Secretary (O)	 Cluster 2 
The requirement to provide guidance to the head of institution could also be seen 
amongst single-role secretaries: 
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“I think I have given advice that he’d rather I didn’t give. We haven’t fallen out about it but I 
have given advice that …..Probably quite small things I suppose…. I mean this is very 
straightforward stuff but I sometimes have to say, ‘no that’s a matter that’s got to go to the 
board, that’s not a matter that can be dealt with by chairman’s action or it’s not a matter that 
the Vice Chancellor can do on his own, it is a matter that I will refer to the board’. That’s 
not unknown.” 
Post-92 Secretary (K) Cluster 3 
Whatever the type of system adopted for the secretary’s role, it appears that, to 
operate effectively, the secretary and head of institution have to establish a 
constructive working relationship and the head of institution has also to be open to the 
fact that their position or decision can be challenged, or at least guided, by the 
secretary. That is not to say that responsibility for decision-making then rests with the 
secretary, but it does suggest that the secretary can help find a way through the 
governance structure that will enable the executive to establish common ground on 
decision-making with the governing body. This was acknowledged by some heads of 
institutions (33%) in a refreshingly open way: 
“…You’ve got to get on with your registrar/secretary. If you don't that’s very difficult. I’ve 
seen people, examples around the system, where they don't get on, and it’s destructive. In 
fact, actually the governing body should recognise this and do something about it because 
if that chemistry doesn’t work,….you’re under such pressure. You’ve both got to understand 
where the other one is coming from and each of you be predictable – and it’s that 
predictability that’s really important because you don't have time to discuss every single 
issue which you might have to deal with. I’ve got to think, ‘What will [the Secretary] say if 
we should go down that route’, and he will be thinking, ‘What would the Vice Chancellor say 
if I suggest that?’” 
Pre-92 VC (M) Cluster 2 
“If it was a question of vires, have the board the power to do this, the Vice Chancellor might 
want to do something adventurous. If the secretary felt that that was inconsistent with the 
power of the board, the secretary might recommend to the board that counsel’s opinion be 
obtained and if the counsel’s opinion said ‘this is really a bit iffy’ then I’d expect the 
secretary to do a very, very strong waving job in front of the chairman of the board that you 
really couldn't go down this path, even though the Vice Chancellor wanted to set up an 
imaginative project on a warm Mediterranean island or something.” 
“The secretary’s role is really if there is a conflict between what the Vice Chancellor wants 
to do and the board. That’s where I think the secretary’s conflict resolution comes in……” 
Post-92 VC (E) Cluster 1 
In more difficult cases, perhaps where a head of institution did not recognise the 
position and authority held by the governing body and took a line that was not 
supported elsewhere within the institution, the relationship between the secretary and 
the head of institution could be put under considerable strain. In these instances, it 
could be necessary for the secretary to intervene at a variety of levels, either with the 
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individual concerned or with the governing body itself. These were rare cases (22%), 
but were difficult conflicts that had to be addressed by the secretary: 
“….There perhaps have been issues where I felt that perhaps proper accountability lines 
were being bypassed or endeavoured to be bypassed, but that is no longer the case. I have 
had some issues in the past with the head of the institution in relation to matters that 
haven’t been given due process in my view and due diligence hadn't been accorded to 
decision making, and that the governing body’s responsibility had been in a sense 
bypassed. But that was taken up with the head of the institution and put right, but not in 
time - it was retrospective.” 
Pre-92 Secretary (U) Cluster 1 
These difficulties might apply to any of the types of secretary identified earlier. It could, 
however, be suggested that a dual-role secretary would be closer to the situation and 
able to identify such problems at an earlier stage, even if it proved more difficult, 
because of their dual role, to address them. It also seems likely that a good working 
relationship and the position of ‘special-advisor’ to the head of institution may not be 
enough. It must be accompanied by the ability to put some distance into that 
relationship should it prove necessary, to have a finely attuned ‘political radar’ that can 
detect when problems are occurring, and to be sufficiently assertive to be able to 
intervene without, unless it is unavoidable, causing further deterioration in the 
relationship: 
“You have to cooperate with the Vice Chancellor in terms of making sure that the university 
is managed effectively, but you also have to step back from the Vice Chancellor and say 
‘these are the responsibilities of the governors’ and…..making sure they ask the right 
questions of the Vice Chancellor or requiring him to be sufficiently accountable in what he’s 
doing.” 
Post-92 Secretary (Y) Cluster 2 
All of this, of course, concerns only the one-to-one relationship between the secretary 
and the head of institution, much of which takes place at the operating stage where 
management problems are being addressed and strategies and policies are being 
formulated. Amongst the external governors the chair is most likely to have routine 
contact with the institution on many of these issues, though in some cases, the 
treasurer may have a more detailed insight into specifically financial matters. The 
survey identified that chairs can often spend considerable time on institutional business 
and, in so doing, they are likely to forge their closest institutional relationship with the 
head of institution. In some cases, the chair can act as advisor, or confidante to the 
head of institution, whilst, in others, the head of institution may simply ensure that 
regular contact with the chair takes place so that there are ‘no surprises’ for the 
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governing body arising from the institution’s work or routine problems that may arise. 
The secretary has to understand that relationship and be prepared to work within it 
because of, in many cases (44%), the dual reporting lines that they hold with the head 
of institution and the chair: 
“….It really has to be somebody who’s familiar with matrix management and can essentially 
work for at least two bosses. That’s what a secretary has to do. The secretary reports to 
the Vice Chancellor and the university structure and to the chairman of the board and the 
governance structure. That’s not an easy task. Having spent many years in matrices in 
industry, I’m very familiar with the difficulties of doing that and it requires somebody who 
understands both sides, who can balance those, and not create conflicts between the two 
sides.” 
Post-92 Chair (Z) Cluster 2 
On occasion (22%), however, the relationship between the chair and the head of 
institution can be so close as to exclude the secretary from business that might impact 
upon the governing body. In one such case, this led to the secretary taking the matter 
up with the chair: 
“…..At that stage the [Head of Institution] and the Chairman….used to get into very tight 
little cabals and nobody had a clue what was going on……I had to listen out, pick up the 
signs of what was going on. The work was quite secretive, and for me quite damaging, 
because nobody actually knew from the governors what was going on behind closed 
doors.” 
“It made it difficult, yes. I’ve challenged it on a couple of occasions and the 
chairman…didn't enjoy it because he thought that I was challenging him personally… which 
I was. I was also challenging the independence….and neutrality of what they did. So, yes, 
it does, it creates some substantial difficulties.” 
Pre-92 Secretary (S) Cluster 3 
Some chairs recognise the balancing role that the secretary should play and form just 
as close a working relationship with the secretary as with the head of institution. This 
does not only happen with external secretaries where the reporting lines might have 
been expected to be clearly to the chair, and it can cover an advisory role that extends 
beyond work strictly associated with the governing body, say, for example, into other 
managerial responsibilities held in a dual-role structure. In fact, when it comes to the 
management of governance, some chairs (55%) are clear that the secretary’s 
contribution can be even more ‘useful’ than that of the head of institution, as suggested 
in this instance of the chair of a dual-role structure university: 
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“The secretary. Without any doubt at all. It is the secretary’s job to be my principal advisor 
in relation to all matters concerned with council. The thought of not accepting that advice is 
just unimaginable. The fact that on occasions I try to sort of slightly nudge it left or right is 
slightly different, and [the Secretary] understands that. The Vice Chancellor’s job again is 
that of the chief executive, it is not to ensure we have a nice cosy council, it is to conduct 
the management business of the university and convey it in the terms that he’s comfortable 
with at the council meeting. It’s the secretary’s job to work out if that’s likely to lead to two 
different views coming forward and get us together beforehand to sort it out.” 
Pre-92 Chair (B)	 Cluster 3 
In the case of an external secretary, the chair was even clearer about the relationship 
between the secretary, the chair and the board: 
“…..He has a duty to support me in my chairman’s role and he has a duty to support the 
board as a whole and also ….to exercise that independent role. He’s not accountable to 
the Vice Chancellor, he doesn’t take direction from him. If he was to take direction from 
anyone it would be from either me or from the board or me acting on behalf of the board, 
so he provides a very independent role….” 
Post-92 Chair (J)	 Cluster 3 
The more interventionist stance of some relatively new chairs (44%) was particularly 
apparent, caused, possibly, by the expectations placed on governors in higher 
education in recent years, and the wider acknowledgement that governance has 
become a high-profile issue: 
“...I think in the past…..the old chair……wouldn't even be shown the agenda, he wouldn't 
discuss it. (The Head of Institution) and I would discuss it and again (the Head of 
Institution) and I have never had any problems…..So now, yes, there is a change…The 
new chair, he’s younger, more dynamic…..it’s not an age thing, it’s just [the Chair] is far 
more hands on. He wants to be involved and he expects to see the agenda and to know 
what’s behind each agenda item…” 
HEC Secretary (V)	 Cluster 2 
In one case, however, the chair had a working style that did not wholly accept the need 
for ‘modern’ developments in governance, seeing them as an unnecessary burden on 
the work of the governing body: 
“I mean I think the main areas that we have differences of opinion between the chair and I, 
are probably that I want to slightly push to a more formal basis and he is resolutely resisting 
some of these and wants to be slightly more laissez faire, shall I say…..” 
HEC Secretary (H)	 Not in Cluster Group 
(see Table 29) 
It will be apparent that both extremes can cause the secretary some difficulty in 
handling this relationship. In the first example, the interventionism of the chair can 
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mean that there is a danger of straying into management issues, and the secretary 
may be called upon to bring the working style back into balance. It was the view of 
some heads of institutions (44%) that it may be easier for the secretary to deal with 
such a problem: 
“I am aware of other places where the chair has wanted to do things which are not 
necessarily completely consistent with either good governance or the articles and the Vice 
Chancellor has felt that it is difficult for the Vice Chancellor to act. It is really that the 
secretary’s got to dig their heels in as a company secretary should and say, ‘hey, you can’t 
do that’.” 
Post-92 VC (E) Cluster 1 
At the other end of the spectrum, the laissez-faire approach could mean that the 
governing body is not able to meet expected external requirements without some 
degree of tension in the introduction of new governance arrangements. 
The expected independence of the secretary’s role, the authority it has as an ‘officer’ of 
the governing body, the ability of the secretary and the judgement of knowing when, 
and how, to intervene are important factors in resolving such issues. However, the 
authority held by the secretary may not be enough to deal with problems where two 
strong personalities in the roles of chair and head of institution are unable to see eye-
to-eye. Small issues can sometimes (22%) spill over into the triadic relationship. One 
secretary noted that: 
“I haven’t had to do it in terms of actually going as far as the board itself, but we have had 
issues where the Chairman has asked me for information which the Vice Chancellor has 
not been happy should go to the board, and I’ve had to try and resolve that and that has 
actually been quite difficult because I felt that in that particular case both of them were 
acting in a rather unreasonable manner…..I was stuck in the middle of this thing thinking, 
‘why on earth are you two bothering to argue about this?’.” 
Post-92 Secretary (Y) Cluster 2 
Whilst this suggests that interpersonal relationships in higher education governance 
may sometimes be difficult, the majority of interviewees (78%), regarded the 
relationships between the chair, head of institution and the secretary to be effective. 
In most institutions, the need for the chair to achieve a balance between governance 
and management was well understood: 
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“….I’m physically removed from it and have about half a dozen other jobs as well, which I 
try to do but which I don’t allow to prevent me doing every single thing I have to do 
here…..the temptations of micro management….I think would be quite disastrous for a 
head of a council, because I have no academic qualifications and why should I set myself 
up to say I’m better than the senior management team on most of the decisions they have 
to take and certainly not on any of the academic decisions….” 
Pre-92 Chair (N) Cluster 2 
Furthermore, many suggested (89%) that it was the ‘triad’ of key players in higher 
education governance that was an essential component of effective governance, and 
governing, in their institution. This view extended across types of institution and was 
held by representatives of all three constituencies of interviewees: 
“…it’s all a question of confidence and trust….all the three ways, you know, between me 
and the Vice Chancellor, between me and the Registrar, between the Vice Chancellor and 
the Registrar…..I think the problems arise when two of the three, or none of the three, get 
on, or have differing views…To achieve anything you’ve got to have some sort of 
agreement or else you either have inaction or you have chaos.” 
Post-92 Chair (D) Cluster 1 
“It’s the triangular relationship between the Vice Chancellor, the Chairman of the Board and 
the secretary I think…..I wouldn't rank myself above the influence for instance of the Vice 
Chancellor or the influence of the Chairman. I mean it’s developing that relationship and 
understanding what makes it work and I guess it’s just having good working relationships 
with the people concerned. I could imagine in different circumstances where the 
personalities that didn’t gel or whatever, that it would be a very different role probably that I 
would then have to play.” 
Pre-92 Secretary (U) Cluster 1 
“Well, I don't provide the sort of constitutional advice to council, I would automatically leave 
all those sorts of things to the Registrar but I think in most substantive areas it’s probably a 
sort of partnership…..One issue is actual recruitment to the membership of council. The 
registrar, chairman and I very much work on that together in a joint way. I think apart from 
the sort of constitution, in our system of course he assembles the agenda and the minutes 
and all the rest of it, so he deals with all of those secretarial things. In terms of most 
substantive issues, I think we probably work together.” 
Pre-92 VC (C) Cluster 3 
5.4 How do the key players in institutional governance perceive the question of 
influence? 
The influence ratings considered earlier for the cluster groups were also analysed 
across the whole survey population to determine where factors of influence would be 
displayed by the secretary, chair and heads of institutions (Figure 11). Given that the 
responses were drawn from a population of only one of the three key players, it might 
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Figure 11: Mean ratings, by secretaries, of their influence, and that of their chair and head of institution, on aspects of 
their institution’s governance (1 = ‘no influence’, 5 = ‘very influential) 
have been expected that the results would have seen the secretary’s role tending 
towards a high degree of influence across each aspect of governance. In fact, the 
survey participants allocated levels of influence between the three players such that 
distinctive roles emerged for the secretary, chair and head of institution. The levels of 
influence were categorised in rank order for each governance factor (Table 32). 
The dominant position of heads of institutions in the central column of Table 32 
suggests that they have a constant influence in work of the governing body, and are 
only expected to have the greatest influence in terms of dealing with relationships 
between the governing body and the rest of the institution. Of equal interest, perhaps, 
is the interchangeability of the chair and secretary between first and third order levels 
of influence. Whilst there are points at which the secretary and the head of institution 
appear to influence ‘governor shaping factors’ such as communications between 
governors and the institution and governor induction, it is apparent that the secretary 
and chair appear to show the greatest influence in the backstage management of 
governance, such as the planning of meetings, while the chair and head of institution 
share the stage in meetings. 
Table 32: Ratings of influence on aspects of institutional governance by order of key 
players 
Serial Governance Factors Level of Influence 
First Order Second Order Third Order 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Communications 
Selection and appointment 
Induction 
Planning meetings 
Debate in meetings 
Decision-making 
Relationships 
Motivation 
Effectiveness 
Management 
Secretary 
Chair 
Secretary 
Secretary 
Chair 
Chair 
Head of Institution 
Chair 
Chair 
Secretary 
Head of Institution 
Head of Institution 
Head of Institution 
Chair 
Head of Institution 
Head of Institution 
Secretary 
Secretary 
Head of Institution 
Chair 
Chair 
Secretary 
Chair 
Head of Institution 
Secretary 
Secretary 
Chair 
Head of Institution 
Secretary 
Head of Institution 
Given that the survey respondents had only these choices, the picture of how 
governing bodies actually operate in meetings was always going to be less than 
complete. To address this point, the interviewees were asked for their view about who 
had the power to influence, what that power was and how it was used, during 
governing body meetings. 
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The question prompted some interesting responses, including those where pre-
meeting planning for the governing body appeared to play a major part in ensuring the 
contributions of the head of institution, the chair and the secretary were co-ordinated. 
These extracts are from the same institution: 
“The biggest influence is the Vice Chancellor. I think that’s because the structure of council 
meetings gives the Vice Chancellor, I think, a very powerful position. Furthermore here the 
Vice Chancellor……appreciates the role of lay members, he doesn’t fight against it, he 
welcomes it, and, in the main, he’s done his homework before he comes to a council 
meeting. So he’s the most influential in that sense.” 
Pre-92 Chair (B) Cluster 3 
“I think in a council meeting, given our personalities and the relative strengths, it’s probably 
the Vice Chancellor who carries the most influence if there were issues of consequence. 
But I mean there would be very few occasions, I can’t think of one, where if you like the 
three of us would go into the meeting without a clearly understood way of handling it if 
there were differences of opinion between the chair of council, me and the Vice Chancellor 
in any way.” 
Pre-92 Secretary (A) Cluster 3 
“Oh yes. He [the Secretary] would normally leave influence on major strategic issues to 
me, except where we’d agree that he will do something. Normally, I mean, most of the 
major strategic issues will be left to me to speak to council on them but that doesn’t mean 
that we haven’t discussed them and agreed beforehand, I’m the front end of the 
representation!” 
Pre-92 VC (C) Cluster 3 
Other institutions (44%) also noted that the power to influence rested largely with the 
head of institution. There were points, however, at which the secretary was able to 
interject and influence quite strongly. In some cases, these were in technical matters, 
as noted earlier in this study, but in others, particularly in the case of dual-role posts, 
they extended into contributions made as a member of the senior management team, 
requiring the secretary to ‘change hats’ during the process of the meeting: 
“Where I might intervene to influence the board is to keep them on the straight and narrow, 
or to keep an individual member on the straight and narrow…..So there are those kinds of 
interventions that I would make.” 
“It's not my role, acting as clerk to the board, to influence decision making as such, they 
are there to make the decision, that’s what their role as the board is. If I’m acting as a 
member of the senior management team bringing recommendations I would clearly be 
trying to influence the decision in favour of the recommendations that I’m making. My role 
as clerk to the board is to make sure that decisions are taken on a properly informed basis 
and that they’re within the powers of the board to make.” 
Post-92 Secretary (F) Cluster 1 
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In many instances (78%), secretaries were involved in the debate because they were 
trusted, as senior colleagues, to take a line in the best interests of the institution: 
“…….one is, in a sense, trying to occupy some middle ground because I don't think I 
operate, I’ve never operated in a council arena, where I am the silent advisor whispering in 
the ear of the [Chair]. I do think I’ve got as much stake in the university as anyone else 
around that table and there are times when I have to make sure that my voice is heard.” 
Pre-92 Secretary (O)	 Cluster 2 
Yet others are called upon to contribute because they have a wealth of experience that 
the governing body wants to use. These extracts are, again, from the same institution, 
but this time with an external single-role secretary, and with an interesting view from 
the head of institution which reflects the accepted distancing of the governing body and 
the executive in that institution: 
“I’m still working on this one, I’m not a member of board except as a clerk. I don't think it is 
my job to say much but I do - you can’t stop me now and again – but…..it really is the chair 
and the governors and the Principal who have to, in a sense, make things work.” 
HEC Secretary (H)	 Not in Cluster Group 
(see Table 29) 
“It’s perfectly possible that some members of the Governing Body don't know what's going 
on in terms of roles. In so far as they do there is no hesitation about giving that space to 
say whatever she has to say, including going well beyond her immediate legal brief on 
matters simply because she’s a very experienced person who can contribute in her own 
right. So I’ve never had any resistance to that whatsoever.” 
HEC Chair (G)	 Not in Cluster Group 
(see table 29) 
“So I think the influence can come from many different places, the power is held by the 
chair and the clerk, strongly mediated by me - probably the right kind of balance.” 
HEC Principal (I)	 Not in Cluster Group 
(see Table 29) 
In the view of one secretary, when trying to see a debate through to the desired end, 
the power rested with the head of institution, but the conclusion depended upon the 
contribution made by the chair: 
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“…..it depends what the issue is, as to whether the board….has got to really come to a 
decision, I don’t mean voting, it’s actually got to come to a decision. A lot then hangs, I 
think, on the view of the Vice Chancellor who’s got in some ways, as the chief executive, 
to take a lead on it and then I think it’s for the board to weigh up whether what they’re 
hearing is right or appropriate and make a decision….By the time you get to the actually 
summing up of the debate, I suspect then that it’s the chair of the board” 
Post-92 Secretary (K) Cluster 3 
The split of influence between the chair and head of institution was highlighted by 
other interviewees (55%), though it could be moderated somewhat (33%) by other 
contributors to the meeting: 
“The Vice Chancellor has quite a lot of power. I think partly the power comes from the 
respect people have rather than just from the role of Vice Chancellor. Power also comes 
from the committee chairmen…. and then the Vice Chancellor will bat on all the operational 
matters, in terms of buildings or in terms of strategy and planning and so on….” 
Post-92 Chair (D) Cluster 1 
The interviews suggested that it was likely to be a close contest as to whether the head 
of institution or the chair was the most influential in governing body meetings. Outside 
the boardroom, one aspect of the secretary’s role could, however, often supersede the 
first level rating (Table 32) given to the head of institution. This was the influence of 
the secretary as an independent ‘bridge’ in the relationship between the governing 
body and the rest of the institution. More particularly, it was noted that the relationship 
of the secretary to other managers must work well so as to ensure the smooth flow of 
information to and from the governing body. It also appeared to be the chairs (78%) 
who best recognised this aspect of the secretary’s work: 
“I think that it’s really vital that the secretary has this link into the organisation. A chair of 
an organisation and a council, many of who are lay people coming from outside, that 
secretary is a vital link into the management and operational matters of the university…..” 
Pre-92 Chair (Q) Cluster 1 
In one institution, when pressed on whether it was the secretary’s responsibility, or that 
of the head of institution, to act as a bridge, the response from the chair was clear: 
“No, because the Vice Chancellor’s got too many other things to do, it’s unreasonable to 
expect the chief executive to also fulfil this role. The other thing is to a certain extent I want 
the chief executive to be free of that anyway, I don’t really want the chief executive to be 
worrying about, ‘Oh dear, I’m going to get banged by council on this’. He’s got to answer to 
his conscience. If he believes what is coming forward is in the best interest of the 
university, he’s got to bring it forward and be prepared to defend it and it’s the Registrar 
and Secretary who’s the best person to sort out all the difficulties…..” 
Pre-92 Chair (B) Cluster 3 
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Yet, even in the same institution, the Vice Chancellor was not entirely keen to let go of 
the reins: 
“I think that the Registrar and the Vice Chancellor really act as a bridge between the council 
and senior management and senate happens to play a significant role….” 
Pre-92 VC (C) Cluster 3 
In reality, it seemed that the ‘bridging’ role was played by both the head of institution 
and the secretary in most institutions, and depended on the matter in hand. Most 
major strategic or other academic items appeared to be dealt with by the head of 
institution, building upon their role as chair of senate or the academic board, whilst 
operational and business issues tended to be addressed by the secretary. Finally, in 
89% of cases, the backstage role of the secretary was considered to be a powerful 
means to influence the work of the governing body: 
“…..My influence is much better used outside the meeting, before we get to the meeting, 
with individual members or whatever but at the meeting it seems to me that one does have 
to take the role of secretary of council and try to be judicious about when you actually 
intervene, and what one says.” 
Pre-92 Secretary (O) Cluster 2 
The interviews suggested that the orders of influence identified in Table 32 could be 
more complex than first thought, so the analysis was extended by using the results of 
the question set on role influence (survey question 29) from the interviews with the 
chairs and heads of institution, together with those provided by their secretaries. It only 
proved possible to obtain a full set of data from 4 institutions (1 pre-92, 2 post-92 and 1 
HEC) because interview participants were sometimes reluctant, or unable, to place a 
numerical score on the role of the other key players. Given this limitation, the results of 
the analysis should be treated with care, but they nonetheless point to some interesting 
conclusions. The analysis used the results from the 4 institutions to chart the views of 
the secretary, chair and head of institution about their influence and that of the other 
two key players (Figure 12). The results from the survey were then added, to 
determine whether the 4-institution sample was broadly representative of the wider 
group of secretaries. 
The wider sample of secretaries and the 4-institution group proved to be similar in the 
general pattern of response, but there were some differences in the levels of reported 
influence, shown by the light blue line (all secretaries) and the dark blue line (4-
150 
g 
x 
The Secretary’s view The Chair’s view The Head’s view
of relative influence of relative influence of relative influence
Mean Ratin Mean Rating Mean Rating
No 1 2 3 4 5 Very No 1 2 3 4 5 Very No 1 2 3 4 5 Very
Influence
Communications
Selection
Induction
Planning
Debate
Decisions
Relationship
Motivation
Effectiveness
Management
Influential Influence
Communications
Selection
Induction
Planning
Debate
Decisions
Relationship
Motivation
Effectiveness
Management
Influential Influence
Communications
Selection
Induction
Planning
Debate
Decisions
Relationship
Motivation
Effectiveness
Management
Influential
1
5
1
 
Key: Secretary
Chair
Head
All Secretaries
Figure 12: Ratings of relative influence of the interview group secretaries, chairs and heads of institution, and the ‘all secretaries’ 
survey group 
institution group) in Figure 12. Where the views of the all secretaries group varied from 
the 4-institution group, they tended towards slightly lower levels of influence for 
secretaries and chairs and a fairly consistent match in the case of heads of institution, 
apart from the effectiveness of the governing body, the management of governance, 
communication between the institution and governing body members and the selection 
of new governors, where the wider group felt they had more influence. In short, 
secretaries in the 4-institution group reported a slightly higher rating for their own 
influence, and that of their chair, than the survey population. Despite these 
observations, the maximum differential ratings were from -0.79 (influence on 
effectiveness by heads of institution) to 0.81 (influence on the planning of meetings by 
chairs); all other observations fell within this range. 
The views of all three key players about the influence of the chair were broadly 
consistent, with higher levels of influence for their contribution to debate and decision-
making in governing body meetings. The chairs consistently provided lower ratings for 
their own contribution than those of the secretaries and heads of institution, but the all 
secretaries group provided very similar ratings, apart from in the planning of meetings, 
where the wider group felt the chair had a lower level of influence than that perceived 
by the interviewed chairs, and in the selection of governors, where the all-secretaries 
group felt the chair had more influence than that perceived by the interviewed chairs. 
Further variations were found in the views expressed about the influence of heads of 
institution. In this case, the chairs felt the head of institution had more influence than 
them over decision-making, relationship building between the governing body and the 
rest of the institution and motivation of governing body members, but less in the 
planning of meetings and governor induction. The 4-institution secretaries, on the 
other hand, took the view that heads of institution had lower levels of influence in a 
wider range of activities, largely involving work outside governing body meetings. 
The widest variations were seen in the case of the secretaries. Whilst there was 
general consensus about the level of influence of secretaries on communications and 
the selection of governors and induction, differences began to emerge between the 
views of secretaries and heads of institution around the planning of meetings, building 
relationships between the governing body and the rest of the institution and, most 
noticeably, in terms of influence on debate in governing body meetings, where the 
heads of institution provided lower ratings than the secretaries and the chairs. 
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Interestingly, however, heads of institutions and chairs suggested that secretaries 
might have a slightly higher level of influence on decision-making in governing body 
meetings than that felt by either secretarial group. Chairs tended towards a higher 
rating for the influence of the secretary on the motivation of governors and the 
effectiveness of the governing body. 
The ratings are re-presented in Figure 13 to show the responses of the 4-institution 
group, and the way in which each key player rated their own influence and that of the 
other two key players. The views of the all secretaries group are also shown. 
This view of the data allows the relative ‘influence priorities’ of each key player in the 4-
institution sample to be compared. Table 33 shows the order of influence of each 
factor. The interview dataset revealed that the secretary had first order influence, as in 
the wider survey, on communications, induction, the planning of meetings and the 
management of governance. The head of institution had first order influence on 
relationships between the governing body and the institution, but also debate in 
meetings and the selection of governors, a slightly broader pattern than shown in the 
earlier analysis. In the latter two cases, the chair was relegated to the second order 
level. The picture in the second order ratings was also different than the earlier 
analysis in that the head of institution did not dominate this level, and the secretaries 
could be seen at higher ratings than the heads of institutions for decision-making, 
motivation and effectiveness of the governing body 
The comparison of the interview results with the survey results, both of which took 
account of the mean scores across the full scoring range, revealed matches between 
the order of influence ratings in 4 areas that placed the secretary at the first order level 
(communications, induction, planning of meetings and management of governance) 
and one where the chair was at first order level in the motivation of governors. The 
correspondence of the interview data with the survey results for the first order level of 
influence shown by the secretary appears to support the suggestion that the influence 
of the secretary is significant. The spread of first order influence also supported the 
notion that there could be a triadic relationship at work in higher education governance. 
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Figure 13: Ratings of the influence of the interview group secretaries, chairs and heads of institution, and the ‘all secretaries’ survey 
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Table 33: Interview ratings of influence on aspects of institutional governance by order 
of key players, compared with the ‘all secretaries’ survey results 
Serial Governance Factors Level of Influence Survey 
match First Order Second Order Third Order 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Communications 
Selection and appointment 
Induction 
Planning meetings 
Debate in meetings 
Decision-making 
Relationships 
Motivation 
Effectiveness 
Management 
Secretary 
Head of Institution 
Secretary 
Secretary 
Head of Institution 
Chair 
Head of Institution 
Chair 
Chair 
Secretary 
Head of Institution 
Chair 
Head of Institution 
Chair 
Chair 
Secretary 
Chair 
Secretary 
Secretary 
Chair 
Chair 
Secretary 
Chair 
Head of Institution 
Secretary 
Head of Institution 
Secretary 
Head of Institution 
Head of Institution 
Head of Institution 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
N 
Y 
N 
Y 
Despite the evidence of each of the key players being in a position to exert influence on 
various governance factors, there remained an issue about the differences in views 
shown between them on the scale of influence at play. To address this point, the 
differences in mean scores for the 4-institution sample were calculated for the ratings 
of pairs of key players about the third key player. The results were then ordered to 
show in which areas there was general agreement about the level of influence and 
where the views of the two key players contributing the rating differed (Figure 14). The 
rating of the influence of the chairs by the heads of institution and secretaries was 
broadly comparable. However, the analysis revealed a generally lower rating of the 
influence of the secretaries by heads of institution than chairs, and a lower rating of the 
influence of heads of institution by the secretaries than chairs. Each of the perceived 
differences took a unique form, and there was no consistent order of difference in the 
governance factors across all three tables. 
It should be remembered that these results were based on a small group of institutions, 
and it seemed clear from the data that the chairs had been relatively positive in rating 
the influence of the secretary and head of institution in each case. What was apparent, 
however, was that the secretaries and heads of institutions did not take the same 
approach and appeared to have the greatest differences in how they saw the influence 
of the other party. This view seemed to be supported by the interview material which 
pointed to tensions between the secretary and the head of institution where the actions 
of the head of institution, in particular, needed to be held in check, or at least ‘nudged’ 
in a particular direction, by the secretary. There will obviously be differences in the way 
in which this relationship is managed over time and in terms of the context of the work 
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Figure 14: Differences in the ratings of influence and the consequent ranking of influence factors 
at hand. Nevertheless, the pattern of views in this study suggests that there is a need 
to focus on this aspect of the triadic relationship as a priority, to establish a greater 
awareness about the governance responsibilities that the head of institution and 
secretary think they hold, and to show that different perceptions of influence exist so 
that they can be more openly addressed. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The investigation of the working relationship between the secretary, chair and head of 
institution identified a number of major issues and pointed to areas where the secretary 
can influence the work of the governing body. The cluster analysis pointed to three 
main types of governance approach, each of which could be characterised by a series 
of variables. It is recognised that these clusters could, over time, be fluid in 
membership and that they are not yet tied to a measure of effective governance. 
Nevertheless the analysis provided useful indicators of the governance culture in the 
surveyed institutions. These included variations between institutions in their view of the 
value of external guidance on governance, the part played in governance by the head 
of institution and chair, the provision of advice by the secretary to the governing body 
and the views of secretaries on contributions to governing body effectiveness. All of 
these factors provide a rich vein for further comparative research. 
The rating by secretaries of the influence of the ‘triad’ of the three main governing body 
players distinguished clear roles between them. The relative ratings of influence 
indicated that the secretary and chair have considerable influence, at least in the views 
of the secretaries, in the management of governance within their institutions. In the 
case of the secretary, some of this, it appears, is operated backstage in a supporting 
role to the head of institution, but it may also take place on stage, in the setting of 
governing body meetings or front-of-house, amongst the wider institutional community. 
Influence may also be expressed independently, with other members of the governing 
body and the executive, where the ‘bridging’ role played by the secretary appears to be 
critical, or even in cases where the secretary needs to deal with difficult relationships 
between the head of institution and the governing body. In other words, the secretary’s 
influence could be seen as much in the facilitation of governing as much as in securing 
progress with the business of governance. 
When looking further at the issue of influence, some useful findings emerged about 
perceived levels of influence between the whole survey population, consisting only of 
secretaries, and the, albeit smaller, sample of interviewees, comprising chairs, 
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secretaries and heads of institutions. The conclusion was drawn that secretaries 
appear to have a high degree of influence, at least over communications between the 
governing body and the rest of the institution, governor induction, the planning of 
meetings and the management of governance. This supports the hypothesis that 
research on higher education has underestimated the importance of the part played by 
the governing body secretary in the ‘doing’ of governing (Study Aim (a)) and has 
helpfully described the main areas of influence that can be seen in this work (Study 
Aim (b)). 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS FOR PRACTICE 
6.1 Introduction 
Three cross-cutting themes considered to be important to this study were identified in 
Chapter 1. These were the role context, relationships and influence used by 
secretaries in the management and operation of governance activities. The themes 
were investigated in the literature review in Chapter 2 and, informed the development 
of the conceptual model in Chapter 3, in which it was suggested that they underpinned 
other elements of practice seen in the secretary’s work. 
Several other factors began to emerge in the early stages of the study that lent weight 
to the existence of the cross-cutting themes. The first, related to context, was that the 
secretary’s role had developed in importance in the last ten years, possibly because of 
the increasingly technical and compliance-based environment of governance within 
higher education. The second theme of relationships highlighted the roles played by 
the secretary in ‘boundary-spanning’ (Aldrich and Herker, 1977; Williams, 2002) or 
‘bridging’ between the governing body and the rest of the institution, in the 
management and co-ordination of governance, and between the governing body and 
the external environment (Korac-Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Kouzmin, 2001, p.29; 
Middlehurst, 2004, p.275) when dealing with external guidance or new institutional 
structures. A further factor in this theme, which began to move into the realm of 
influencing, was the requirement to act as a ‘balancing agent’ in the relationship 
between the chair and head of institution, advising them in their governance roles 
whilst also acting as a member of the triadic governing network. The third theme 
concerned the backstage influence of the secretary, which was fundamental to both 
bridging and balancing activities, and was likely to shape the work of the governing 
body and the contributions of its other key players through informal mechanisms as 
well as formal processes. 
The empirical stage of the study attempted to test to what extent these themes could 
be seen within UK higher education governance, and how they fell within the 
conceptual model presented in Chapter 3. It was apparent from the survey data that 
this was an extremely complex operating environment. Differences in institutional 
culture, the organisation of governance and individual styles added local nuances to 
the way in which governance and governing was conducted. Nevertheless, a number 
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of patterns emerged in the data that appeared to confirm that aspects of role, 
relationships and influence could be identified in governance practice and that they had 
proved a useful frame of reference for the study. 
6.2 The role of the secretary 
The first theme concerned the technical role played by the secretary, which can 
encompass a wide range of legal, procedural or constitutional issues. It was found that 
the majority of secretaries do not hold professional qualifications in these areas. The 
professional administrator/manager does not seem to be as prevalent in governance as 
in other areas of university administration (Whitchurch, 2006), such as the 
management of estates or human resources functions, possibly because, until recently, 
governance has often played a secondary role to other duties held by the person 
responsible for the work of the governing body. But does this matter? Whilst there are 
early signs that the position could be changing with the introduction of specialist 
governance units, there are also concerns about the potential loss of the co-ordinating 
role of the senior-most administrator (Holmes, 2006) who, in most cases, acted as 
secretary to the governing body. A number of interviewees noted that an ability to deal 
sensitively with a wide range of interpersonal and political issues was probably of 
greater importance than a professional qualification. It seems that professional 
knowledge is only one element of the skills set required for the role to be undertaken 
successfully. 
Shattock (2006) proposed that the distinctive contribution of the secretary was the 
management of the ‘governance business’ of the higher education institution. This 
suggests a process-based approach that simply relies upon the co-ordination and 
presentation of information for the governing body; a role as custodian of the ‘soft-law’ 
rulebook with the occasional intervention on ‘hard-law’ issues. The fieldwork found that 
whilst most secretaries are engaged in these activities, with key contributions in the 
recruitment and induction of new governors, agenda setting and providing legal and 
procedural guidance, the contribution was often more than simply ‘management’. It 
could extend to a role equal to that of members of the governing body, and in some 
cases involved leading the delivery and development of governance processes and 
finding innovative ways to improve institutional governance. In such cases, the 
secretary’s role could be more accurately described as ‘directing’ the business of 
governance, to ensure that a wider set of considerations than governance processes 
were brought into play. 
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Despite this, the role is unlikely to be widely understood, as demonstrated in the 
response to a survey question about perceptions of the understanding of the role within 
the institution (survey question 22). Figure 15 shows the means scores from all 
secretaries (n=99) compared to those from the chairs, heads and secretaries of seven 
institutions gathered during the interviews (2 pre-92, 3 post-92 and 2 HECs). 
Figure 15: Perceptions of the understanding of the role of governing body secretary 
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The results indicate that there is greater understanding of the role of the secretary by 
those nearest to the secretary’s work, with close agreement amongst the respondents 
about the level of understanding by non-executive (lay) and staff governors. Of 
interest, however, is the higher perceived understanding of the role by the chairs and 
heads of institution than suggested by the secretaries, either in their own institutions or 
in the wider survey sample. This implies that secretaries may feel their role to be not 
as well understood as it could be, even by those who work closely with them on 
governance matters. At the other extreme, the responses for student governors, other 
staff and other students were closely related in both secretary categories of response, 
and also by the chairs. Of interest here is the view taken by heads of institutions that 
the secretary’s role is less well understood in the wider institution than it is believed to 
be by chairs and secretaries. This second disconnection could be the result of work by 
the secretary of which the head of institution is unaware, a more accurate reflection of 
reality (though the response from chairs might suggest otherwise) or a view amongst 
heads of institutions that a degree of understanding is not entirely necessary. 
A number of interviewees (55%) felt that the work of the secretary was not of 
significance to many staff, and certainly not to the wider student body, unless the 
governing body had made a controversial decision to which these constituencies took 
exception: 
“They would see the registrar, I think, as the guy who runs the administration, is part of 
the senior management team. I don’t think they would have a very clear conception of his 
role in relation to the governing body, in his role as secretary.” 
Pre-92 VC (C) Cluster 3 
Others (33%) took a different view, particularly chairs who felt that communication with 
the wider institution could be improved: 
“I’m always a bit shocked……by how little most academics seem to know what the 
(governing body) does….I think the knowledge of the university’s governance amongst its 
own academics is not as good as it ought to be…….I think there is a need to better inform 
people about the functions of the different people in the university, if only to reduce the 
huge amount of conspiratorial stories that go around about this, that or the other being 
fixed.” 
Pre-92 Chair (N) Cluster 2 
Whilst there is a perception that staff and students may not care much about the role of 
governance, particularly in larger institutions, the decisions ultimately made by the 
governing body have an impact on the rest of the organisation. It is therefore 
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incumbent on the secretary to find a way to improve communications between 
governing bodies and the rest of the institution, so that the wider organisation can 
begin to appreciate the constraints within which major institutional decisions are made, 
and governors can obtain a range of views from constituencies other than the senior 
management. This process could begin by setting out more clearly what it is that the 
governing body does, and, in particular, the role played by the secretary in the directing 
of governance. The results from this study show that a starting point might be in 
persuading heads of institutions that this form of ‘bridging’ could be a valuable 
component of the secretary’s work. 
6.3 Relationships between the secretary, chair and head of institution 
Aspects of the relationship between the secretary, chair and head of institution were 
apparent throughout the study. An early unexpected finding was the extent to which 
the performance of the secretary seemed to be evaluated without the involvement of 
the chair. The survey found about 20% of cases of this type, and particular examples 
were explored in subsequent interviews. The CUC guidance (2004), suggests that: 
‘Normally the secretary combines this function with a senior administrative or 
managerial role within the institution. The institution and the secretary must 
exercise care in maintaining a separation of the two functions. Irrespective of 
any other duties that the secretary may have within the institution, when 
dealing with governing body business the secretary will act on the instructions 
of the governing body itself’ (p.21, paragraph 2.16(b)) 
The guidance also says that, ‘the secretary should be solely responsible to the 
governing body and should therefore have a direct reporting link to the chair…..for the 
conduct of governing body business’ (paragraph 2.16 (c)). At the same time, Chairs 
are encouraged to, ‘take care not to become involved in the day­to­day executive 
management of the institution’, (p.20, paragraph 2.13), one aspect of which could 
reasonably expected to be the monitoring of the performance of the secretary’s work. 
In cases where the reporting link exists but the performance of the secretary is 
overseen without any input from the governing body, there is potential for confusion 
and miscommunication, even though, in reality, many secretaries appear to operate 
somewhat independently and tend to set their own work agenda and performance 
standards. Nevertheless, greater clarity in the guidance, and options available for 
monitoring the work of the secretary, might be helpful for all concerned, particularly if 
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the trend towards single-role secretaries outside the senior management team is 
continued, so as to map out the relationship expected between the secretary, the chair 
and the rest of the institution. The approaches could include, for example, separate 
reviews by the chair and head of institution or joint meetings between all three parties. 
A forum for the frank exchange of views about the performance of the board, and the 
secretary’s role in the work of the governing body should, however, be available, as a 
first step in evaluating key governing relationships and their contribution to the overall 
performance of the governing body. 
This approach is suggested because the study found that relationships in the governing 
triad are not without their difficulties. A number of interviews revealed tensions 
between the three key players that, whilst not serious, appeared to have emerged 
because either the chair or head of institution had acted outside their sphere of 
responsibility or there had been concerns about the performance of one of the parties 
that had not been openly addressed. The tension between the secretary and the head 
of institution was acknowledged by one secretary to be inevitable and even a positive 
force, so long as the secretary remembered that the head of institution was ultimately 
in charge. In other cases, where a more dominating head of institution was seen, a 
difference in view could be a cause of some frustration for the secretary and could spill 
over into the relationship between the head of institution and a ‘new-style’ chair, 
expecting to fulfil a role closely aligned to the expectations set out in modern 
governance guidance. The secretary could be caught in the middle, balancing their 
own position between these opposing forces, still acting as a ‘special advisor’ to the 
head of institution in their governance and other managerial capacities whilst ensuring 
that sufficient attention was given to the needs of the chair. Ensuring that the ‘triadic’ 
relationship, identified by several interviewees, remains healthy is therefore a key, and 
challenging, task of the secretary, but must also be appreciated by the chair and head 
of institution. 
6.4 The influence of the secretary 
Whilst the chair and head of institution appear to be expected to have distinctive 
governance roles and to largely remain within them, the secretary has to act as a 
bridge in a set of roles and relationships, particularly when working with the chair and 
head of institution. The ability to respond to two ‘bosses’, advise them, make sure that 
they are both aware of each others’ views and sometimes hold either, or both, in check 
requires not only political skill but also the trust of both parties and the wider governing 
body. Much depends upon the strength of the working relationship between these key 
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players and a common understanding of the part to be played by each in relation to the 
governing body. In the case of the secretary and the head of institution, there has to 
be a particular openness about the way in which the secretary must sometimes place 
the wishes of the governing body above those of the ‘chief executive’. With the chair, 
the secretary must ensure that a line of access is maintained so that the advisory role 
often played by the chair with the head of institution can be balanced, if necessary, by 
a wider, independent, institutional perspective. 
In this respect, the analysis of the provision of advice and the handling of conflicts was 
revealing. It highlighted the influence held by the secretary in governing relationships 
and demonstrated how the secretary must be able to move seamlessly between acting 
as a ‘servant’ and ‘leader’, either with the whole governing body or with individual 
governors. This requirement is not, however, restricted to members of the governing 
body. The secretary may not formally act as a representative of the governing body in 
other institutional decision-making settings, particularly if present in another managerial 
capacity, but must nonetheless remain aware of the likely reaction of the governing 
body to policy developments, the decisions proposed by managers and the actions of 
other staff, and be a source of influence and guidance on emerging proposals before 
they reach the boardroom. This type of influence could be seen in the advisory role 
played by the secretary in a range of decision-making groups and committees and in 
the way in which information prepared by other contributors, even in some cases the 
head of institution, was reshaped by the secretary before it went to the governing body. 
This could be considered as merely ‘gatekeeping’ or ‘controlling’ the information that 
the governing body is eventually able to see, elements of the second dimension of 
power described in Chapter 2 (Hardy et al., 1996). However, it seemed, from the 
interviews in particular, that there was a more subtle process involved, related to the 
shaping of preferences seen in the third dimension of power (Lukes, 2005). An 
intervention by a secretary was often aimed at ensuring that the business of the 
institution was not unduly delayed because the governing body would not be able to 
reach a conclusion from poor information or the poor presentation of that information. 
At the same time, most interviewees took the view that certain decisions were reserved 
for the governing body and could not be taken in such a way that the governing body 
was circumvented, even though, as noted by Boston (2000, pp.105-106), proposals 
continue to be presented more often as a fait accompli, than a set of options from 
which the governing body has to make a choice. The secretary’s bridging role was 
extended into less formal settings than other institutional committees to ensure that 
these objectives were achieved. In some cases, the directing of governance was 
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handled via the senior management team, contact with (typically) senior staff or even 
by routine meetings between the chair, head of institution and the secretary. In others, 
the secretary took the initiative to build relationships with groups perceived to be more 
‘distant’ from the work of the governing body. The survey-based evidence of stronger 
relationship-building by some secretaries with elected staff and student members of the 
governing body, or with their constituencies, was a case in point. 
Like the management of the role, the exercise of influence is not without its difficulties. 
The analysis described in Chapter 5 (see Figure 15), for example, revealed opposing 
views from secretaries and heads of institutions about their perceived influence in 
certain aspects of the operation of institutional governance. The three greatest 
differences were in the planning of governing body meetings, debate within those 
meetings and in relationship building between the governing body and the rest of the 
institution, all areas where it might be expected that a head of institution would want to 
stake a claim. In two of these functions, the head of institution was regarded as 
having a first order influence (Table 34), but in the area of meeting planning, the first 
order level was held by the secretary. It will be evident that perceptions need to be 
transformed into a clearer understanding of operating responsibilities if conflict is to be 
avoided in the close working relationship required between the secretary and the head 
of institution. 
6.5 Reframing our understanding of higher education governance 
Byrne (2002, p.7) noted that complex systems need to be considered as a whole, 
rather than in discrete elements, but that they can change over time, often in non-linear 
ways. He suggested that ‘much neglected techniques….of numerical taxonomy 
typified by cluster analysis’, could yield a more useful insight into the ‘condition’ of such 
systems than many linear statistical techniques. This study set out to gather the views 
from key players in higher education institutions to try to interpret the role and influence 
of the secretary, recognising that whilst this would change over time, a snapshot of the 
‘condition’ of governance in this sector could prompt a debate about the way in which 
governance is more usually associated with institutional structure than the people who 
operate governing systems. Data from the cluster analysis, considered in Chapters 3 
and 5, suggested that there were three groups of institutions that could be defined by 
the time spent by key players on governance activities. The clusters revealed other 
features that suggested that styles of governance could be characterised in a new 
approach, not bound by institution type but effectively reframing our understanding of 
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higher education governance in terms of practice-based groupings. These groupings 
were: 
Cluster 1:	 Medium time input, active governing body, process-averse with more 
value placed on the contribution of the head of institution than lay 
governors; 
Cluster 2:	 Low time input, inactive governing body, process-aware with more value 
placed on the contribution of the (more interventionist) head of institution 
than lay governors; 
Cluster 3:	 High time input, proactive governing body, process-friendly with less value 
placed on the contribution of the head of institution than lay governors. 
In mapping the clusters (Figure 16) it was apparent that the role of the head of 
institution was a critical factor. In institutions where governance had developed a high 
profile role, the part played by the head of institution was less important than those in 
which governance was generally not as ‘active’. It was also clear that where the head 
of institution did play a fundamental role, it could differ between the controlling function 
seen in Cluster 2 and the more benign contribution seen in Cluster 1. Cluster 2 
contained three interview sites. In two of these there had been some underlying 
tensions in the relationship between the secretary and the head of institution on 
governance matters. In the third institution, there was no evidence of any problems in 
the relationship, but a clear will, on the part of the secretary, to have an equal voice on 
governance matters as a key stakeholder in the institution and to move the governing 
body forward in terms of its role and shape, in an environment where the head of 
institution did not see a major role for the governing body in institutional decision-
making. It is difficult to say whether this was a different expression of an underlying 
tension, particularly because other cases of this nature were apparent in interview sites 
in different clusters. Nevertheless, it appears to corroborate the earlier conclusion that 
achieving an appropriate balance in the triadic network, and, in particular, managing 
effectively the relationship between, and expectations of, the secretary and the head of 
institution, could be more important factors in the smooth operation of institutional 
governance than have hitherto been appreciated. 
Figure 16 shows how the clusters are distributed against three measures: their 
approach towards governance processes, the ‘activity level’ of the governing body and 
time inputs on governance, as well as the relative value placed on the contribution of 
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the head of institution. The result is a 3-dimensional view of the practice-based 
clusters that provides a more valuable insight into the complex operating environment 
of governance than is possible in the 2-dimensional structure-based approach of 
institution type. 
Process friendly 
Process averse 
Inactive GB 
Proactive GB 
High time input 
Low time input 
Cluster 3 
Contribution of head of institution valued more than lay governing body members (Clusters 1 and 2) 
Contribution of head of institution valued less than lay governing body members (Cluster 3) 
Cluster 2 
Cluster 1 
Figure 16: A 3-dimensional representation of the governance clusters 
6.6 Conclusions and recommendations for theory and practice 
6.6.1 Summary of the major findings of the study 
The major findings of this study are that: 
•	 The cross-cutting themes of role context, relationships and influence, investigated 
via a rare insight into the views of senior participants in higher education 
governance, are vital to developing our understanding of the people, social 
interactions and individual contributions that make our governance systems work; 
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•	 The multi-theoretical approach to researching these cross-cutting themes has 
identified two new questions that have to be addressed: ‘Who Governs 
Governance? – the tension between supporting and directing the business of 
governance’ and ‘Governance or Governing? - the tension between process and 
people', to help us understand the settings and dynamics of governance in action; 
•	 There is a triadic network in operation between the secretary, chair and head of 
institution, and, through the relationships displayed in this network, the secretary 
can have considerable influence over the institution’s approach to governance; 
•	 The secretary’s key areas of influence are in the management of communications 
between the institution and the governing body, governor induction, the planning of 
meetings and the overall management, or even ‘directing’ of institutional 
governance; 
•	 There can be significant tensions and overlap in responsibilities between members 
of the triad, sometimes leading to conflict, but more often resulting in sub-optimal 
working relationships. Critical operating roles held by the secretary, such as in the 
provision of advice required by the governing body, or the management of conflicts 
of interest, can be significant, and appear to vary, in frequency, by institution type; 
•	 Institution type is not, however, a key determinant in the practice of governance: 
this study concludes that the time spent on governance, together with other 
variables, can more usefully characterise the approach taken by institutions, and 
enable them to be categorised into three distinct clusters. 
6.6.2 The theoretical approach and conceptual model 
It was noted in Chapter 2 that the theoretical framework for this study needed to be 
based on a multi-paradigm approach. It was evident from the empirical stages of the 
study that the framework had been helpful, in that no single theoretical stance could be 
seen in the work of the secretary. The multi-paradigm examples ranged from the 
stewardship approach, where the secretary’s work was geared towards improving 
decision-making by the governing body; stakeholder theory, where the secretary 
helped provide a bridge to ‘distant’ constituencies in the institution; managerial 
hegemony theory, where the secretary was seen as part of a technically ‘expert’ group 
of managers able to influence the operation of the governing body either backstage or 
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in its meetings; and even the agency model, where the secretary could act as part of 
the system of monitoring required by the governing body by controlling the actions of 
the head of institution and other senior staff. In the end, the complexity seen in the role 
required a different method of establishing an underpinning theory. 
Cornforth’s (2005b) paradox approach provided a means to consider ways in which a 
productive tension between controlling and partnering could be created between the 
governing body and the executive, with a focus on the relationship between the three 
key players in higher education governance and governing. Aspects of trust in the 
management of governance and issues over the responsibilities held by each key 
player were evident throughout the fieldwork, particularly in the interview stages of the 
project. The element of trust in the management of governing relationships added a 
further dimension, where the secretary could often ‘control’ and ‘partner’ rather than 
take a single line. This suggests that the paradox is insufficient to capture some of the 
unique features of the secretary’s work and that a new definition is required. One 
approach might be through the identification, and further investigation, of two new 
paradoxes. The first: ‘Who governs governance? - the tension between supporting 
and directing the business of governance’, would recognise that the higher education 
secretary might play either, or both, roles, depending on a variety of structural and 
relationship factors that can vary over time and the context of the work at hand. The 
second: ‘Governance or governing? – the tension between process and people’, might 
allow future investigators to delve more deeply into the relationship factors that this 
study has begun to uncover to see how they impact upon the work of governing bodies. 
In so doing, they might be urged to continue to look beyond the chair-head of institution 
nexus and consider other contributors to higher education governance, and governing. 
The adoption of a conceptual model (Chapter 3) to describe the role and influence of 
the secretary, helped set a ‘top-level’ approach to analyse the range of roles and 
relationships with which the secretary must deal. It is very likely that some of these 
roles and relationships, and the influence that might accompany them, will differ by 
institution, contribution and over time, making them a constantly moving target (Hay 
and Richards, 2000, p.4). Nevertheless, as a way of illustrating the variety of roles and 
responsibilities that appeared to be held, in the view of the survey population and those 
subsequently interviewed, the approach used in the model could be a helpful building 
block for other investigators looking at the relationships between key players and their 
impacts upon governing body effectiveness. In this study it proved to be an invaluable 
device to structure the investigation and help meet the requirements set out in Study 
Aim (c). 
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6.6.3 Developing our understanding of the secretary’s role 
Study Aim (b) sought to identify the nature of the current role played by the governing 
body secretary and the way in which secretaries are able to exert influence on the work 
of the governing body. The major findings relating to the role are explained in Chapter 
4 and those on influence in Chapter 5. A number of the findings may be of particular 
relevance to the way in which governance practice is developed in the higher education 
sector. 
The first of these is that the secretary will be expected to demonstrate a positive form of 
political influence in the role and that this sometimes requires a degree of 
independence from the chair and head of institution as much as it does the other 
members of the governing body. Secretaries need to establish the ground rules 
necessary to maintain an independent line early on in their relationship with other key 
players, and should be provided with the means to establish this position without undue 
interference from heads of institutions or other senior institutional managers. 
Separating the role description for the duties of the secretary from other responsibilities 
held in the institution may be one possible approach. Another may be the promotion of 
a greater understanding of the ‘triadic’ relationship between the key players and 
determining ways in which the effectiveness of that relationship can be improved. 
The second is that future guidelines on governance practice should have an increased 
emphasis on the development of effective working relationships between the secretary, 
chair and head of institution. At present, the emphasis is on formal methods of 
communication rather than informal interactions between the three key players and 
with the wider governance community, and this balance needs to be redressed so as to 
more accurately reflect ‘real-world’ governing practice. 
These findings are likely to make a timely contribution to interests in this area held by 
the LFHE and the CUC, particularly as governing bodies are encouraged to move 
beyond the realm of monitoring institutional performance to more rigorous methods of 
monitoring their performance, and contribution, to the life of the institution. They also 
point to a need for much greater understanding, at the micro-level, of the operating 
roles and environment of key players in institutional governance, and how their 
activities relate to the work of the institution’s executive management. The approaches 
seen in recent research on complementary leadership teams (Miles and Watkins, 2007; 
Sheard and Kakabadse, 2007), for example, could usefully be extended to higher 
education governance to address these issues. A greater understanding of the factors 
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at play in governing bodies that require high levels of advice and support, and where 
conflicts of interest are more routinely seen, could also identify mechanisms to help 
secretaries deal with these difficult aspects of their role. 
6.6.4 Managing governing relationships 
Cornforth (2005a, p.243) noted that, ‘How boards work is crucially affected by the 
relationship between the board and the management or other staff they work with’ and, 
citing Mole (2005), concluded that, ‘aligning expectations and achieving a satisfactory 
division of responsibilities and activities are often problematic’. He suggested that 
there was a need for boards and managers to regularly review and negotiate their 
relationship to take account of differing expectations and responsibilities. The same 
need for clarity, particularly between the roles of executive chairman and CEO, has 
been recognised in the US company sector (Nadler et al., 2006). A number of other 
studies cited in the literature review by Kezar and Eckel (2004, p.386) suggested that 
the clarification of roles was critical to higher education governance effectiveness and 
efficiency, and that addressing informal interaction outside the formal structure was 
key. 
This study found a pattern of misaligned expectations similar to that identified by Mole 
(op cit), but this time between three key players in higher education governance rather 
than simply between ‘the board’ and a single member of the executive. Whilst 
recognising the small sample involved, the analysis of the interview-based data yielded 
contradictory views about perceptions of influence between the head of institution and 
the secretary, whilst there was general agreement about the contribution of the chair. 
The views were most at odds in relation to the perception of heads of institution of the 
influence of the secretary in debate in governing body meetings, but also emerged in 
backstage work such as the planning of meetings and relationship building between the 
governing body and the rest of the institution. These overlaps, and resulting tensions, 
seemed to have taken place outside formal governing body structures and had more to 
do with the actions of one of the triad or a disagreement amongst members of the triad 
(typically the secretary and the head of institution but also in other two-way 
relationships). 
To address this point, further work is required to establish an understanding of specific 
roles and responsibilities in relation to governance so as to move beyond simple post 
or job descriptions (what needs to be done) onto the way in which tasks are undertaken 
(how things are done). The Leadership Foundation for Higher Education Governance 
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Development Programme has established an annual 2-day event for chairs and heads 
of institutions to, ‘assist in the development of a positive relationship’ (LFHE, 2006, p.3) 
between these key individuals. A different model exists in the US where the AGB 
National Conference on Trusteeship actively encourages attendance by the three key 
players in institutional systems of governance. The AGB has also recently called for 
university presidents to find ways in which senior staff can share insights with the 
president and the board (AGB, 2006). There is scope for the UK development 
activities to be extended to include the secretary so that there is an opportunity for a 
three-way dialogue to take place on institutional and governance matters. Particular 
issues arising from this study that could be addressed in this way include how the 
secretary can act, on behalf of the governing body, as a bridge to other constituencies 
in the institution, how the role of the secretary can be monitored independently of the 
head of institution and how to ensure that chairs and heads of institution understand 
that the secretary’s role may sometimes require intervention in the informal operation of 
the governance responsibilities of the other two parties. 
6.6.5 Improving institutional governance 
Nadler et al. (op cit) noted the conclusion of the US National Association of Corporate 
Directors Blue Ribbon Commission on Board Leadership that effective company 
boards, ‘have not one or two leaders, but a system of leadership, that calls on board 
committee chairs and other individual directors to provide leadership in various aspects 
of governance’ (p.81). It could be suggested that, in the context of higher education, 
the leadership system extends to the role of the secretary. In directing institutional 
governance, and ensuring that governance processes and governing relationships are 
effective, the secretary is in a pivotal position to ‘join up’ the information required by the 
governing body and to progress the business of governance by the use of informal 
networks, as well as formal governance machinery. At this point, however, it may be 
worth noting that there are common frustrations about the way in which these tasks are 
carried out, not only in higher education, but in other sectors. 
Hardin and Roland (2006) reported three key findings about company board processes 
from the Blue Ribbon Commission and annual USC/Mercer Delta Corporate Board 
Surveys that are worthy of consideration in the UK higher education sector. The first 
was that the Blue Ribbon Commission identified significant dissatisfaction with the 
content, volume and accessibility of the information received by company directors, a 
view echoed in LFHE gatherings of higher education governors. There is significant 
scope for further research, networking and practice-sharing on the methods used to 
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streamline this aspect of governance work. The 2003 US survey identified that only 
41% of directors said that their board had significant influence over its own agenda, but 
that this had risen to 60% in 2004. This study has identified the predominant influence 
of the secretary on agenda setting for the governing body, which may be the most 
pragmatic way of dealing with governance work but not the most effective way in which 
to engage governors in the important issues facing their institution. Methods for 
promoting such engagement have been proposed (Chait, Ryan and Taylor, 2005), and 
there are examples of institutions involving their governors in a deeper understanding 
of strategic and marketplace issues, but, again, practice-sharing may be needed to 
persuade executive teams that these approaches are worthwhile and to educate 
governors in their use in a higher education context. The last US survey finding 
concerned the ability of external directors to meet without the CEO present, a practice 
that was rare in 2001 but had become largely routine by 2004. This enabled 
independent directors to consider formally the way in which the company was being 
managed without the influence of the CEO impacting upon the debate. It is not yet 
clear whether higher education governing bodies would feel able to adopt a similar 
stance without alienating the head of institution, particularly, given the results of this 
study, if the secretary was present at these meetings. And, if novel methods such as 
these are to be developed, there will be a need for future generations of heads of 
institutions, secretaries and chairs to understand why they are required and how they 
are intended to work, so that an appropriate level of trust can be maintained in key 
governing relationships. 
6.6.6 Should we reconsider our approach to governance typologies to place 
further emphasis on roles, relationships and influence? 
Study Aim (a) sought to test the hypothesis that research on higher education 
governance had underestimated the importance of the part played by the governing 
body secretary in the ‘doing’ of governing. The findings of this study support the 
argument that the secretary’s contribution is critical to higher education governance, 
and that it should receive greater recognition in future research in this field. The study 
went further, however, to consider the way in which the views of this influential group 
could be used to reflect upon the type of governing seen in higher education 
institutions. The cluster analysis revealed groupings of institutions based upon the time 
the key players spent on governance matters. For example, in Clusters 1 and 3, 
covering 66 of the 94 institutions analysed in this way, the time dedicated to 
governance matters by the secretary was significant and, in some cases in Cluster 1, 
could be more than double that of either the chair or the head of institution. When 
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combined with other characteristics found in each cluster, a new practice-based 
classification of governance was identified. 
The clusters suggested that different levels of importance were attributed by the 
secretaries to their own role, that played by their head of institution and members of the 
governing body other than the chair, whilst there was broad agreement that the quality 
of the chair had the greatest impact on the effectiveness of the governing body. On the 
other hand, the ratings of influence and interview material considered in Chapter 5 
indicated different areas of governance activity in which the secretary, chair and head 
of institution had influence, and in which there could sometimes be conflict. These 
areas particularly concerned the contributions of the chairs and heads of institutions to 
the management of communications with the governing body, the relationship between 
the governing body and the rest of the institution, the selection of new governors, the 
planning of meetings and the contribution of the key players to debate in those 
meetings. 
Whilst the cluster analysis was limited in the sense that it drew upon information 
provided only by secretaries, it suggested that a focus on governance structure seen in 
most previous research on higher education governance was unlikely to tell the whole 
story about the complex web of processes and relationships that make up a system of 
institutional governance. Research with a larger group of chairs and heads of 
institutions would enable the cluster approach to be informed with a wider range of data 
to see whether there are further ‘drivers’ in patterns of influence within and between 
them. 
There is a problem in that these ‘drivers’ may change with the personnel undertaking 
governance work, and may also depend upon relationships that change over time. As 
Petersen and Short (op cit, p.539) concluded, there may also be other attributes at 
play, including aspects of social attractiveness and social style, that could affect 
relationships, the individual survey responses and, in turn, membership of the clusters. 
The cluster analysis can tell us about the characteristics or ‘condition’ of a group of 
institutions when dealing with governance matters but will not reveal how effective their 
approach to governance may be. Whether we can learn more about the effectiveness 
of institutional governance from those that dedicate considerable time to governing and 
have a positive outlook on governance (as in the case of Cluster 3), or, alternatively, 
those with a sceptical approach to external guidelines, an active secretary and an 
active, but not overbearing, head of institution (as in the case of Cluster 1) remains to 
be seen. It is an area where further research could be of substantial benefit. But, it 
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would depend upon there being a more critical debate of what constitutes ‘effective 
governance’ in higher education, that moves beyond adherence to external guidelines 
and ‘soft law’ to look at the way in which governance structures and governing 
relationships add value to the work of the institution. 
To start this debate, my contribution, via this empirical study, has been to provide new 
insights into the role and influence of the secretary in higher education governance, 
embodied in working practices and relationships with other key governance players. In 
the process, rare data and ‘voices’ have been presented to show how research must 
move beyond the constraints of governance structures to consider the way in which 
people actually govern their institutions. Further research could usefully build upon the 
findings of this study, to consider other aspects of the working relationships within the 
triadic network of the secretary, chair and head of institution and to help determine the 
impact of this triad on the effectiveness of institutional governance in UK higher 
education. 
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APPENDIX 4: BACKGROUND DATASET
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Chapter 3 
Table 6 (Page 84)

In what region is your institution based?

Region Count % 
South East 17 15.5 
South West 8 7.3 
London 25 22.7 
East of England 6 5.5 
East Midlands 7 6.4 
West Midlands 8 7.3 
Yorks & Humber 8 7.3 
North East 2 1.8 
North West 8 7.3 
Wales 7 6.4 
Scotland 11 10.0 
N Ireland 3 2.7 
Total 110 100.0 
UK Count % 
19 11.4 
14 8.4 
39 23.5 
8 4.8 
9 5.4 
12 7.2 
11 6.6 
4 2.4 
14 8.4 
12 7.2 
20 12.0 
4 2.4 
166 100.0 
190 
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Figure 3 (Page 100)

Who, in the case of your Nominations Committee, is the principal person that (choose one for each item):

Develops Makes first Confirms Organises/ 
Arranges 
meetings or Provides 
Response 
Services 
Committee % 
membership 
Criteria % 
approach to 
new members % 
appointment 
and role desc % 
hosts tours 
of HEI % 
briefings with 
Chair/HoI etc % 
information/ 
resources % 
No response 3 2.7 8 7.3 7 6.4 5 4.5 4 3.6 3 2.7 3 2.7 
Chair 1 0.9 23 20.9 27 24.5 17 15.5 1 0.9 0 0.0 1 0.9 
Head of Institution 0 0.0 8 7.3 27 24.5 3 2.7 15 13.6 8 7.3 1 0.9 
Secretary 88 80.0 66 60.0 37 33.6 78 70.9 75 68.2 86 78.2 97 88.2 
Other non-exec GB member 0 0.0 1 0.9 5 4.5 1 0.9 1 0.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Other staff 18 16.4 2 1.8 1 0.9 2 1.8 12 10.9 13 11.8 8 7.3 
N/a 0 0.0 2 1.8 6 5.5 4 3.6 2 1.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Totals 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 
Figure 4 (Page 103)

Who, in your governance structure, ultimately: (choose one for each item):

Decides Decides 
format/timing 
of GB 
induction 
content 
of GB 
induction 
Arranges 
provision of 
GB induction 
Delivers 
GB induction 
Evaluates 
GB induction 
Feeds results 
of evaluation 
into future 
Response programme % programme % programme % programme % programme % programmes % 
No response 5 4.5 5 4.5 4 3.6 13 11.8 10 9.1 9 8.2 
Chair 23 20.9 26 23.6 3 2.7 5 4.5 20 18.2 9 8.2 
Head of Institution 8 7.3 7 6.4 4 3.6 13 11.8 6 5.5 5 4.5 
Secretary 68 61.8 66 60.0 88 80.0 60 54.5 43 39.1 65 59.1 
Other non-exec GB member 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 6 5.5 1 0.9 
Other staff 2 1.8 2 1.8 10 9.1 7 6.4 9 8.2 7 6.4 
External contributor 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 2.7 1 0.9 1 0.9 
N/a 4 3.6 4 3.6 1 0.9 9 8.2 15 13.6 13 11.8 
Totals 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 
Figure 5 (Page 109)

Who, in your governance structure, ultimately (choose one for each item):

1
9
2
 
Decides Decides Decides Briefs Chair 
Response 
which items 
appear on 
GB agenda % 
order of 
business on 
GB agenda % 
timing of 
business on 
GB agenda % 
on relative 
priorities on 
GB agenda % 
No response 7 6.4 6 5.5 4 3.6 6 5.5 
Chair 58 52.7 43 39.1 59 53.6 0 0.0 
Head of institution 17 15.5 9 8.2 4 3.6 17 15.5 
Secretary 25 22.7 50 45.5 33 30.0 85 77.3 
Other non-exec GB member 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Other member of SMT 1 0.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
My assistant or staff 0 0.0 1 0.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 
N/a 2 1.8 1 0.9 10 9.1 2 1.8 
Totals 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 
Figure 6 (Page 110)

Who, in your governance structure, is the principal person who prepares and presents papers/reports on the following items for governing body

meetings? (choose one for each item)

Prepares: Response 
Strategic/ 
corporate 
planning % 
Major 
financial 
matters % 
Major 
academic 
developments % 
Student 
matters % 
Major 
support 
service 
developments % 
Risk 
management/ 
audit % 
Corporate 
governance 
systems % 
Summary 
reports of 
committee 
meetings % 
No response 7 6.4 9 8.2 8 7.3 8 7.3 12 10.9 9 8.2 6 5.5 21 19.1 
Chair 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 1.8 0 0.0 
Head of institution 42 38.2 6 5.5 52 47.3 8 7.3 27 24.5 5 4.5 2 1.8 0 0.0 
Secretary 19 17.3 8 7.3 6 5.5 16 14.5 28 25.5 38 34.5 93 84.5 64 58.2 
Other non-exec GB member 0 0.0 4 3.6 1 0.9 1 0.9 0 0.0 5 4.5 1 0.9 2 1.8 
Other executive GB member 7 6.4 9 8.2 10 9.1 9 8.2 6 5.5 6 5.5 0 0.0 2 1.8 
Other staff (by invitation) 35 31.8 74 67.3 33 30.0 38 34.5 37 33.6 47 42.7 6 5.5 18 16.4 
Student GB member 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 30 27.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 2.7 
Totals 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 
Presents: Response 
Strategic/ 
corporate 
planning % 
Major 
financial 
matters % 
Major 
academic 
developments % 
Student 
matters % 
Major 
support 
service 
developments % 
Risk 
management/ 
audit % 
Corporate 
governance 
systems % 
Summary 
reports of 
committee 
meetings % 
No response 9 8.2 11 10.0 11 10.0 11 10.0 13 11.8 11 10.0 9 8.2 26 23.6 
Chair 2 1.8 1 0.9 1 0.9 1 0.9 1 0.9 1 0.9 8 7.3 5 4.5 
Head of institution 72 65.5 13 11.8 76 69.1 17 15.5 36 32.7 11 10.0 4 3.6 5 4.5 
Secretary 7 6.4 5 4.5 1 0.9 13 11.8 28 25.5 27 24.5 82 74.5 31 28.2 
Other non-exec GB member 1 0.9 20 18.2 2 1.8 2 1.8 1 0.9 29 26.4 3 2.7 30 27.3 
Other executive GB member 4 3.6 7 6.4 8 7.3 9 8.2 5 4.5 5 4.5 0 0.0 2 1.8 
Other staff (by invitation) 15 13.6 53 48.2 11 10.0 23 20.9 26 23.6 25 22.7 3 2.7 6 5.5 
Student GB member 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 34 30.9 0 0.0 1 0.9 1 0.9 5 4.5 
Totals 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 
Figure 7 (Page 114)

How often have you been required to provide the following types of advice to the governing body, in your role

as secretary, in the last 3 years?

1
9
3
 
Response 
1 
Legal % 
2 
Constitutional % 
3 
Procedural % 
4 
Ethical % 
No reply 
Every meeting 
Twice a year, on average 
Once a year, on average 
Never 
Advice provided by another member of 
staff or external advisor 
11 
9 
27 
34 
7 
22 
10.0 
8.2 
24.5 
30.9 
6.4 
20.0 
11 
19 
49 
29 
1 
1 
10.0 
17.3 
44.5 
26.4 
0.9 
0.9 
12 
22 
38 
35 
2 
1 
10.9 
20.0 
34.5 
31.8 
1.8 
0.9 
11 
1 
14 
52 
31 
1 
10.0 
0.9 
12.7 
47.3 
28.2 
0.9 
Total 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 
Advice types: 
1. Legal advice to support decisions concerning institutional business 
2. Constitutional advice (including institutional governance arrangements) 
3. Procedural advice (eg on meetings procedure or related matters such as the powers of the governing body) 
4. Ethical advice (to ensure that high standards of governance are maintained by governing body members) 
1
9
4
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Figure 8 (Page 127)

On average, how many hours per month do you have contact on governing body business, including agenda preparation,

with the following?

Elected 
Head of Treasurer or Non-exec staff Student 
Hours per month Chair % Institution % Vice Chair % equivalent % members % members % members % 
No response 15 13.6 15 13.6 47 42.7 45 40.9 24 21.8 26 23.6 24 21.8 
<1 2 1.8 3 2.7 25 22.7 14 12.7 20 18.2 41 37.3 34 30.9 
1 15 13.6 15 13.6 14 12.7 12 10.9 20 18.2 18 16.4 27 24.5 
2 24 21.8 16 14.5 9 8.2 17 15.5 19 17.3 15 13.6 12 10.9 
3 13 11.8 13 11.8 3 2.7 9 8.2 8 7.3 4 3.6 9 8.2 
4 14 12.7 8 7.3 3 2.7 2 1.8 10 9.1 3 2.7 1 0.9 
5 6 5.5 10 9.1 1 0.9 5 4.5 4 3.6 1 0.9 1 0.9 
6 1 0.9 4 3.6 2 1.8 1 0.9 3 2.7 2 1.8 1 0.9 
7 0 0.0 1 0.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
8 4 3.6 3 2.7 1 0.9 1 0.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.9 
9 1 0.9 1 0.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
10 3 2.7 9 8.2 1 0.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
>10 12 10.9 12 10.9 4 3.6 4 3.6 2 1.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Total 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 
1
9
5
 
Figure 9 (Page 130) 
Survey Question 20 
On average, how many days per year would you expect the following to devote to the work of the governing body? 
Days per year Chair % 
Head of 
Institution % Vice Chair % Treasurer % Secretary % 
Non-exec 
members % 
No response 19 17.3 21 19.1 38 34.5 43 39.1 20 18.2 16 14.5 
<5 0 0.0 1 0.9 9 8.2 6 5.5 0 0.0 13 11.8 
6 to 10 17 15.5 12 10.9 19 17.3 13 11.8 1 0.9 34 30.9 
11 to 15 14 12.7 19 17.3 16 14.5 17 15.5 6 5.5 26 23.6 
16-20 15 13.6 16 14.5 8 7.3 7 6.4 3 2.7 10 9.1 
21-25 12 10.9 6 5.5 5 4.5 2 1.8 5 4.5 6 5.5 
26-30 11 10.0 9 8.2 8 7.3 7 6.4 8 7.3 2 1.8 
31-35 3 2.7 10 9.1 1 0.9 5 4.5 7 6.4 2 1.8 
36-40 5 4.5 3 2.7 2 1.8 4 3.6 10 9.1 0 0.0 
41-45 0 0.0 1 0.9 0 0.0 2 1.8 4 3.6 0 0.0 
46-50 5 4.5 4 3.6 2 1.8 0 0.0 11 10.0 1 0.9 
>50 9 8.2 8 7.3 2 1.8 4 3.6 35 31.8 0 0.0 
Total 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 
Figure 10 (Page 136)

Mean influence ratings for each cluster by key player, as perceived by the survey respondents

Governance Secretary 
Factor 1 SD 2 SD 3 SD 
Communications 4.19 0.86 3.90 0.89 4.25 0.90 
Selection 3.26 0.89 3.06 0.86 3.15 0.92 
Induction 4.02 0.81 4.03 0.80 4.13 1.08 
Planning 4.29 0.89 4.21 0.69 4.46 0.91 
Debate 2.83 1.01 3.07 1.12 3.20 1.00 
Decisions 3.52 0.86 3.36 0.80 3.36 1.12 
Relationship 3.74 0.91 3.32 0.72 3.63 0.87 
Motivation 3.20 0.81 2.78 0.72 3.17 1.06 
Effectiveness 3.40 0.73 3.31 0.74 3.56 0.91 
Management 4.00 0.94 4.00 0.66 4.20 0.94 
Governance Chair 
Factor 1 SD 2 SD 3 SD 
Communications 3.58 1.08 3.71 0.91 3.89 1.15 
Selection 4.27 0.90 4.21 0.69 4.32 1.02 
Induction 2.90 1.06 2.89 0.87 3.29 0.97 
Planning 3.39 1.14 3.24 1.04 3.66 0.77 
Debate 4.24 0.89 4.34 0.80 4.56 0.97 
Decisions 4.22 0.99 4.21 0.86 4.37 0.98 
Relationship 3.32 1.01 3.11 0.94 3.50 1.02 
Motivation 3.66 1.02 3.56 0.95 4.04 0.85 
Effectiveness 3.95 0.92 4.15 0.85 4.19 0.93 
Management 3.61 0.92 3.70 0.87 3.80 0.85 
Governance Head of Institution 
Factor 1 SD 2 SD 3 SD 
Communications 4.20 1.05 4.16 0.83 4.00 1.05 
Selection 3.88 0.98 3.92 0.77 3.66 0.84 
Induction 2.95 1.30 3.02 0.78 3.23 0.80 
Planning 3.39 0.95 3.42 1.17 3.40 0.91 
Debate 4.15 0.85 4.34 0.76 4.21 0.94 
Decisions 3.93 0.91 3.90 0.80 3.89 0.92 
Relationship 4.15 0.85 3.93 1.08 3.97 1.02 
Motivation 3.07 1.08 3.05 0.93 3.08 0.81 
Effectiveness 3.75 0.93 3.89 0.91 3.77 1.07 
Management 3.63 1.03 3.62 1.20 3.58 1.00 
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Figure 11 (Page 145) 
Mean ratings, by secretaries, of their influence, and that of their Chair 
and Head of Institution, on aspects of their institution's governance 
Governance 
Factor Secretary SD Chair SD 
Head of 
Institution SD 
Communications 4.14 0.88 3.74 1.04 4.17 0.97 
Selection 3.15 0.91 4.28 0.85 3.80 0.91 
Induction 4.10 0.86 3.04 0.97 3.07 1.03 
Planning 4.33 0.85 3.44 1.01 3.40 0.98 
Debate 3.01 1.05 4.40 0.87 4.20 0.86 
Decisions 3.41 0.91 4.32 0.93 3.92 0.86 
Relationship 3.60 0.92 3.35 1.01 4.04 0.94 
Motivation 3.10 0.88 3.78 0.97 3.07 0.95 
Effectiveness 3.41 0.79 4.06 0.90 3.79 0.95 
Management 4.07 0.84 3.72 0.91 3.63 1.06 
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Figures 12 (Page 151), 13 (Page 154) and 14 (Page 156) 
Mean ratings of influence by: 
The Secretary 
Governance 
Factor 
Interviewed 
Secretaries SD 
Surveyed (All) 
Secretaries SD Chair SD 
Head of 
Institution SD 
Communications 4.75 0.50 4.14 0.88 4.25 0.96 3.75 0.96 
Selection 3.25 0.50 3.15 0.91 4.25 0.50 3.25 0.96 
Induction 4.25 0.50 4.10 0.86 3.25 0.50 3.25 0.96 
Planning 4.75 0.50 4.33 0.85 4.25 0.50 3.25 0.50 
Debate 3.50 1.00 3.01 1.05 4.75 0.50 4.25 0.50 
Decisions 3.75 0.50 3.41 0.91 4.75 0.50 3.75 0.96 
Relationship 3.75 1.26 3.60 0.92 4.00 0.82 4.00 1.41 
Motivation 3.00 0.00 3.10 0.88 4.25 0.50 2.75 1.26 
Effectiveness 3.75 0.50 3.41 0.79 4.50 0.58 3.00 1.41 
Management 4.25 0.50 4.07 0.84 3.50 0.58 3.25 1.71 
The Chair 
Governance 
Factor 
Interviewed 
Secretaries SD 
Surveyed (All) 
Secretaries SD Chair SD 
Head of 
Institution SD 
Communications 4.50 1.00 3.74 1.04 3.75 0.50 4.00 0.82 
Selection 3.50 1.00 4.28 0.85 3.75 0.96 4.00 1.15 
Induction 4.25 0.50 3.04 0.97 3.00 0.82 3.25 0.96 
Planning 4.25 0.96 3.44 1.01 4.00 0.82 3.00 0.82 
Debate 3.50 1.29 4.40 0.87 4.50 1.00 4.00 0.00 
Decisions 4.00 1.41 4.32 0.93 4.50 0.58 4.50 0.58 
Relationship 3.75 0.96 3.35 1.01 3.50 1.29 4.00 1.15 
Motivation 4.00 0.82 3.78 0.97 3.75 0.96 3.75 0.50 
Effectiveness 4.25 0.96 4.06 0.90 4.00 0.82 4.00 0.82 
Management 4.50 1.00 3.72 0.91 4.00 0.82 4.25 0.50 
The Head of Institution 
Governance 
Factor 
Interviewed 
Secretaries SD 
Surveyed (All) 
Secretaries SD Chair SD 
Head of 
Institution SD 
Communications 4.50 0.58 4.17 0.97 4.00 1.15 4.25 0.50 
Selection 3.00 1.41 3.80 0.91 4.25 0.96 3.75 0.50 
Induction 4.50 0.58 3.07 1.03 3.75 0.96 3.75 0.96 
Planning 3.75 0.50 3.40 0.98 4.00 1.15 3.50 0.58 
Debate 2.25 1.26 4.20 0.86 4.25 0.50 4.00 0.82 
Decisions 4.00 0.82 3.92 0.86 5.00 0.00 3.75 0.50 
Relationship 3.00 0.82 4.04 0.94 4.25 0.96 3.50 1.29 
Motivation 3.25 1.71 3.07 0.95 3.75 0.96 3.25 0.50 
Effectiveness 3.75 1.26 3.79 0.95 4.50 0.58 4.00 0.00 
Management 4.50 0.58 3.63 1.06 4.25 0.50 4.00 0.82 
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Chapter 6 
Figure 15 (Page161)

All Secretaries Group

How would you rate the understanding of your role and responsibilities as secretary of the governing body by?

(1= poor understanding; 5 = good understanding)

Rating Chair % 
Head of 
Institution % 
Non-exec 
Governors % 
Staff 
Governors % 
Student 
Governors % 
Other 
staff in HEI % 
Other 
stdts in HEI % 
No response 11 10.0 10 9.1 10 9.1 10 9.1 10 9.1 12 10.9 13 11.8 
1 0 0.0 2 1.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.9 6 5.5 59 53.6 
2 2 1.8 2 1.8 3 2.7 7 6.4 13 11.8 38 34.5 28 25.5 
3 9 8.2 14 12.7 22 20.0 24 21.8 41 37.3 31 28.2 9 8.2 
4 26 23.6 18 16.4 43 39.1 46 41.8 29 26.4 16 14.5 0 0.0 
5 62 56.4 64 58.2 32 29.1 23 20.9 16 14.5 7 6.4 1 0.9 
Total 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 110 100.0 
Mean ratings by: 
Interviewed 
Understanding of Interviewed Interviewed Heads of Survey of all 
the secretary's role by: Secretaries SD Chairs SD Institutions SD Secretaries SD 
Chair 4.14 0.69 4.86 0.38 4.86 0.38 4.49 0.75 
Head of Institution 4.14 0.69 4.86 0.38 5.00 0.00 4.40 0.94 
Non-Exec Governors 3.71 0.95 4.14 0.69 3.86 0.69 4.04 0.82 
Staff Governors 3.43 0.98 3.71 0.49 3.57 0.53 3.85 0.86 
Student Governors 3.57 0.79 3.14 0.90 2.57 0.53 3.46 0.95 
Other staff 3.00 1.41 2.71 0.95 2.00 0.82 2.80 1.03 
Other students 1.43 0.79 1.43 0.53 1.14 0.38 1.52 0.75 
APPENDIX 6: STATEMENT ON PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT
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Introduction 
As a chartered secretary, I am used to the concept of being a reflective practitioner and 
of the need to ensure that my practice is continually developed. I have undertaken 
other forms of management development in higher education, but, on occasion, found 
that these activities lacked rigour in the investigation of previous research, analysis and 
debate. I saw the DBA programme as a way of providing a deeper understanding of 
the issues I was addressing in the practice of higher education management so that I 
would be able to bring a more informed perspective to my work. Whilst I could have 
attempted to take this approach independently, the structure of the DBA programme 
provided a focus to develop my style of working. It also provided ‘thinking time’ away 
from the workplace, in which to reflect on what I was learning and the ways in which 
my institution could gain from practice elsewhere. 
The programme was structured around three key areas: 
•	 The residential periods, that provided a formal series of presentations but also the 
opportunity for informal interaction with other DBA participants; 
•	 The DBA Phase 1 assignments and; 
•	 The thesis 
The Residential Periods 
The residential periods largely took place in Phase 1 of the DBA programme. A 
number of presentations were made by leading figures in the (mostly UK) higher 
education system. These provided a helpful overview of the way in which policy 
developments had taken place, and the roles of the organisations they represented. 
There were times when the discussions that ensued were equally useful, in that the 
speakers often wanted to hear the views from participants from other systems (of 
which this cohort of the DBA had a good cross section) and fresh, and often 
challenging, insights into the issue being discussed would then arise. 
The formal series of lectures helped provide a route into the literature on higher 
education, to which I had not been exposed to any great extent. It was illuminating to 
see the range of academic work on the purpose, structure and development of higher 
education, both in the UK and elsewhere. It was also telling, however, that much 
debate centred on a number of recurring themes, such as structural issues, shared 
governance, or simple typologies of institutions, and that the results did not always 
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relate well to the reality of working in a contemporary higher education institution. 
Somewhere between the practical focus of management development programmes 
and the academic focus of much of this research, there appeared to be room for DBA 
participants to open up an approach that was, at once, academically orientated and 
applicable in practice. 
The lectures provided by members of the School of Management proved to be 
particularly helpful in this respect. This was possibly because of my background as a 
higher education manager, but also, perhaps, because I could see ways in which the 
methods used by these researchers could cross over into the research that I wished to 
undertake. They provided, for example, a lead into material on research methods that 
were new to me, and methods of presenting data that I have since found helpful. 
Informal contacts with other DBA participants provided a learning environment that was 
rich with experience of different institutional and system cultures and styles, and helped 
me develop new ways in which to consider the context of the UK in the globalisation of 
higher education. When I read the Times Higher Education Supplement, for example, I 
no longer skip over the international pages, because I now know that there may be 
useful information arising from developments in other HE systems. 
The assignments 
Four assignments were required for Phase 1 of the DBA programme: 
DBA Phase 1 Units Assignments From which: 
Strategic organisational 
change in higher 
education 
The Higgs Report: an analysis of its 
impact on UK Higher Education 
Colleges 
Used as the basis of a 
presentation made to the 
SCOP Governance 
Network 
Strategic issues in 
higher education 
development and 
management 
An Assessment of Undergraduate 
Agricultural Student Numbers in the 
UK 
Used in my institution’s 
work on the HEFCE 
Land-Based Studies 
Review 
University strategic planning in a 
developing country: Lessons from 
Amazonia 
-
Research Methods The Role, Power and Influence of 
the Secretary of the Higher 
Education Board: 
The Research Approach 
-
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My first and fourth assignments, the way in which they helped develop thinking for my 
later research and the way in which they impacted on governance practice in my 
institution, are described in the later section on my thesis. 
The second assignment was borne out of concerns in my institution about the reporting 
of student numbers in our specialist subject base, resulting from difficulties in the rural 
sector in 2001. The study indicated that agricultural student numbers were being 
considerably over reported in official data and that this area could be regarded as one 
of what were later called ‘strategically important and vulnerable subjects’ (SIVS). This 
conclusion came about at the time when the concept of SIVS was just being developed 
and had yet to be more widely known through initiatives on, amongst others, basic 
sciences and modern languages. Whilst agriculture was not immediately addressed, a 
review of Land-Based Studies has since been conducted by HEFCE and the report of 
the review group has recently been published. The findings of the assignment fed 
directly into my institution’s strategic planning and contributed to our thinking about 
how to address the review, which is of considerable significance to my institution. The 
assignment therefore had a direct impact on my working practice. 
The third assignment looked at strategic planning in a federal teaching institution in 
north eastern Brazil. I had been engaged in DFID-funded consultancy work to 
introduce the concept of strategic planning to the institution. This work, and other 
aspects of the project, formed the platform from which the institution became a Federal 
University in 2004. The assignment looked at the way in which international 
consultants can impact upon higher education institutions in developing countries, as 
well as the methods adopted for the consultancy project. The assignment helped with 
the ‘closure’ of my work on the Brazilian project, but also allowed me to reflect on the 
experience of working with an institution that was trying to change to a new status on 
which its future depended, but for which it was poorly prepared and resourced and in 
which there were a number of managerial difficulties. The assignment also helped me 
reflect on the planning processes used in my own institution, for which I am 
responsible, and helped me develop a more participative style for this aspect of my 
work. 
The thesis 
The study of the role and influence of the secretary in relation to higher education 
governing bodies has had an important influence upon my working practice. Earlier 
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DBA assignment work on the impact of the Higgs Review on higher education colleges 
led to an interest in the potential ‘codification’ of the sector’s governance and the way 
in which this could feed through to the secretary’s role (Llewellyn, 2003). The Lambert 
Report, released later in the same year (Lambert, 2003), heralded a new code of 
governance practice for the sector that took shape in the form of Committee of 
University Chairmen guidance towards the end of 2004. A similar shift has since 
been reported in US higher education through ‘voluntary efforts of governing boards to 
conform to the model presented by Sarbanes­Oxley’ (Gee, 2006, p.24), whilst in 
Australia, financial incentives have been offered to institutions to comply with National 
Governance Protocols, leading to their near universal adoption (Baird, 2006; Walters, 
2006). My work on Higgs was presented to the SCOP Governance Network in May 
2004, enabling contacts to be established with the team which was undertaking the 
CUC review. 
Whilst investigating this earlier work it became clear that there was a considerable 
literature in the field of governance, on topics such as board effectiveness and 
board/executive relationships, that had not received a great deal of attention within the 
higher education sector. My reading on ‘people factors’ in governing, and their impact 
on governance performance, together with helpful insights from DBA colleagues, led to 
a small project where my governing body undertook an ‘in-meeting’ review of 
governance processes over the course of the 2004/05 academic year. The project 
involved the completion of a questionnaire by 3 members of the governing body during 
its meetings, where the focus was on the presentation of written and oral material to 
the governing body, the way in which meetings were managed and the contributions of 
governing body members. The purpose was to build upon earlier governance 
effectiveness reviews which had followed the traditional format of a set of structure-
based questions, and which were not really adding new information on what made for 
effective governing. The project was highlighted as one of the innovative practices in 
the CUC report released in late 2004, and led to a number of UK and US universities 
enquiring about the questionnaire and considering whether to use a similar method 
when reviewing their institutional governance. 
As a result of my interest in the sector’s governance, and as a representative of SCOP 
(now GuildHE), I was invited to join the Leadership Foundation’s (LFHE) Governor 
Development Programme Reference Group, in late 2004. This is an advisory body that 
helps set the shape of development activities for UK higher education governors. At 
the same time, I was successful in an application to the LFHE research programme for 
a grant to help support the work undertaken for this thesis. This, in turn, allowed me to 
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attend the US Association of Governing Boards (AGB) Board Professional Staff 
Workshop in April 2005, an event that I also attended in 2006 and 2007. The 
opportunity to meet with overseas governing body secretaries has proved extremely 
helpful in enabling issues of practice to be explored, and the differences in our 
approaches discussed. 
It was evident from these sessions that whilst the structure of the US higher education 
system was far more diverse than our own, there were common interests in the 
management of governing relationships and, in particular, the balancing role of the 
secretary with those of the chair and head of institution. At the 2006 event, I was able 
to chair a small networking session to explore the relationships, and differences, 
between the results of the AGB national board professional staff survey conducted in 
2004 and the survey material from my research. I ran a similar networking session at 
the 2007 Workshop. My link with the AGB has continued and I have been able, from 
time to time, to share examples of UK governance practice with its Zwingle Library and 
Resource Center, or other US HEIs. One recent example was a 360º appraisal 
instrument for chairs of HE governing bodies on which I had been asked to comment 
by the UK consultant conducting this work. 
In early 2005 I was asked to be part of a team of consultants that produced guidance, 
on behalf of the SCOP Governance Network, on the induction of new governors in 
higher education (Schofield, Fielden, Miller, Slater and Llewellyn, 2006). I have also 
presented the early findings of my research, and related material on higher education 
boardroom practice from the UK and US, at four LFHE events, two for governors in 
small higher education institutions (2005 and 2007), one for an institutional governor 
development programme (2006) and one for a national meeting of governing body 
secretaries (2007). I have recently joined an LFHE Working Group that has developed 
an induction guide for new secretaries of HE governing bodies. 
All of these activities have informed the governing practice of my own institution, and 
have led to a culture of continuous improvement amongst governors, not only in terms 
of the structures and processes that we adopt, but also in the quality of information 
used by governors and the way in which the governing body is seen to be part of the 
organisation, rather than a separate entity. The results of this work have been fruitful. 
An audit by HEFCE in February 2006 led to a ‘high assurance’ rating for institutional 
governance. A review by the Quality Assurance Agency of the University College’s 
application for research degree awarding powers, conducted over the 2005/06 
academic year, and which included attendance at governing body meetings, also 
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concluded that the institution’s governance systems and relationships were effective. 
These results were important for the University College in the light of the new 
accountability framework for higher education institutions (HEFCE, 2006) and the 
strategic positioning of the institution within the sector. 
I attended the OECD seminar on the Roles and Responsibilities of Institutional 
Governing Bodies in August 2006, at which I was able to discuss the early findings of 
my research with a range of international representatives. There appears to be 
considerable, and ongoing, interest in the issue of governing relationships, and 
governing body effectiveness. A recent OECD circular, reporting on the August 
seminar, concluded that governance was very much on the agenda, and that there 
were a number of common issues impacting upon it. One of these was, ‘The 
importance of the relationships between the governing bodies, senior management and 
the academic bodies within the institution’ (OECD, 2006, p.2). My research has sought 
to shed light on this aspect of higher education governance. 
These practice-based activities have been informed by further reading around 
governance and related subjects, guided by my supervisor, Dr Annie Pye. Our 
discussions provided valuable insights into previous research and theoretical 
perspectives that would not be available to most governance practitioners. There is a 
need for a greater understanding of the forces at play in the practice of HE governing 
and plenty of room for further research. Collaboration between academics working in 
this field and HE governing body secretaries could, therefore, be beneficial for both 
sides, and worthy of further investigation. 
Conclusion 
I believe that participation in the DBA programme has helped me both professionally 
and personally. It has contributed to my institution’s work in a variety of ways, from 
arguing the case for specialist subject status to strategic planning and to identifying 
ways in which to improve institutional governance. It has also made me consider the 
research base available to those working in higher education much more than I would 
have done in the past. From a personal perspective, it is unlikely that I would have 
been involved in sector-wide developments in governance without having taken part in 
the DBA programme, and this has, in turn, contributed greatly to the way in which this 
aspect of my work has been managed, and developed, for the benefit of my institution. 
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